

# OCR

Oxford Cambridge and RSA

## 25 April – 6 May 2016

### A2 GCE HISTORY B

F985/01 Historical Controversies – British History

Candidates answer on the Answer Booklet.


**OCR supplied materials:**

- 12 page Answer Booklet (OCR 12)  
(sent with general stationery)

**Other materials required:**

None

**Duration:** 3 hours



#### INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Write your name, centre number and candidate number in the spaces provided on the Answer Booklet. Please write clearly and in capital letters.
- Use black ink.
- Answer **both** subquestions from **one** Study Topic.
- Read each question carefully. Make sure you know what you have to do before starting your answer.
- Do **not** write in the bar codes.

#### INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES

- The number of marks is given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question or part question.
- The total number of marks for this paper is **60**.
- This paper contains questions on the following four Study Topics:
  - The Debate over the Impact of the Norman Conquest, 1066–1216 (pages 2–3)
  - The Debate over Britain's 17th Century Crises, 1629–1689 (page 4)
  - Different Interpretations of British Imperialism c.1850–c.1950 (page 5)
  - The Debate over British Appeasement in the 1930s (page 6)
- You should write in continuous prose and are reminded of the need for clear and accurate writing, including structure of argument, grammar, punctuation and spelling.
- The time permitted allows for reading the extract in the one Study Topic you have studied.
- In answering these questions, you are expected to use your knowledge of the topic to help you understand and interpret the extract as well as to inform your answers.
- **You may refer to your class notes and textbooks during the examination.**
- This document consists of **8** pages. Any blank pages are indicated.

Answer **both** subquestions from **one** Study Topic.

## 1 The Debate over the Impact of the Norman Conquest, 1066–1216

*Read the following extract about the impact of the Norman Conquest and then answer the questions that follow.*

If finally we turn to the results of the Norman Conquest of England, and attempt to summarize a subject which requires a book to itself rather than the tail-end of a chapter, we may, indeed, begin with the word 'colonization', or the phrase 'the Norman settlement', for almost everything else follows from this. Sociologically the Norman Conquest was aristocratic colonization, the imposition upon a pre-existing kingdom of a new, alien and different ruling class, overwhelmingly Norman and, though liberally interlaced with Bretons, Flemings and others, all the more Norman for that, given Norman society's attraction and tolerance of immigrants. The new ruling class in Church and State included, of course, a new ruling house of princes, the Norman kings of England and subsequently their Angevin and 'Plantagenet' kinsmen and successors. About them and their magnates, the latter changing a little as time passes through fortune and continuing settlement from France – Clare, Bohun and Bigod, Mowbray and Mortimer, Mandeville, Warenne and Vere – future English history has to be written, as indeed does most of the history of Wales, Ireland and Scotland.

In a sense, the continuous political history of England begins in 1066. So sweeping a change of personnel at the top was crucial in an age of personal kingship and personal lordship, with immense power concentrated in the hands of the few – especially after 1066 since a greater concentration of wealth in the hands of fewer than before is itself one of the results of the Norman settlement. For a start the very nature of society became what we call feudal, as the new lords and their new king naturally and automatically transplanted to England those forms of social organization, custom, tenure, military organization and tactics which were prevalent in Normandy and northern France. The law changed, not least the land law. The power of the monarchy was vastly increased as the monarch became not only a divine and Old Testament king but the feudal suzerain, the lord of lords, the greatest magnates of the realm his tenants.

The chief trouble of English medieval history, one might say, is not overmighty subjects but overmighty monarchs, and the trouble begins in 1066, as witness Magna Carta. The unity of the realm, itself a measure and condition of royal power, achieved new dimensions in, for example, the obliteration of the ancient distinction between the Danelaw and English England, or the imposition of effective control upon the north, or in the rapid development of the coherence and discipline of feudalism. The machinery of royal government also developed rapidly after 1066. Whatever the degree of its development before, and whatever controversy surrounds this subject in particular, it simply is significant that only in Norman England do we hear of a chancellor and chancery, treasurer and treasury and (very soon) of that medieval wonder, the Exchequer. As for the Domesday survey of 1086 that, too, is a post-Conquest achievement of royal administration unparalleled until the nineteenth century.

The Church, as we have seen, was no less under new management than the state well within a generation after 1066, and changed accordingly – in a word, it was Normanized. It was placed under the direction of Lanfranc, appointed Archbishop of Canterbury in place of Stigand in 1070. The ecclesiastical changes wrought thereafter are very much more than organizational, important though the re-organization was. The changes included also a new sense of purpose, a new dynamism, a recharged spirituality, all derived from Normandy whose own church was then at the apex of a great revival. England was brought culturally and intellectually into the mainstream of the new learning of northern France. Such judgements, of course, are qualitative, involving an element of personal preference, and are thus particularly emotive. Perhaps the most acceptable statement to make, which yet comes very close to the truth about the Old English Church as of Old English society as a whole, is that both were old fashioned by the standards of northern France. It is not unfair to say that in England at Hastings in 1066 the Old World went down before the New.

