

# OCR

Oxford Cambridge and RSA

## June 2015

### A2 GCE HISTORY A

F965/01 Historical Interpretations and Investigations



#### INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- You must submit one piece of work, up to 2000 words long, for the Interpretations task. Interpretations tasks are set by OCR.
- You must also submit one piece of work, up to 2000 words long, for the Investigation element. This may either be an approved OCR Investigation title or an adapted generic OCR question.
- Your answers must be submitted in the format specified in the *History Coursework Guidance* document.

#### INFORMATION FOR CANDIDATES

- Each question carries **40** marks. The total number of marks available for the unit is **80**.
- You are reminded that before submitting your final answers you must refer to the relevant table of prohibited combinations of investigation and interpretation questions.
- For the interpretation questions, answers should be based on the arguments presented by these historians, any evidence they present and your own knowledge of the topic.

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### Topic

Please note that topics in **bold** have replacement questions for 2015.

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## 1. The Age of Justinian

### 1a. Justinian's Administration

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Justinian was successful domestically because he chose excellent administrators.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian believes that Justinian himself was responsible for initiating policies.

In his own law-making Justinian was largely concerned with administrative reform. In 535-6 he took this burning question in hand. General edicts abolished the sale of offices and commanded vigilant government with a rigid care of the revenue. In special edicts Justinian endeavoured to simplify provincial government, no longer sticking closely to the elaborate hierarchy of separate civil and military authorities devised by Diocletian. Under Theodora's influence prostitutes were protected by the law from white slave-traders. There was a desire for public utility as well as for splendour and art in Justinian's passion for building. There was wholesale new building and new cities were founded, like Justinian's birthplace. Above them all Constantinople was favoured after the destruction caused by the Nika riot. To the public usefulness of these works may be added the employment they gave to an industrious population. Trade, too, was favoured with paternal care. Justinian's diplomacy aimed at opening routes to the Far East which circumvented Persian control of products. The best help to industry was given by two patriotic missionaries who smuggled some silk worm eggs in hollow wands from China and so the Empire could produce its own silk which became a government monopoly.

From: C. W. Previté-Orton, *The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History*, published in 1960.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Justinian chose competent, but not necessarily popular, officials.

For all Justinian's projects, the necessary funds were raised by a general streamlining of the system of tax collection. These measures led to popular discontent which was increased by John of Cappadocia, the official appointed by the Emperor to put them into effect. John was rough and uncouth, but Justinian recognised a superb administrator when he saw one and in 531 promoted him to Praetorian Prefect. In this capacity he instituted stringent economies to the provisioning of the army, launched a determined campaign against corruption, introduced at least 26 new taxes and did much to centralise the government. Most of these reforms were long overdue and John certainly left the financial machinery of the state in much better shape than he found it. Unfortunately he combined with his industry and efficiency, a degree of moral depravity that aroused universal contempt. By 532 he was the most hated man in the Empire. One other official ran him close and that was the jurist Tribonian. He was a man of immense erudition and breadth of learning and this quality appealed to Justinian, who was a considerable scholar himself. In Tribonian he found the one man who could bring to fruition his planned undertaking of a complete recodification of the Roman law.

From: John Julius Norwich, *Byzantium; The Early Centuries*, published in 1988.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers that there was a change in Justinian's administration towards the end of his reign.

In Justinian's later years his regime became almost a gerontocracy. There was a noticeable lack of new blood. Incompetence or disfavour might necessitate retirement but old age did not. Liberius, the prefect of Egypt, was sent by Justinian to investigate charges against his predecessor and had him put to death, despite his claim that he had been carrying out Justinian's orders. Justinian sent a replacement for Liberius but, at the same time instructed Liberius not to desert his post. Even when Liberius was past 80, Justinian considered him for a post in Italy as he was too elderly to be ambitious. He died aged 89. Narses who worked his way up the ranks by sheer ability and attracted the attention of Theodora, became the Emperor's confidant. He died, immensely wealthy, at the age of 95 under Justinian's successor. Justinian maintained faith in his officials. Corruption was a way of life in the bureaucracy but he was lenient and in return the officials kept the administrative momentum under way. In its last years, Justinian's government showed all the defects of an ageing regime, but, one way or another, it kept the dark clouds at bay until after his death.

From: J. A. S. Evans, *The Age of Justinian: The Circumstances of Imperial Power*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers Justinian's choice of officials.

