



**Tuesday 3 June 2014 – Morning**

**A2 GCE ECONOMICS**

**F585/01/SM** The Global Economy

**STIMULUS MATERIAL**

**Duration: 2 hours**



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## Introduction

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has a number of roles and responsibilities, including surveillance. In 2012 the IMF concluded its annual assessment of the UK economy which, whilst supporting the UK Government's policy of austerity, made policy recommendations which it thought were necessary to secure a sustained economic recovery in the UK. These policy recommendations focused on the need to ensure that fiscal austerity did not reduce aggregate demand and hold back economic growth. The IMF thought that the UK output gap needed to be closed and was concerned that fiscal tightening might have a long term impact on the productive potential of the economy. It recommended that the UK Government should consider policies of balanced budget fiscal expansion and a loosening of monetary policy. The UK Government responded to this assessment of its economic policy by saying that expansionary policies should not conflict with the objectives of reducing the budget deficit and national debt. Later in 2012 the IMF published research which suggested that fiscal multipliers in a number of countries were much higher than previously thought and estimated these to be in the range of 0.9 to 1.7.

In comparison to its lukewarm support of fiscal austerity in the UK, the IMF was full of praise for the results of fiscal austerity in Latvia. IMF support for Latvia had previously been conditional upon a substantial tightening of fiscal policy. Despite Latvia operating a fixed exchange rate against the euro, the IMF claimed that Latvia had been able to restore its international competitiveness through cutting wages and prices. Fiscal austerity had helped achieve this improved international competitiveness through large cuts in public sector wages and the deflationary consequences of fiscal tightening on the private sector. The consequence was that, even though Latvia's nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) had been broadly stable, its real effective exchange rate (REER), adjusted for changes in unit labour costs, had depreciated by around 20% since the end of 2007. Not all economists, however, agreed that such 'internal devaluation' was the best way for an economy such as Latvia's to deal with its external imbalances. These economists drew a comparison with Iceland which operated a floating exchange rate. Its exchange rate had depreciated by 50% since the end of 2007.

Nevertheless, the IMF was strong in its support of Latvia's intention to adopt the euro. It felt that this would bring benefits to the Latvian economy in both the short run and the long run.

The trend towards fiscal austerity raised fears that the global economy was heading towards recession. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) expressed a view that fiscal austerity in developed economies would put at risk the gains in economic development in the developing world through its impact on international trade. However, the experience of resource-rich economies in sub-Saharan Africa seemed to contradict this view. Commodity exports had grown strongly despite the downturn in economic growth in developed economies. Trade in commodities remained an important contributor to economic development for resource-rich economies in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite this, there were some concerns about the extent to which economic development in such economies could be promoted solely by a reliance on international trade.

## Pre-release stimulus material

**Extract 1:** IMF surveillance report on the UK economy

**Extract 2:** Fiscal austerity and the UK output gap

**Extract 3:** IMF praise for fiscal austerity in Latvia

**Extract 4:** Latvia and Iceland – internal devaluation versus exchange rate devaluation

**Extract 5:** Economic development in resource-rich economies in sub-Saharan Africa

## Extract 1

### IMF surveillance report on the UK economy

One of the IMF's main roles is 'surveillance'. This takes the form of an annual assessment of the economic situation in each member country. Officials from the IMF conduct a detailed analysis and then make forecasts of economic performance which are followed by in-depth discussions with a country's government and central bank. The IMF believes that such 'surveillance' encourages member countries to adopt sound economic policies.

The IMF's 2012 annual assessment of the UK made comments on the country's economic situation (Fig. 1.1). The IMF also made policy recommendations which it thought were necessary to secure a sustained recovery in the UK (Fig. 1.2).

**1. Current policies are aimed at assisting economic rebalancing and financial sector stability.**

Strong fiscal consolidation is under way and reducing the high structural deficit over the medium term remains essential. The UK has made substantial progress towards achieving a more sustainable budgetary position and reducing fiscal risks. Bold monetary stimulus has helped support the economy, as has the free operation of automatic fiscal stabilisers.

**2. But the economy has been flat.**

The rebalancing from public sector to private sector demand-led growth has not fully materialised. UK output remains more than four percentage points below its 2008 peak. Encouragingly, labour market performance has been better, with fewer employment losses than in the aftermath of previous major UK recessions. But unemployment at 8.2%, with a large number of young people without a job, is still much too high.

