OCR
RECOGNISING ACHIEVEMENT

26 November 2012 – 8 December 2012

A2 GCE HISTORY B

F985/01 Historical Controversies – British History

Candidates answer on the Answer Booklet.

OCR supplied materials:
- 16 page Answer Booklet (sent with general stationery)

Other materials required:
None

Duration: 3 hours

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INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Write your name, centre number and candidate number in the spaces provided on the Answer Booklet. Please write clearly and in capital letters.
- Use black ink.
- Answer **both sub-questions** from **one** Study Topic.
- Read each question carefully. Make sure you know what you have to do before starting your answer.
- Do **not** write in the bar codes.

INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES

- The number of marks is given in brackets **[ ]** at the end of each question or part question.
- The total number of marks for this paper is **60**.
- This paper contains questions on the following 4 Study Topics:
  - The Debate over the Impact of the Norman Conquest, 1066–1216 (page 2)
  - The Debate over Britain's 17th Century Crises, 1629–89 (page 3)
  - Different Interpretations of British Imperialism c.1850–c.1950 (page 4)
  - The Debate over British Appeasement in the 1930s (page 5)
- You should write in continuous prose and are reminded of the need for clear and accurate writing, including structure of argument, grammar, punctuation and spelling.
- The time permitted allows for reading the Extract in the one Study Topic you have studied.
- In answering these questions, you are expected to use your knowledge of the topic to help you understand and interpret the Extract as well as to inform your answers.
- **You may refer to your class notes and textbooks during the examination.**
- This document consists of **8** pages. Any blank pages are indicated.

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1 The Debate over the Impact of the Norman Conquest, 1066–1216

Read the following extract about the impact of the Norman Conquest and then answer the questions that follow.

This book is concerned with regime change, 11th-century style. One of the characteristics which the Norman Conquest of England shares with 21st-century regime change is overwhelming violence. William's harrying of the North constituted 'shock and awe' even without the use of munitions. Ruthless violence on this scale was necessary to enforce change of a magnitude and speed unparalleled in English history. Many of those important Englishmen who did not die fighting in the pitched battles of 1066 and the subsequent ineffectual attempts at resistance, or did not flee into exile, quickly found themselves in pitifully diminished circumstances. As the Anglo-Saxon Chronicler put it, at the conclusion of his entry for 1066, 'always after that it grew much worse'.

The other characteristic which the Conquest shares with modern regime change is the heavy emphasis on justification, regardless of the intervening millennium. There are, however, two important distinctions. First, although the Norman Conquest resulted in the swiftest, most brutal and far-reaching transformation in English history, it was not justified as a change of regime. On the contrary, the Normans claimed that they were the old regime continued. The existing kingdom of England was not even under new management, for, it was argued, Duke William was the sole legitimate heir to the English throne. King Edward the Confessor, regarded by the Normans as the last Old English king, had nominated William as such. There had been no change at all. Even the fact that William had conquered England by defeating King Harold – deemed a usurper by the Normans – was progressively excised from the historical record.

Second, the elaboration of this fiction of continuity rapidly transformed England into something which Englishmen prior to 1066 would have found increasingly difficult to recognize. For instance, within fifty years of 1066 every English cathedral church and most major abbeys had been razed to the ground and rebuilt in a new continental style, known to architects as 'Romanesque.' In a very literal sense, this rebuilding was one aspect of the renewal of the English church to which Duke William appears to have pledged himself early in 1066, in order to secure papal backing for the Conquest. No English cathedral retains any masonry above ground which dates from before the Conquest. Wulfstan, bishop of Worcester, was the only English bishop to survive the wholesale renewal (or, differently expressed, purge) of the English hierarchy during the first decade of the reign and its replacement with churchmen of chiefly Norman extraction. Only those saints whose holiness could be documented stood any chance of transfer into the new churches. Frenchmen assessed the legitimacy of English saints and found many woefully wanting. They were consigned to the dustbin of history. Paul, the new abbot of St Alban's and nephew of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Lanfranc, destroyed the tombs of former abbots, whom he described as 'yokels and idiots'. Demolition of the Old Minster at Winchester began in 1093. Within a year, only one chapel and the high altar were left of the church in which Edward the Confessor had been crowned and many members of the Old English royal house had been buried. Unlike Old English churches, Old English saints were not systematically eliminated. But in the process of evaluation and selective translation, those who were permitted to survive were sanitized and appropriated by the new hierarchy. In this way they were made to lend their authority, as it were, to the pretence that nothing had changed. In truth, of course, Old England, in an architectural sense, had been eradicated.

(a) What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation, approaches and methods of the historian? Refer to the extract and your knowledge to explain your answer. **[30]**

(b) In their work on the Norman Conquest, some historians have focused on the importance of changes introduced in later reigns. Explain how this approach has added to our understanding of the Norman Conquest. Has this approach any disadvantages or shortcomings? **[30]**

2 The Debate over Britain's 17th Century Crises, 1629–89

Read the following extract about Britain's 17th century crises and then answer the questions that follow.