The Empress Theodora cheerfully accepted many of the public appearances required of the sovereign, appearances which her introverted husband was happy to forego. The result was to reinforce the emperor's isolation in his capital, which made him extraordinarily dependent upon the men he selected to act in his name. Justinian was born with an instinct for selecting men of ability to do his bidding, notably men of intelligence and determination. Skill in government mattered far more than virtue; a good family was the sort that gave its sons native ability rather than noble ancestors. Above all, the emperor's men possessed ambition enough to be successful, but enough loyalty to value their emperor's success above their own. Justinian learned early that he could more easily bind a wealthy man to his will than a poor one, provided that he was the source of that wealth. He may not have excited the adoration of his lieutenants, but he was also never betrayed by any of them. This is not to say that they never betrayed one another. While Justinian may not have encouraged loathing among his closest advisers, he was clearly unbothered by it. History records no greater hatred than that exhibited by the inner circle of Justinian's court; by Theodora for her husband's *de facto* Prime Minister, John the Cappadocian, and by the Cappadocian for Justinian's greatest general, Belisarius.

From: William Rosen, *Justinian's Flea: Plague, Empire and the Birth of Europe*, published in 2006.

## 1b. Justinian's Vision

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Justinian's imperial policies were driven by vision rather than circumstances.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian evaluates Justinian's reputation.

Few Emperors established their threatened position with such inspired opportunism as Justinian in the 530s, but, in doing so, he cast his own shadow over the rest of his reign. Compared with the euphoria of the 530s, the remaining twenty-five years of his reign seem an anti-climax. For modern scholars Justinian has been trapped in his own image. His astute manipulation of the resources of propaganda has been taken at face value. Hence he has gained the reputation of being a romantic idealist, haunted by the mirage of a renewal of the Roman Empire; and the difficulties of the succeeding years have usually been presented as the collapse of a grandiose policy. Justinian is, in fact, a more complex figure. He sought glory while the going was good, because he sorely needed it to maintain his position. He had the genius to understand the vast resources available to an east Roman emperor of the early sixth century, with its past history, a full treasury and an unrivalled supply of talent in every field. But the history of his reign was written by the alienated and the embittered. In their view Justinian had betrayed the traditionalist governing class of the empire and outflanked them in a policy of flamboyant glory.

From: Peter Brown, *The World of Late Antiquity*, published in 1971.

**Interpretation B:** This historian considers Justinian's aims and circumstances.

In the period of relative tranquillity that followed the Nika riots and the peace concluded with Persia eight months later, Justinian was at last able to turn his mind to what he had always determined was to be the primary objective of his reign: to recover the Empire of the West. Like the vast majority of his subjects, he believed the Roman Empire to be one and indivisible, the political manifestation of Christendom; that half of it should have fallen into alien and heretical hands was an offence against the Will of God, and it was therefore his Christian duty to regain his lost heritage. During the previous century such a reconquest had been impossible; the Empire had been hard put to defend itself from the Germanic and Slavic tribes for ever pressing on its frontiers, while the barbaric infiltration of the army made its very loyalty uncertain. But by Justinian's times these problems were largely resolved; moreover, as it happened, he had found in Belisarius one of the most brilliant generals in all Byzantine history – the one man to whom he believed this sacred task could be confidently entrusted. To this end he had recalled him from Mesopotamia in the autumn of 531. Belisarius' military gifts were unquestioned: his personal courage had been proved over and over again and he was a natural leader of men.

From: John Julius Norwich, *Byzantium, The Early Centuries*, published in 1988.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers Justinian's aims.

It has been argued that it was the Nika riots that led Justinian into undertaking the campaigns to re-establish direct imperial rule over parts of the former western Roman Empire that are a central feature of his reign. Thus, although the Emperor successfully suppressed the disturbances in Constantinople, he needed to distract attention in the capital away from the violent suppression of the riots and the underlying tensions that had caused them. For this, a military venture with the prospect of victory and possibly some more tangible economic benefits, would seem to fit the bill. Tempting as such an argument might be, it should probably be resisted. There are hints from Procopius that the expedition against the Vandal kingdom in Africa was already being planned before the outbreak of the Nika riots. Belisarius, who had been commanding the imperial army in Mesopotamia, was in Constantinople in January 532 because Justinian had just concluded a war with Persia which had been going on since 527. Procopius suggests that Justinian made a treaty with Persia because he wanted to free his hand to launch the expedition against Africa. It must also be admitted that such a venture was potentially extremely risky; something that Justinian's ministers stressed to him at the time. Previous eastern emperors had sent expeditions against the Vandal kingdom in Africa and all had proved to be expensive failures.