**3. The recovery is expected to gain pace, but much productive capacity could remain idle for an extended period.**

Despite the projected modest increase in growth in the second half of 2012, the UK output gap is projected to remain sizeable for an extended period, raising the risk of hysteresis as sustained cyclical weakness may reduce the economy's future productive capacity.

**4. Inflation is falling.**

Inflation has been on a downward trend since peaking in September 2011. This trend will continue as the large output gap exerts disinflationary pressure. Thus inflation is expected to decline below the two percent target over the next 18–24 months. This is dependent on an unchanged macroeconomic stance and an absence of a sustained increase in commodity prices.

**5. Risks are large and tilted clearly to the downside.**

Setbacks in the euro area are the key risk to economic prospects and financial stability in the UK as trade and financial links are substantial. Another risk is that the adverse impact of measures to reduce public and private sector debt may be even larger than expected and the anticipated rebalancing of demand is even slower to materialise. Commodity price volatility also remains a risk for both inflation and growth.

**Fig. 1.1 – Selected comments from the IMF on the economic situation in the UK**

**1. Policies to bolster demand should help close the output gap faster.**

It needs to be recognised that policy options in this regard come with risks, including uncertainty about their effectiveness. However, these risks need to be weighed against that of weak demand leading to long run slow growth, high unemployment and a negative impact on consumer and investor confidence.

**2. A more expansionary monetary policy is required via further quantitative easing and possibly cutting the interest rate.**

Weak nominal wage growth and broadly stable inflation expectations suggest underlying inflationary pressure is weak, providing space for a more expansionary monetary policy.

**3. A more expansionary fiscal policy should be considered if downside risks materialise and the recovery fails to take off.**

Balanced budget fiscal expansion should be pursued to increase growth. For example, cuts in spending on items such as public employee wages could be used to finance higher spending on items such as infrastructure.

**Fig. 1.2 – Selected IMF fiscal and monetary policy recommendations for the UK**

The IMF annual assessment of the UK's economic situation reignited debate about the effectiveness of the Coalition Government's Deficit Reduction Plan. There was a stark contrast between the statements of the Managing Director of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, and the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne.

*“Unfortunately the economic recovery in the UK has not yet taken hold and uncertainties abound. The stresses in the euro area affect the UK through many channels. Growth is too slow and unemployment... is too high. Policies to bolster demand before low growth becomes entrenched are needed.”*

Christine Lagarde

*“The IMF couldn't be clearer today. Britain has to deal with its debts and the Government's fiscal policy is the appropriate one and an essential part of our road to recovery. I welcome the IMF's continuing support for the UK Government's Deficit Reduction Plan.”*

George Osborne


## Extract 2

### Fiscal austerity and the UK output gap

The first official estimate of UK Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the second quarter of 2012 sharpened the focus on the UK's weak economic performance. Figures released by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) showed that GDP had declined by 0.7% between April and June. This represented the biggest quarterly fall in UK output since early 2009.

Predictably, some economists saw this as further evidence of a need for the UK Government to change the direction of economic policy away from austerity and towards the direct stimulation of economic growth. Others doubted the reliability of the estimates of GDP, pointing out that unemployment continued to fall, tax revenues were increasing and that business surveys showed rising rather than falling economic activity. They argued that the Government should not be distracted from its commitment to reduce the budget deficit and national debt. The head of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Angel Gurría, echoed the assessment of the IMF that measures to promote growth should concentrate on balanced budget fiscal expansion.

The extent of the UK's weak economic performance can be seen in Fig. 2.1. This compares the change in GDP from the start of the 2008 recession with the next most recent recession (1990–93) and what is considered to be the worst recession (1930–34).



**Fig. 2.1 – A comparison of the change in GDP in three UK recessions**

The case for more fiscal and monetary stimulus would be a strong one if the UK output gap was large. In all previous recessions, UK output had returned to its pre-recession level within 48 months of the start of the recession. This was clearly not the case with the recession which started in 2008. There was agreement that the UK's output gap in 2012 was negative. However, estimates of the size of the output gap varied from -2.5% of GDP (Office of Budget Responsibility) to -9% of GDP (Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge).

