

**29 April 2013 – 12 May 2013**

**A2 GCE HISTORY B**

**F985/01** Historical Controversies – British History

Candidates answer on the Answer Booklet.

**OCR supplied materials:**

- 16 page Answer Booklet  
(sent with general stationery)

**Other materials required:**

None

**Duration: 3 hours**



**INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES**

- Write your name, centre number and candidate number in the spaces provided on the Answer Booklet. Please write clearly and in capital letters.
- Use black ink.
- Answer **both sub-questions** from **one** Study Topic.
- Read each question carefully. Make sure you know what you have to do before starting your answer.
- Do **not** write in the bar codes.

**INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES**

- The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question.
- The total number of marks for this paper is **60**.
- This paper contains questions on the following 4 Study Topics:
  - The Debate over the Impact of the Norman Conquest, 1066–1216 (page 2)
  - The Debate over Britain's 17th Century Crises, 1629–89 (page 3)
  - Different Interpretations of British Imperialism c.1850–c.1950 (page 4)
  - The Debate over British Appeasement in the 1930s (page 6–7)
- You should write in continuous prose and are reminded of the need for clear and accurate writing, including structure of argument, grammar, punctuation and spelling.
- The time permitted allows for reading the Extract in the one Study Topic you have studied.
- In answering these questions, you are expected to use your knowledge of the topic to help you understand and interpret the Extract as well as to inform your answers.
- **You may refer to your class notes and textbooks during the examination.**
- This document consists of **8** pages. Any blank pages are indicated.

## 1 The Debate over the Impact of the Norman Conquest, 1066–1216

*Read the following extract about the impact of the Norman Conquest and then answer the questions that follow.*

The feudal structures in England after the Conquest were not imported intact from Normandy. Nor did the structures have any general parallel in England before 1066. England was an ‘old’ country with diverse forms of lordship and land tenure. There certainly were tenants holding land in forms comparable with those found after the Conquest (for example, some of the leaseholders of the bishop of Worcester). Lords also tried to assert lordship over family land, much as they did in Normandy. But Anglo-Saxon wills and charters, together with Domesday Book which throws much light on conditions before the Conquest, suggest there was still a great deal of land held from no one at all. The circumstances of the Conquest meant a complete new start, bringing all secular lands into the hands of the king.

Of course, a new form of tenurial hierarchy is still perfectly compatible with kings and lords before 1066 having enjoyed in some respects equivalent powers. When it came to the raising of armies, the contrast between the two systems certainly seems of little significance. In other ways, too, kings and lords before 1066 exercised powers comparable with those of their post-Conquest successors. Land was forfeited for breach of faith. Both king and lords had large numbers of followers in their special allegiance, and on the death of such men they could demand a ‘heriot’ from their families, a death duty rather than the later feudal payment to inherit, but probably just as valuable.

Yet despite these similarities, the change brought by the Conquest was still momentous. The fact was that kings and lords before 1066 wielded much less power over their men than their post-Conquest successors. They lacked the same ability to manipulate the descent of land and take possession of it when heirs were under-age. The king’s exploitation of his new feudal rights was absolutely central to the working of politics and society in the century and a half after the Conquest. It could be a major cause of friction between the king and his barons as the concessions in the early clauses of both the Coronation Charter of 1100 and Magna Carta in 1215 show.