From: Roger Collins, *Early Medieval Europe, 300-1000*, published in 1991.

**Interpretation D:** This historian analyses the concept of imperial power.

Justinian inherited a concept of the imperial office which was already well-established and pressed it to its logical conclusion. He believed in his divine appointment. It was God who entrusted His emperor with the mission of defending orthodox belief and of guarding and remaking the Roman Empire. The theory was that the emperor was the choice of the army, the senate and the people, but generally an emperor chose his successor and the role of the army, the senate and the people was restricted to expressions of joy. Justinian's building programme was a manifestation of his vision of the imperial office as a delegation of divine power. Thus Justinian built for the glory of God and the good of his people, and his inspiration came from God himself, who went so far as to vouchsafe him the technical skill necessary for raising the great dome of Hagia Sophia. It was God, wrote Procopius, who had given Justinian the mission of watching over the whole Roman Empire and, if possible, remaking it. The emperor's own piety was vital to maintain divine support, yet this perception posed a dilemma. How could a subject of the emperor explain demonstrations of God's wrath, such as plagues, earthquakes, fires and disasters in war, all of which marked Justinian's reign? One answer was that God sent calamities to turn His people from their wickedness. Once this was accepted, the emperor could take on a new role as the leader of an anxious and penitent populace, and with the duty of keeping his subjects from sin. Thus we find Justinian outlawing swearing and blasphemy, with the explanation that they brought earthquakes and plague as retribution.

From: J. A. S. Evans, *The Age of Justinian, the Circumstances of Imperial Power*, published in 1996.

**1c. The military collapse of Justinian's empire.**

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that it was Justinian's fault that his empire was ruined.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the commitments with which Justinian landed the empire proved to be a drain on resources.

It is not easy to draw up a balance sheet of Justinian's reign. Territorially, he greatly increased the empire by the recovery of lands in the West and in North Africa. But it may be questioned whether the empire was not weakened rather than strengthened by these conquests. In the first place, it may be asked whether Justinian's aggressive wars in the West did not so exhaust the Eastern parts in finance and manpower as seriously to weaken the defence of the Danube and the Eastern Front. And secondly it may be asked whether the recovered provinces of the West were not rather a liability than an asset, requiring Eastern troops to garrison them and yielding insufficient revenue to pay for their defence. The wars of reconquest were undoubtedly long and exhausting. The diversion of the empire's resources in manpower and money to the West inevitably weakened the Danube and Eastern fronts. For the last decade of the reign there was peace but the condition of the reconquered provinces was far from happy. Financially the Western provinces can hardly have paid their way during the period; they certainly can have contributed nothing towards the general expenses of the empire. In manpower they were undoubtedly a drain on the resources of the Eastern parts. Italy was depopulated by the war and could furnish no recruits, and very few Ostrogoths took service under the empire. Africa made some contribution: not only were a substantial number of Vandals transported to the Eastern front, but Moors were also recruited for service overseas. But these cannot have compensated for the large number of Egyptian troops required for the garrison of Africa. The wars of reconquest had lasted longer than they need have done because Justinian had refused to expend the men and money needed to achieve a quick decision, and, as a result Italy, and to a lesser extent Africa, were so exhausted by the time that they were finally pacified that they could contribute little to the revenues of the empire. Though the Western wars cannot be said to have exhausted the empire, their net result was to saddle it with heavy military commitments without any countervailing increase in its resources.

From: A. H. M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire*, published in 1964.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the western reconquests inflicted particular harm on the Byzantine position in the Balkans but also that the revival of warfare with Persia was the emperor's chief concern and expense.