The middle of the seventeenth century was a period of revolutions in Europe. These revolutions differed from place to place, and if studied separately, seem to rise out of particular, local causes; but if we look at them together they have so many common features that they appear almost as a general revolution. There is the Puritan Revolution in England, at the same time there were also the revolts known as the Frondes in France and the palace revolution in the Netherlands. There were also revolts in Catalonia, Portugal and Naples. To contemporary observers it seemed that European society itself was in crisis. 'These days are days of shaking and this shaking is universal,' said an English preacher.

What was the general cause of this crisis? Contemporaries tended to find deep spiritual reasons. For a generation they had felt it coming. Ever since 1618 at least there had been talk of the dissolution of society. This sense of gloom was justified sometimes by new interpretations of Scripture. So the crisis was anticipated, even before the accidents that launched it. No doubt accidents made revolution longer or deeper here, shorter or more superficial there. No doubt, too, the universality of revolution owed something to mere contagion; the fashion of revolution spreads. But contagion implies receptivity: a healthy body does not catch a disease. Therefore we must ask a deeper question. What was the general condition of western European society which made it vulnerable to the epidemic of revolution?

In the 1620s Puritanism triumphs in Europe. Those years, we may say, mark the end of the Renaissance. The playtime is over. The sense of social responsibility has now returned with a vengeance. War and depression had made the change emphatic, even startling. Such was the mood of general, non-doctrinal, moral Puritanism which in the 1620s launched its attack on the Renaissance courts. There are differences, of course, of personality from place to place. There are also differences in society itself. For instance, in England the cost of the Court fell most heavily on the gentry: they were the tax-paying class: wardship, purveyance and all the indirect taxes which were multiplied by the Stuarts fell heaviest on them. On the other hand in France the nobility was exempt from taxation, and the taxes, which were multiplied by the early Bourbons, fell heaviest on the peasants. In England when the revolution came, it was a great revolution, controlled by the gentry; in France there were little, but serious, revolts of the peasants. Nevertheless, if the rebels were different, the general grievance against which they rebelled – the character and cost of the State – was the same.

Wherever we look, this is the burden of all complaints. From 1620 to 1640 this is the cry of the country, the problem of the courts. We hear the cry from the backbenches of the English parliaments, we hear the cry of protest in Spain of the Cortes. The demands are not constitutional. Nor are they economic: they are not concerned with methods of production. Essentially, they are demands for emancipation from the burden of centralization; for the reduction of useless expensive offices, including – even in Spain – clerical offices; abolition of the sale of offices, abolition of those wasteful indirect taxes from which the ever-expanding Court is fed. Thus the tension between Court and country grew. But revolutionary situations do not necessarily lead to revolutions. Therefore we must take account of the intervening events and errors. In England the corruption of the Court was left unchanged. Whenever we study that system we find its cost had grown. In Spain the voice of the reformers was soon stifled. A policy of reform was possible without a revolution but the Stuarts defended the old system to the last. The political structure of England went down because 'the country' mutinied not against the monarchy but against the ever-extending apparatus of parasitic bureaucracy which had grown up around the throne. In England, the storm of the mid-century, which blew throughout Europe, struck the most brittle, most overgrown, most rigid Court of all and brought it violently down.

(a) What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation, approaches and methods of the historian? Refer to the extract and your knowledge to explain your answer. **[30]**

(b) In their work on Britain's seventeenth-century crises some historians have focused on regional studies. Explain how this approach has contributed to our understanding of Britain's seventeenth century crises. Has this approach any disadvantages or shortcomings? **[30]**

3 Different Interpretations of British Imperialism c.1850–c.1950

Read the following extract about British imperialism and then answer the questions that follow.

The economic impulse was to find markets and outlets for the new manufacturing potential set in motion by industrialization, together with an increased need to find the raw materials to feed it. Britain became the 'workshop of the world' and entrepreneurs looked well beyond the confines of their homeland. It is important, however, not to pre-date the movement into many overseas regions; some did not feel the impact before the 1850s. The industrial revolution proceeded by a process of anticipating potential demand overseas. Where demand did not exist, as among the unclothed inhabitants in Africa, it could be created.

Without a doubt the products of Manchester and Birmingham spread widely and sources of supply were also remarkably diffuse. W S Jevons in 'The Coal Question' (1865) enthused: 'The plains of North America and Russia are our corn fields; Australasia contains our sheep farms; the Hindus and the Chinese grow tea for us, and our coffee, sugar and spice plantations are in all the Indies.' Here we see the intoxication of a sense of world mastery, the exciting feeling of having organized the entire world for the purpose of satisfying the needs of the expanding British economy.

Above all, it was Palmerston who led the movement into exotic new regions. He pointed out, 'One way in which a government may assist the commerce of the country is by opening new markets for our trade.' The foundations of a vast new opening for commerce had, he hoped, been laid in China. Securing so big a market for British manufacturers, was, he claimed, a matter of the highest importance. The solution to domestic distress, said Palmerston, was the extension of foreign trade. The dynamic vision which drove exertions forward was based for example on the expectation of British manufacturers that all the mills of Lancashire could not make stocking stuff sufficient for one of the provinces of China. A market of over 300 million people was a tempting prospect.