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## Extract 3

### IMF praise for fiscal austerity in Latvia

In December 2008 the IMF announced plans to lend €1.7 billion to Latvia to help to stabilise its economy. This financial assistance was supplemented by loans from the European Union (EU), the World Bank and several Nordic countries to provide a package totalling €7.5 billion. The assistance was part of an agreement to defend Latvia's currency peg to the euro (a fixed exchange rate) and the country's commitment to join the euro. The Latvian currency, the lat, had come under pressure as a result of a current account deficit on the balance of payments of almost 25% of GDP in 2007. This deficit was financed by increasing levels of private sector external debt. The credit and growth boom that followed Latvia's accession to the EU simply could not be sustained. Very high wage growth, far in excess of productivity growth, had severely undermined Latvia's international competitiveness and contributed to the economy's large external imbalances. Latvia was once the fastest growing economy in the EU. By the end of 2008 it was the worst-performing economy.

In exchange for financial assistance from the IMF and other lenders, Latvia agreed to a 'strong package of policy measures' including:

- large cuts in public sector wages
- substantial tightening of fiscal policy
- structural reforms to raise international competitiveness.

IMF staff visited Latvia in May 2012, as part of its surveillance role, in order to monitor the outcome of its programme of assistance and the policy measures adopted by the country. In a press release, the IMF concluded that:

*“The Latvian authorities have made good progress toward the programme's strategy of euro adoption. Impressive fiscal consolidation during the programme means the Maastricht fiscal criteria should be easily met. Joining the euro would be beneficial for the Latvian economy.”*

The IMF's assessment of the outcome of its programme of assistance and the policy measures adopted by Latvia were held up as examples of the success of fiscal austerity measures. Latvia had rejected devaluation of the exchange rate in place of a policy of 'internal devaluation' to restore international competitiveness. Latvia is one of four economies, known as the BELLS (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), which adopted and stuck to a fixed currency peg with the euro and have been regarded as success stories of fiscal austerity. The fiscal tightening in Latvia initially produced a loss of output of around 20% and an increase in unemployment from 6% to 18.4%. However, by 2011 the country's current account deficit had become a surplus and GDP growth, at 5.5%, was one of the highest in the Europe.

In a speech in Riga, Latvia's capital, in June 2012, Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the IMF, was full of praise for the country's policy of austerity. She praised the Latvian government's economic policy as a “success story” that “could serve as an inspiration for European leaders grappling with the euro crisis”. Fig. 3.1 gives extracts from her speech.



*It is a great pleasure to be here today in this beautiful city of Riga to celebrate the remarkable achievements of Latvia over the past few years.*

*Let me begin with the context. As you all know too well, Latvia has been tested severely over recent years. It lost a fifth of its output in just two years, 2008 and 2009. Unemployment rose to almost 20%, and double this rate among young people. Poverty increased and people from all walks of life endured great suffering.*

*And yet, while challenges remain today, you have pulled through. You have returned to strong growth and reduced unemployment, even if it remains far too high at around 16%. You have lowered budget deficits and kept government debt ratios to some of the lowest in the European Union. You have become more competitive in world markets through wage and price cuts. You have restored confidence and brought down interest rates through good macroeconomic policies.*

*How did you do it?*

*If we want to single out one factor for Latvia, it would be its impressive determination. This had a number of dimensions:*

- *instead of spreading the pain over many years, the country stood together and did what needed to be done up front. The achievement was incredibly impressive – in the first year of its programme, Latvia implemented fiscal adjustment of more than 8% of GDP. Total adjustment for the whole programme is even higher, at around 15% of GDP.*
- *Latvia also had a clear goal: euro adoption. This meant that everybody knew where they were going, and Latvia has stayed the course.*
- *to cushion the hardship, the government agreed to protect the poorest and most vulnerable people by strengthening the social safety net. So, even in an atmosphere of major budget cuts, Latvia expanded and improved unemployment assistance.*

*Speaking for the IMF, I am proud to have been part of Latvia's success story, alongside our European Commission and Nordic partners.*


**Fig. 3.1 – Selected quotes from a speech by Christine Lagarde**

## Extract 4

### Latvia and Iceland – internal devaluation versus exchange rate devaluation

Some economists are sceptical about the success of Latvia's internal devaluation in delivering a sustained economic recovery and correcting external imbalances.