In his reaction to the revival of the menace of Persia, Justinian showed that he was no dreamer. The war in Italy was instantly relegated to a backwater. In coming years Justinian was prepared to spend more money on impressing the Persian ambassador in Constantinople than on all the armies in the reconquered western provinces. From the Black Sea to Damascus, the emperor's foresight was crystallized in stone. Justinian's fortifications along his eastern frontier are the most refined example of Roman architecture. They still stand in the desert as tangible reminders of the overriding priority of the Near East in the policies of the east Roman state. While the eastern provincials were sheltered from the consequences of Justinian's western commitments, his fellow countrymen in the Balkans felt the strain directly. The Balkan garrisons were stripped to provide levies for the western armies. The Danube frontier became permeable again. In the 540s Slavs raided deep into Roman territory. From 559 onwards Constantinople itself was frequently menaced by the revival of the great confederacies of Turkic nomads – heirs to the empire of Atilla: first the Bulgars, followed by the Avars. To regain the remote Latinity of Italy and Africa, Justinian weakened the living Latin core of the east Roman state in the Balkans. The Slav settlement of the Balkans was a direct consequence of Justinian's western ambitions.

From: Peter Brown, *The World of Late Antiquity*, published in 1971.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Justinian's military policies had successes.

In fact his efforts to turn the clock back to the great days of the universal Roman Empire had astonishing initial success. A small expedition was launched against the Vandal kingdom of North Africa, the longest standing thorn in Constantinople's flesh, under the brilliant general Belisarius, and the people who had terrorized the Mediterranean in the fifth century were rapidly conquered. The emperor's whirlwind success was celebrated in the extravagant prologues attached to the massive Code of Roman Law which he issued in 529. Throughout the 530s, his military success continued with an invasion of Sicily and Italy, and by 540 the Ostrogoths had lost their main political centres of Rome and Ravenna. By his death in 565 Justinian appeared to have succeeded in restoring the glories of Rome. The Arian kingdoms of Africa and Italy had been returned to imperial rule, and even the Burgundian kingdom was taken over by Justinian's Frankish allies in the 530s. Only Visigothic Spain held out, and it was threatened by internal dissensions and a Byzantine salient around Cartagena. In other ways Justinian's reign marked a new beginning for the Roman Empire. His ideals of autocracy and Romano-Christian universalism became a programme to which all later Byzantine emperors subscribed. The upheavals of the fifth century had not destroyed the relatively uniform Roman life of the Mediterranean.

From: T. Brown, *The Transformation of the Roman Mediterranean*, published in 1992.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that the empire's problems after Justinian's reign were caused by events outside the emperor's control and by the failure of his domestic reform programme. He emphasises especially the financial impact of plague.

In 565 Justinian died. The memory of Justinian was to loom large in the minds of subsequent generations of emperors, just as the physical monuments built in Constantinople during his reign were long to dominate the medieval city. Nevertheless, in spite of the grandeur of Justinian's project, buffeted by plague, frustrated by deeply entrenched social and religious realities, a reign that had promised so much ultimately ended in failure. Justinian bequeathed to his successor, Justin II, an empire which, though larger, was nevertheless markedly fragile and fiscally unstable. This fiscal instability in particular was to do much to undermine the reigns of Justinian's successors and limit their ability to meet ever more pressing military needs. Justin II declared upon his accession to the throne that he 'found the treasury burdened with many debts and reduced to utter exhaustion'. The emperor was consequently unwilling or unable to continue the financial support by which the empire had secured the support of the Ghassanids in Arabia, as well, more recently, as the Avars in the Balkans.

From: Peter Sarris, *The Oxford History of Byzantium*, published in 2002.

### The Age of Justinian Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
1.1 Assess the view that, far from creating religious unity, Justinian's policies created many tensions and divisions. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	
1.2 How convincing is the view that Justinian's greatest military priority was the reconquest of the western parts of the old Roman Empire? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	1b.
1.3 Assess the view that Justinian's wars were motivated mainly by religious objectives. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	1b.
1.4 Assess the view that the Byzantine Empire became weak in the second half of Justinian's reign. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	1c.
1.5 How strong was Justinian's empire at his death? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	1c.
1.6 How successful were Justinian's domestic reforms? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	1a.
1.7 How important a figure was the Empress Theodora in the shaping of policy in Justinian's reign? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	1a.
1.8 How important was the building programme of Justinian? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	
1.9 To what extent can Justinian be viewed simply as a conservative emperor? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	
1.10 How useful is Procopius as a source of information on the reign of Justinian? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	

## 2. The Reign of Charlemagne 768-814

### 2a. The Conquest of the Saxons

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Charlemagne's methods of defeating the Saxons depended more on force than statesmanship.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers that negotiation allowed Charlemagne to end the resistance of Widukind.