The Victorians had a tremendous sense of being in some way in harmony with the progressive forces of the universe. God was on their side. Prince Albert regarded the 1851 Exhibition as a festival of Christian civilization. There was a general conviction that the British had reached the top of the ladder of progress, and that it was their duty to improve the lot of others. The usual British attitude to foreigners was that expressed by Dickens' Mr Podsnap, that other countries were a 'mistake'. More important were the views of Palmerston. He rejoiced in nature's favours, the people's virtues and the blessings of British freedom. He declared, 'Our duty is not to enslave, but to set free, and I may say that we stand at the head of moral, social and political civilization.' Upon what facts did this confidence rest? Upon four, mainly. First, upon economic pre-eminence. Second, upon the unchallengeable power of the British navy. Third, upon internal stability. Fourth, underpinning everything there was a deep religious justification and driving force. To a remarkable extent the ideological motive for expansion was religious. Ideologically the Victorian desire was to improve the rest of the world by a programme of Christian regeneration, spreading civilization on the British model. This was, they believed, the only perfection open to mankind, and it was God-ordained.

(a) What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation, approaches and methods of the historian? Refer to the extract and your knowledge to explain your answer. **[30]**

(b) In their work on the loss of Empire in the 20th century some historians have focused on factors in the colonies themselves. Explain how this approach has contributed to our understanding of British imperialism. Has this approach any disadvantages or shortcomings? **[30]**

4 The Debate over British Appeasement in the 1930s

Read the following extract about appeasement and then answer the questions that follow.

German foreign policy of this period closely conforms with Hitler's statements and utterances. Taken together they constitute a foreign policy programme which aimed not merely at the overthrow of Versailles, but also at total hegemony in Europe. This was to be realized through the subjugation of France first, and then the destruction of the Soviet Union, which at one stroke would destroy the communist world menace and secure living space for Germany. It was assumed, moreover, that this could be achieved, if not in alliance with Britain, with at least her benevolent neutrality. There is not a shred of evidence that economic conditions in the Third Reich had any impact on Hitler's thinking or motivation. On one occasion for example, it was suggested to Hitler by Robert Boothby, a Conservative politician, that national socialism was driven by economic imperatives, to which Hitler replied quite bluntly that national socialism was a purely political movement.

Assuming that Hitler did indeed have a plan, was the British government ever aware of it? There was, of course, from 1933 onwards, a distinct feeling in London that Germany had once more under the Nazis given way to her expansionist inclinations. This perception steadily increased throughout the 1930s until in 1939 it was decided to resist because of the threat to Britain and her empire to which continued German expansion on the continent would give rise. It does not appear, however, that Hitler's foreign policy either in the extent of its aims, or the steps by which those aims were to be achieved, was ever properly understood in London.

The policy of the British government towards the Versailles settlement was to revise those parts of it that hindered the economic revival of Europe. By the beginning of the 1930s, Hitler's advent did not give pause to this process, but rather accelerated it. The failure to revise the Treaty of Versailles had given rise to Hitler; the revision of the treaty might make Hitler a conventional statesman and Germany a stable element in a stable Europe. What was contemplated was the reconstruction of the entire Versailles System in such a way as to bring Germany into satisfactory treaty relations with all her neighbours. Fundamentally, this was the policy of appeasement. What was meant by appeasement was the appeasement of the European situation. What was not implied was the appeasement of Germany in the way that the word would be understood today, in the sense of acceding to the demands of a potentially hostile nation in the hope of maintaining peace.

What also gave impetus to appeasement in Europe was the deterioration after 1931 of the situation in the Far East. British military planners suspected if Britain were to become involved in a European conflict, that would be a signal for Italy or Japan to take advantage of Britain's predicament. As the chiefs of staff warned in a memorandum of 1937, Britain had commitments in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far East. They thought 'the outstanding feature of the present situation is the increasing probability that a war started in any one of these three areas may extend to one or both of the other two.' This was the fundamental premise to which Neville Chamberlain was referring in his statement to the House of Commons on 24 March 1938 in the wake of the annexation of Austria. 'But while plainly stating this decision not to guarantee Czechoslovakia, or come automatically to the assistance of France, I would add this. If war broke out it would be well within the bounds of probability that other countries besides those which were parties to the original dispute, would almost immediately become involved.' Here was an admission that it would be almost impossible for Britain to stay out of such a war and that its logical end might be a world war. This was both a forecast and a warning that was intended as a deterrent.

(a) What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation, approaches and methods of the historian? Refer to the extract and your knowledge to explain your answer. **[30]**

(b) In their work on British appeasement some historians have focused on constraints in Britain such as public opinion. Explain how this approach has contributed to our understanding of appeasement. Has this approach any disadvantages or shortcomings? **[30]**

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