- (a) What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation, approaches and methods of the historian? Refer to the extract and your own knowledge to explain your answer. **[30]**
- (b) In their work on the impact of the Norman Conquest, some historians have focused on the importance of long-term developments. Explain how this approach has added to our understanding of the Norman Conquest. Has this approach any disadvantages or shortcomings? **[30]**

## 2 The Debate over Britain's 17th Century Crises, 1629–1689

*Read the following extract about Britain's 17th century crises and then answer the questions that follow.*

The Glorious Revolution of 1688–9 was made by an alliance of three parties: Whigs, who provided its necessary motive force; Tories who provided its necessary parliamentary majority; and radicals who sought to provide its philosophy. These three parties, united against James II, preserved their uneasy unity so long as there was a possibility that he, being Roman Catholic, might be restored to the throne. All historians of the Revolution agree that it was a decisive act. Men did not blunder into it unwillingly, as they had blundered into the Civil War of 1642. They were drawn together in a perilous adventure by a conviction of overwhelming imminent danger. In their secret invitation to William of Orange they urged him to come without delay, to save the liberties of England 'before it was too late'. The only force which can unite men of different, even opposite interests in desperate common action is overriding fear. The men who acted together in 1688 believed that they were facing a fearful threat: that they were threatened – to use their own words – with 'popery and slavery'. What in 1688 did they mean? If we are to answer this question, we must, I believe, look at the Revolution, as they did, in a large context, in both time and space.

Most Englishmen who took an active part in the Revolution of 1688 were conscious that, throughout Europe, royal power was becoming 'absolute' – centralized, and authoritarian. They observed that those rulers who were most successful in building up and preserving such power were Roman Catholics.

In Charles II's last years, when he had dismissed his last Parliament, broken the organization of his enemies, and remodelled the institutions which they had used against him, Charles felt that he was as absolute a King as any of his predecessors. He had also learned an important lesson. Popery might be the preservative of monarchy, but only if carefully and correctly applied. The dose had to be carefully and correctly applied, for it could encounter dangerous allergies or cause dangerous side-effects. He was worried his brother, if he were put in charge, would apply it too rashly and risk disaster. It was the attempt in 1687 to substitute a Roman Catholic for an Anglican base, which, by alienating the Tory party and the established Church, began the ruin of the Stuart monarchy.

The astonishing speed and completeness of the Revolution ensured that, socially, its effects were limited. The great risk was of civil war. If James had stood firm until the cracks in the alliance had opened up, who can say that civil war would not have broken out. That after all was what happened in the great crisis of 1641–2. It was Charles I's refusal to yield, and his conviction that there were men who would fight his battles, which broke up the parliamentary coalition and led to the long struggle for power. In the course of that struggle, which no one had wanted, radical ideas and radical social forces had emerged. In 1688–9 all these possibilities existed; but the collapse of James II and the presence of an agreed heir enabled a still undivided political nation to settle for a quick compromise. The compromise, in the circumstances, was bound to be conservative. The radicals were given no chance to emerge. The Revolution was essentially defensive, the product of determined resistance to innovation. The framers of the Bill of Rights insisted that they were defending an ancient constitution: the institution of Parliament, the regularity of parliaments, the parliamentary control of finance, the independence of judges, the right of the established national Church.

- (a) What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation, approaches and methods of the historian? Refer to the extract and your knowledge to explain your answer. **[30]**
- (b) In their work on Britain's 17th-century crises some historians have focused on the issue of religion. Explain how this approach has contributed to our understanding of Britain's 17th-century crises. Has this approach any disadvantages or shortcomings? **[30]**

### 3 Different Interpretations of British Imperialism c.1850–c.1950

*Read the following extract about British imperialism and then answer the questions that follow.*

Any balance sheet of Empire depends on the counter-factual chosen. In comparison with a world that had not been colonized by Britain the benefits of Imperial trade alone contributed at most 5–6 per cent to British national income. Imperial investment, compared with a world without Empire, added very little. In total, the direct contribution of Empire to Britain was not entirely negligible, but in its absence British average incomes would still have been ahead of such contemporary first-rank economies such as France and Germany.

The Empire can be seen as a diversion from a more productive development path in which more equipment and talent could have been allocated to the domestic economy. Such counter-factuals show up dramatic improvements in British welfare, but are they to be believed? Periods when the option of overseas investment was not so readily available were indeed times of dynamic domestic development and growth by British standards, though still lacklustre by the standards of other countries. This suggests that the problem was as much the productivity of domestic investment as the domestic share of overall investment. Given the strong trade orientation of the British economy, and the Imperial share in its trade (about one-third), there is a real question whether existing output levels could have been maintained without the Empire.

The real welfare impact of Empire lies elsewhere, and it requires shifting one's gaze away from the British Isles. The attractions of Imperial investment and trade were not merely matters of clever finance, but reflected a unique economic opportunity. This was embodied in the vast potential of natural resources in thinly occupied countries; minerals, timber, but mostly agricultural land and its products: grain, wool, meat. What opened it up was the demand of metropolitan urban societies, and their capacity to pay in cheap manufactures. Given the large cost advantage of these newly productive areas, opening them up with railways and export facilities provided straightforward economic benefit.