In 785 Charlemagne took his entire force through Saxon territory to the Elbe without encountering any opposition, because, as the imperial annals noted, the roads were free. Charlemagne had broken the native resistance. Only Widukind and his son-in-law Abbio eluded the Frankish advance and headed north of the Elbe. Charlemagne tried to negotiate and offered a personal meeting. In view of the overwhelming Frankish strength, Widukind and Abbio were willing to compromise and accepted Charlemagne's offer to come to Francia, though they demanded that Frankish hostages be handed over to ensure their personal safety. After this condition had been met, Widukind and Abbio followed the Frankish king over the Rhine. They were baptised on Christmas Day 785. Charlemagne acted as godfather and honoured Widukind with rich gifts. In this situation, Charlemagne demonstrated his political instincts by offering Widukind the possibility of an honourable surrender rather than pursuing him to the bitter end. The Saxon leader was permitted to return to his own estates and may have been given a high office in the Frankish hierarchy. Widukind's baptism appeared to be the final fanfare of the Frankish victory. The royal annals reported somewhat prematurely that 'all of Saxony had been conquered'. Charlemagne also shared this view as is clear from his request to Pope Hadrian to have all Christians give thanks for the defeat of the Saxons.

From: Matthias Becher, *Charlemagne*, published in 2003.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Charlemagne tried to win the Saxons over.

In 776 Charlemagne began to build an impressive base at Paderborn, deep inside former Saxon territory. He regarded the new town as having more than strategic value. It was also a personal statement. He was to construct a palace-church complex which would overawe the local population. In 777 he underscored the importance of Paderborn and demonstrated his determination to remain in control of the region by holding the spring assembly of his senior nobles and churchmen amidst the construction site for his new capital. This display of power brought more submissions from the Saxons without the need for further fighting. Charlemagne also established churches and monasteries in the newly-subjugated region, believing that the steady drip-drip of teaching, miracle working and preaching would accomplish what necessarily brief displays of military might could not. But the spirit of the Saxons had not been broken. The Frankish chronicles, the main source of information about the wars, are triumphalist in tone and give the impression of a steady, inevitable extension of Frankish control. In fact the fighting was far from being one-sided. The Franks lost several battles and sacrificed thousands of their own warriors in the Saxon Wars.

From: Derek Wilson, *Charlemagne: Barbarian and Emperor*, published in 2005.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers Charlemagne's campaigns.

In the 784 campaign, when excessive rain provoked flooding and made the land impassable, Charlemagne decided not to return home as he might have done at another time, but to leave sufficient forces to keep the enemy at bay and march the rest of the army to lay waste Saxon lands further east. He was not happy with the results obtained and gathered more troops to replace those worn out in the summer campaign and fell back to the fortress of Eresburg to winter for the first time in enemy land. The firmness of his decision was demonstrated by the fact that he had his wife, Fastrada, and his children join him there. Rather than suspend operations during the winter months as was the custom, he continued personally to carry out punitive expeditions against the rebels. His strategic and logistical skills were clearly demonstrated in this campaign. It represented a new concept of inflicting an unbearable and continuous strain on enemy morale and material resources. It was not simply a matter of disseminating indiscriminate terror in order to break the rebels' spirit of resistance but also of shrewdly destroying those enemy forts that could be a future obstacle, maintaining control over the lines of communication and amassing provisions and supplies in the forward base at Eresburg. The intention was that, once the good weather came, the 785 campaign would prove decisive. And so it was to be. In the summer the Saxons found themselves without support in a devastated land, in which the Frankish cavalry was able to push forward wherever it wanted without any resistance.

From: Alessandro Barbero, *Charlemagne: Father of a Continent*, published in 2005.

**Interpretation D:** These historians consider Charlemagne's relationship with the Saxons.

In the 770s warfare with the Saxons proved indecisive. This was partly caused by the lack of a shared political culture between the antagonists. The Saxons, most importantly, had no king and decisions were apparently made at assemblies of lesser leaders. Would-be invaders could not hope for a decisive victory by capturing an identifiable political centre. In 782 Charlemagne issued the First Saxon Capitulary, outlining thirty-four new laws to be applied to the Saxons, many of them of Christianising intent, from the prohibition of human sacrifice to the death penalty for eating meat during Lent. These provisions were unprecedented. Never before had the Franks tried to impose Christianity on a conquered population so systematically. Most significant was the imposition of tithe, which shows that Christianisation implied forced adjustment of social structures and ways of life and even economic behaviour. Such measures provoked hostility, not just from the Saxons themselves but also from Charlemagne's own advisers. Alcuin wrote to Charlemagne, declaring tithes to be an impediment to Christianisation; how could new converts be genuinely brought to God by such oppression? This kind of stringency must have contributed to the almost immediate, and serious, uprising of the Saxons. A contingent of Franks was heavily defeated in the mountains, provoking dramatic retribution from Charlemagne: according to one annalist, 4500 Saxons were summarily executed.