Associated with the introduction of feudalism were wider changes in the structure of the family. England saw the transition from the extended to the linear family. The Normans shut the door on the wider kin, and created a greater expectation that the key properties, including the principal castle, would go to the eldest son. It is difficult to generalize about how these changes in lordship and family structure affected the position of noblewomen. Anglo-Saxon wills show widows and daughters receiving property, and widows also disposing of it as they wished. In a case in the Herefordshire county court a woman actually announced that she would grant nothing to her son. Yet after the Conquest, too, women could hold property. The Coronation Charter of Henry I in 1100 laid down that widows were to receive the land assigned by the husband for his wife’s support after his death. If all this suggests that women, before and after 1066, enjoyed independent power as landholders, the impression may be misleading. In the Herefordshire case, the woman is not named and the whole transaction was probably masterminded by its chief beneficiary, the great thegn Thurkill the White. After the Conquest, when widows alienated land, they usually did so with the consent of their heirs. The Conquest did, however, bring changes especially when it came to the control exercised by kings and lords over marriage. After 1066 the new tenurial rights of lordship gave the king and lords tighter controls in this area. Henry I did not keep his promise not to force widows of tenants-in-chief to marry. He did not relinquish the right to find husbands for the heiresses of deceased tenants-in-chief.

- (a) What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation, approaches and methods of the historian? Refer to the extract and your knowledge to explain your answer. **[30]**
- (b) Some historians have studied the impact of the Norman Conquest by focusing on local studies. Explain how this approach has contributed to our understanding of the impact of the Norman Conquest. Has this approach any disadvantages or shortcomings? **[30]**

## 2 The Debate over Britain's 17th Century Crises, 1629–89

Read the following extract about Britain's 17th century crises and then answer the questions that follow.

Early modern England was a personal monarchy. In such a system the personal weaknesses of the monarch could cause the collapse of order. England had a civil war in the 1640s just when the danger had appeared to recede. The stability of early Stuart England made civil war unlikely; it was the instability of early modern Britain that first made the war of 1642 possible. It was the strength of Tudor England which allowed it to extend its claims to sovereign power in Ireland, and it was dynastic chance that created the union of the Crowns of England and Scotland in 1603 that set up that problem. Multiple kingship led to tension and jealousies within political elites and created a knock-on effect between the events of the three kingdoms. England, Ireland and Scotland all experienced authoritarian government in the 1630s and the rebellions in Scotland, Ireland and England reflect varying responses to a shared problem – the incompetence and authoritarianism of Charles I. His attempt to ram major reforms of the Scottish Church down the throats of the Scottish people was breathtakingly inept.

At one level, given the scale of Charles' assault on cherished political liberties and religious values, it is surprising that he secured as much support as he did in the 1640s. On the other hand, it took some spectacular miscalculation on his part to create the circumstances in which resistance became feasible. England lacked a focal point around which resistance could gather; a Pretender or a militarized nobility.

In 1640 there was an ideological crisis as well as a functional one. There were three quite distinct perceptions of misgovernment – localist, the legal-constitutionalist, and the religious. The localist perception of misgovernment need not detain us. Localism has much to teach us about the nature of the civil war, but little to tell us about why civil war broke out. The legal-constitutionalist perception of misgovernment was one of a limited tyranny, and it led to an unhurried and largely uncontroversial programme of legislation by the Long Parliament. However, I believe that it is almost impossible to over-estimate the damage caused by the Laudians. I see no reason to doubt that most of the 'hotter sort of protestants' were integrated into the Jacobean church and state. Puritan magistrates and ministers can be found working for an evangelical drive to instruct the ignorant and impose godly discipline. They saw Charles I abdicating his responsibility under God to promote true religion. They saw him as a negligent king who was oblivious to the threat of popery at home, abroad, and within the church of which he was supreme governor.

The religious perception of misgovernment differed from the localist and the legal-constitutionalist perception in its intensity. It spilled over into everything in the early weeks of the Long Parliament. It saturates the language of the petitions to Parliament. Talk of 'popery' was not just background noise. This has been the error made by many historians of the English Revolution. It falsifies the passionate belief that England was being subjected to the forces of Antichrist and the prospects were anarchy. In 1641 during a debate about the abolition of church music an MP said, 'The year 666 that was designated for the coming of the Antichrist, bishop of Rome, brought to the church singing and the use of organs.' Have we been so confused in seeking parallels between the British Crisis of the 1640s and the wave of rebellions on the continent, or between the English Revolution and the events of the French and Russian Revolutions, that we have missed the obvious point? The English civil war was not the first European revolution; it was the last of the Wars of Religion.