The establishment of overseas English-speaking nations was by far the largest permanent benefit created by Britain and her Empire. In doing so, it inflicted an appalling cost on the aboriginal peoples of Canada, Australia, and South Africa. Most of the benefits did not accrue directly to Britain, but were reaped on the spot. These communities were among the richest in the world. Britain planted the seed, and nourished it with infusions of migrants, talent, and money. She also transferred a set of mature institutions such as a legal system. Take Australia, the richest society in the world between the 1860s and the 1890s, settled almost entirely by British migrants and their descendants. The Antipodes depended absolutely on Britain for their markets. Their inhabitants may not have been more wealthy than Britons on the average, but manual workers were much better off in terms of wages and status, and lived in more equal societies. The overseas, English speaking, natural resource economy absorbed millions of migrants from Britain. In reality the Dominions were extensions of the British Isles, tied to Britain by a web of kinship, investment, and trade, and by the political institutions of Empire. Had there been no Empire, these territories would not have remained undeveloped. Settlers would have come from elsewhere in Europe, North America or even Asia. This would have been a loss to the people of Britain, and perhaps (given these countries' democratic instincts and their internal stability) a loss to global welfare.

- (a) What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation, approaches and methods of the historian? Refer to the extract and your knowledge to explain your answer. **[30]**
- (b) In their work on British imperialism some historians have focused on imperialism as political and physical domination. Explain how this approach has contributed to our understanding of British imperialism. Has this approach any disadvantages or shortcomings? **[30]**

#### 4 The Debate over British Appeasement in the 1930s

*Read the following extract about appeasement and then answer the questions that follow.*

Among policymakers and publics, and among many scholars as well, the futility of appeasement has acquired the status of a lawlike generalization. The implicit assumption is that the Western allies' primary aim was to secure a lasting peace with Germany through concessions to resolve Hitler's grievances. If that was the aim, the policy clearly failed. But, as we shall demonstrate, that was not appeasement's primary aim.

If the resolving-grievances interpretation of British appeasement is correct we should expect to see evidence that British leaders consistently viewed Hitler's war aims as limited and believed that concessions would resolve bilateral differences. If the buying time interpretation is correct, we would expect to see evidence that British leaders believed that concessions would probably not moderate Hitler's aggressive designs and that a future war was likely.

The British and French surrender of Sudeten Czechoslovakia to Hitler was the product of an assessment of relative capabilities and expected shifts in the balance of power, rather than the mistaken belief that war could be avoided for the foreseeable future by satisfying German grievances.

Neither Chamberlain nor Halifax viewed the German challenge as legitimate. As Chamberlain told French Premier Daladier, 'It makes my blood boil to see Germany getting away with it time after time and increasing her domination over free people.' Furthermore, while neither Chamberlain nor Halifax was irrevocably convinced that war with Germany was inevitable, neither was optimistic that it could be avoided. Chamberlain often observed that because Britain would suffer economically in a war or even in maintaining a deterrence footing for an extended period, making a last-ditch effort to defuse the ongoing crisis with Germany was worthwhile. Chamberlain's view is not equivalent to that often attributed to him – that he naively expected negotiations to cement a constructive European peace. He and Halifax fully acknowledged the magnitude of the German challenges, and believed that further German conquests in Central and Eastern Europe would most probably lead Germany into an eventual war with Britain and France. In April 1938, Halifax told a meeting of trade unionists that 'War with the Reich appears from now on as inevitable, but diplomacy has as its goal to delay it, to choose its terrain, and to fortify its means of defence.' Although neither Chamberlain nor Halifax completely abandoned hope of avoiding war over the longer term by making concessions, they were not optimistic that this policy would succeed, and they simultaneously accelerated the British military buildup to prepare for war.

When Chamberlain and Halifax presented their rationale for restraint to the Cabinet, it was premised on the balance of forces, rather than on the prospects for a long-term settlement with Germany. At the pivotal 22 March 1938 Cabinet meeting, they highlighted British military inferiority to Germany, especially with respect to aircraft and air defences.

At core, then, the decision to abandon the Sudetenland was based on the belief that a deterrent threat by Britain was tantamount to an empty bluff that, if called, would have resulted either in humiliating surrender or, worse, a devastating defeat. When defending the Munich agreement before the Cabinet, Chamberlain declared, 'I hope that my colleagues will not think that I am making any attempts to disguise the fact that, if we now possessed a superior force to Germany, we should probably be considering these proposals in a very different spirit.'

- (a) What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation, approaches and methods of the historian? Refer to the extract and your knowledge to explain your answer. [30]
- (b) In their work on British appeasement some historians have focused on Hitler. Explain how this approach has contributed to our understanding of appeasement. Has this approach any disadvantages or shortcomings? [30]

**END OF QUESTION PAPER**



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