Although Latvia's GDP has grown since 2010, it is not clear that such growth can be sustained. This is because of the sharp change in the composition of GDP growth which has resulted from internal devaluation. High levels of private sector indebtedness remain in Latvia and, as a result, growth in both investment and consumer expenditure remain weak (see Fig. 4.1). Fiscal tightening has limited the contribution of government expenditure to GDP growth. Latvia's economic growth is, therefore, very heavily dependent on growth in net trade. Whether Latvia can sustain economic growth solely from exports depends not only on the growth in world trade but also on Latvia's international competitiveness.




**Fig. 4.1 – Latvian investment and consumer expenditure (billion lats, constant 2000 prices)**

Internal devaluation puts downward pressure on nominal wages and prices and has been responsible for restoring some of Latvia's international competitiveness which was lost prior to 2007. However, most of the reduction in nominal wages occurred in the public sector and not in the private sector. In addition, for reductions in unit labour costs to be sustained, there needs to be improvements in productivity as well as a reduction in nominal wages. The improvement in Latvia's current account balance has been short lived. The surplus recorded in 2010 disappeared and by 2012 a deficit on the current account re-emerged.

Economists who are sceptical about the success of Latvia's internal devaluation in delivering a sustained economic recovery and correcting external imbalances draw a comparison with the experience of Iceland. Unlike Latvia, Iceland has a floating exchange rate. Iceland's nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) index depreciated by almost 50% after the end of 2007. In comparison, Latvia's NEER was broadly unchanged (see Fig. 4.2). Latvia was more dependent on a change in its real effective exchange rate (REER), which depreciated by around 20% measured in terms of unit labour costs. This compares to a 45% depreciation in Iceland's REER based on changes in unit labour costs. In addition, Iceland's fiscal tightening was not as aggressive as Latvia's. Fig. 4.3 shows the different outcomes from 2007 until 2012 in the two economies of the different approaches to the problem of external imbalances.



**Fig. 4.2 – Nominal Effective Exchange Rate Indices for Iceland and Latvia, 2007–11**



**Fig. 4.3 – A comparison of key economic indicators in Iceland and Latvia, 2007–12**

## Extract 5


### Economic development in resource-rich economies in sub-Saharan Africa

At the end of 2011 the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) warned that fiscal austerity policies being implemented by European countries were driving the global economy towards a recession. In a policy brief published in December 2011, UNCTAD stated that:

*“A fragile global economy has a significant interest in the implementation of expansionary, rather than contractionary, fiscal policies in key economies. Only the former can open a path towards lower fiscal deficits and falling public debt ratios. A ‘lost decade’ for the world economy would risk the development gains achieved during recent years.”*

This contrasted with an assessment by the IMF in April 2012 of the economic outlook in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). According to the IMF the fall in economic activity in Europe had not had a significant impact on growth in most of SSA. This was because most countries in SSA had diversified their exports to emerging markets and intra-regional trade had increased. In addition, around 80% of exports from SSA were commodities. Between 2005 and 2010 the region’s commodity exports had grown in total by 16.6%, but exports of commodities to Europe had only grown by 2.6%.

Exhaustible natural resources account for a large share of output and export earnings in many SSA countries. Fig. 5.1 shows the major natural resource exports in the region.



**Fig. 5.1 – Major natural resource exports in sub-Saharan Africa**

Rising world commodity prices, coupled with new resource discoveries, have stimulated growth in these economies during the past decade. Ensuring that these resources will lead to long-term economic development entails many policy challenges. Some of these challenges include the natural resource sector’s tax/licensing regime and the state’s role in the sector. Other policies will be needed to cope with declining government revenues as resources are depleted. Yet another set of policy concerns stem from the high volatility of resource prices. This volatility requires an appropriate framework for macroeconomic management because of the resulting large fluctuations in export revenues, budget receipts, and, in some cases, foreign direct investment (FDI).

Countries which export natural resources experienced faster economic growth than other SSA economies during 2000–12, but the improvement in their social indicators was not noticeably faster. Strong output growth following the discovery of natural resources changed the composition of output quite markedly among resource exporters, but the effect on the composition of employment has been modest. In part, this reflected the normally capital-intensive nature of resource production, but it also indicated the emergence of a sharply dualistic economic structure in which low-productivity sectors (such as agriculture and many services) remained largely untransformed. Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in SSA was, on average, higher in natural resource exporters than in non-resource exporters. This income advantage, however, was not reflected in significantly higher scores on the human development index (HDI).





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