- (a) What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation, approaches and methods of the historian? Refer to the extract and your knowledge to explain your answer. **[30]**
- (b) In their work on Britain's seventeenth-century crises some historians have focused on the changing fortunes of the gentry. Explain how this approach has contributed to our understanding of Britain's seventeenth-century crises. Has this approach any disadvantages or shortcomings? **[30]**

### 3 Different Interpretations of British Imperialism c.1850–c.1950

*Read the following extract about British imperialism and then answer the questions that follow.*

What was the British Empire really like from the point of view of the rulers, the administrators who made it possible? As one historian has said, the task is ‘to recover the ‘world-view’ of social assumptions of those who dominated and ruled the empire’. This does not mean that the ‘victims and critics’ were unimportant, but it does mean that any understanding of the empire should start with trying to capture the mentality of those who bore responsibility for an empire which was the largest the world has seen.

The empire was not simply a forerunner of the modern pluralist democracy, so valued in the West. It was something entirely different. It is simply misleading to describe the British Empire, as one historian has done, as the champion of ‘free-market liberalism’ and democracy. Such a judgement pays too little attention to what the empire was really like, or to the ideas that motivated the people who actually administered it. Notions of democracy could not have been further from the minds of the imperial administrators themselves. Their heads were filled with ideas of class, of intellectual superiority and of paternalism. Perhaps the key to understanding the British Empire is the idea of natural hierarchy. Class and status were absolutely integral to the empire and notions of class were important in forming alliances with local elites, the chiefs, the petty kings and maharajas who crowded the colonial empire. The dominance of ideas of class and status made it easy for the British to establish local chiefs as hereditary rulers. In Kashmir, a Hindu family were established as rulers over an overwhelmingly Muslim kingdom. The Dogras ruled Kashmir for a hundred years.

The so-called natural leaders, the maharajas, the sultans and nawabs, were flattered and cultivated. Individual rulers were set up in the Middle East, in India and in Africa. The irony of this generally pro-monarchical policy was that it was not consistent. A centuries-old monarchy in Burma was torn down by an abrupt change of policy, while monarchies were set up in Kashmir and Iraq which had no real tradition of independent monarchy. Behind monarchy lay ideas of class, which made aristocracies and natural leaders a favourite theme of Colonial Office civil servants, and governors. Natural leaders were explicitly part of Lord Lugard’s policy of indirect rule, a policy which prevailed in large parts of the Indian subcontinent, where a third of the Indian Empire was formed by the princely states.

The power exercised by district commissioners in places like the Sudan, where young men in their mid-twenties would rule a land the size of Wales, as judges, lawgivers and policemen rolled into one, was immense. The arrogance of provincial governors in Sudan was legendary. This aspect of empire shows the extent to which there was a predisposition to strong individuals, leaders who, by sheer force of character, could impose their will on circumstances. This individualism was anarchic in that there was very often no policy coherence or strategic direction behind the imperial government as experienced in individual colonies. Often strong-minded officials and governors would reverse the policy of decades, thereby creating more confusion and instability.

The British Empire allowed individuals, the civil servants and imperial administrators who worked within it, a wide degree of freedom; the man on the spot was often, quite literally, the master of all he surveyed. A Kitchener in the Sudan, or a Lugard in Nigeria, for example, could rule like a benign dictator with very little supervision from Whitehall. The British Empire was an aristocratic empire, and it openly celebrated ‘rule by the best people’. British imperial rule must be understood on its own terms.

- (a) What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation, approaches and methods of the historian? Refer to the extract and your knowledge to explain your answer. **[30]**
- (b) In their work on British imperialism some historians have focused on decision-making in the metropole. Explain how this approach has contributed to our understanding of British imperialism. Has this approach any disadvantages or shortcomings? **[30]**

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#### 4 The Debate over British Appeasement in the 1930s

*Read the following extract about appeasement and then answer the questions that follow.*

Although today it is considered shameful and cowardly, the policy of appeasement once occupied almost the whole moral high ground. The word was originally synonymous with idealism, magnanimity of the victor and a willingness to right wrongs. Its greatest practitioner and most eloquent defender, the British Ambassador to Berlin from 1937 to 1939, Sir Nevile Henderson, described appeasement in his book, 'Water Under the Bridges', as 'the search for just solutions by negotiation in the light of higher reason instead of by resort to force'. It was further boosted by the feeling that, after the Great Depression, the world's economic problems could only be solved through international co-operation.

Sheer abhorrence of war, though undoubtedly the driving force behind the policy, was by no means its sole impetus. It is too simple to suggest that appeasement sprang, fully disarmed, out of the head of Britain's Great War experience. It is an extraordinary fact that, in common with other leading appeasers, Halifax had not himself actually seen any combat in the Great War, whereas such anti-appeasers as Churchill had.

Halifax almost personified the moral side of the policy of appeasement, and the opposition had no one to approach him for respectability or general spiritual rectitude. Typical is the letter which a vicar wrote to Butler after Eden's resignation in February 1938, which read, 'Nobody can say this is a defeat for idealism with Lord Halifax and you in the saddle now.' His defenders have claimed that the mild-mannered Halifax's Christianity left him somehow incapable of comprehending Hitler's special depravity and he was thus unable to appreciate the threat posed. This supposes that his career to date had simply been an extension of his privileged upbringing. In fact, Halifax had seen plenty of evil. His profound anti-Bolshevism kept him alive to the crimes of Lenin and Stalin. A leading civil servant at the Foreign Office said, 'Halifax did realize what sort of a monster Hitler was. Halifax would give a look of pained surprise at each enormity that Hitler committed, but he fully realized how enormous they were. Halifax's religious convictions played little or no part in his day-to-day politics'.

In domestic politics appeasement was a ruthless policy ruthlessly applied. Critics within the Conservative Party were harried mercilessly. The huge popularity the policy enjoyed with the electorate can partly be explained by the way it brought together so many different groups: anti-communists; League of Nations enthusiasts; imperialists who saw Germany as no threat to the Empire; ex-servicemen; pacifists; those who regretted the virulence of Great War anti-German propaganda; businessmen who demanded peace for trade; and the vast numbers of ordinary people to whom magnanimity in victory seemed only decent common sense. The novelist Anthony Powell observed that to be anti-French and pro-German in the 1920s was considered the height of progressive sophistication and cleverness. If everyone who professed himself an anti-appeaser in the 1950s actually had been one in the 1930s, the policy could not have lasted a day. Scapegoats were required to show it to have been the work of a small clique rather than the consensus view of both ruling parties for the best part of two decades. When Churchill warned of the German air menace in 1934, many MPs saw this as yet another of Churchill's hobby-horses, designed to embarrass the Government. In 1935 Halifax became Secretary of State for War. His decisive intervention was to challenge the Chiefs' of Staff assertion that Britain needed an increased pace of rearmament. At the end of the year, defence expenditure fell to £100 million, leaving naval manpower at its lowest for forty years. Halifax must bear a heavy part of the responsibility for this dangerous state of affairs. In 1933, the East Fulham by-election turned a Tory majority of 14,521 into a pro-disarmament Labour majority of 4,820. Three weeks after Halifax arrived at the War Office, the League of Nations announced the results of their Peace Ballot. These were interesting not for the huge majorities in favour of 'Peace' but for the fact that eleven and a half million people took part.

- (a) What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation, approaches and methods of the historian? Refer to the extract and your knowledge to explain your answer. **[30]**
- (b) In their work on British appeasement some historians have focused on Chamberlain's role. Explain how this approach has contributed to our understanding of appeasement. Has this approach any disadvantages or shortcomings? **[30]**

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