From: Marios Costambeys, Matthew Innes and Simon Maclean, *The Carolingian World*, published in 2011.

## 2b. Decline in the later years of Charlemagne's rule

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the effectiveness of Charlemagne's government declined after 800.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers that the administration of Charlemagne was weak after 800.

We surely need to ask what the political and social situation was like inside this western empire during the years 801 to 814. The answer, beyond any doubt, is that this was a period during which the Carolingian state experienced, as never before, a rampant growth of all the symptoms and consequences of a bad administration. There are instances of malfunctioning of the public services, arbitrariness and extortion, acts of individual and collective violence, threats to the security of individual and corporate bodies and their property, especially where humbler folk were concerned. To be convinced, one only has to read the capitularies which year after year denounce the same abuses. The fact is that the Frankish and Lombard kingdoms had to function with a totally inadequate administrative and judicial apparatus, which left too much to the discretion of agents of public authority, many of whom had not the slightest hesitation in sacrificing their official duty to their greed.

From: F. L. Ganshof, *The last period of Charlemagne's reign: a study in decomposition*, published in 1948.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Charlemagne embarked on extensive legal reforms after 800.

Although in wide tracts such as east of the Rhine, there were mainly homogenous populations, yet elsewhere the sprinkling of the Franks and others over all the Carolingian Empire during its formation, resulted in a variety of laws held or 'professed' by the inhabitants of a particular district and produced a confused medley most alien to unity and good order. Charlemagne took the first steps to reform, although he seems to have hoped to do more, in the great assembly of 802. By his command, the unwritten customary law of certain tribes was reduced to writing, and that of others, like the Salic Law, was edited authoritatively. Amendment and extension, however, and the issue of laws cutting across the personal laws and so binding on the whole Empire, were effected by the numerous capitularies issued by the king. These were in no way part of a systematic code. They dealt with such questions of legal and administrative reform as came up year after year and each contained a mixture of laws, regulations and temporary or permanent commands according to need. The most significant feature is that the State, embodied in the Emperor, was attempting to develop the law and provide a better life for its members. It was in this spirit that Charlemagne paid special attention to economic conditions. Bridges and roads, tolls and customs, weights and measures, coinage and mints were regulated.

From: C. W. Previté-Orton, *The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History*, published in 1960.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Charlemagne faced problems in governing his large empire after 800.

The internal organization of the Frankish Empire under Charlemagne was widely marked by a considerable divergence between desire and reality. According to modern scholars, Charlemagne's empire after 800 encompassed approximately one million square kilometres. This unimaginably large empire was probably only governable because far fewer demands were made on the state by contemporaries than today. But Charlemagne himself was not satisfied with this situation. On the contrary, he continually strove to implement his far-reaching policies. But the reality in his empire looked different as he himself probably realised. In 813 at the end of his reign, Charlemagne ordered as many as five synods to be held, in Arles, Rheims, Mainz, Chalons and Tours, which were supposed to deal with the shortcomings. Charlemagne failed because of the individual interests of the nobles, of which he was undoubtedly aware. But he could not restrict them effectively as he needed them for the administration of his empire. It was the traditional right of the nobility to serve the king in a distinguished position. The king had to consider these claims since his great conquests would have been impossible without the support of the nobility. In 802 Alcuin assessed the reform efforts of his lord in the following manner: 'I am certain of the good intention of our lord and emperor and that he seeks to order everything in the realm granted to him by God according to what is just. However, I am also certain that he has more followers who seek to undermine justice, than who seek to support it and that there are more who seek their own advantage than those who look after God's advantage.' Only a few of Charlemagne's undertakings for the organization of the empire proved to be lasting, with the result that the last years of Charlemagne's reign can be described as an era of decay and crisis.

From: Matthias Becher, *Charlemagne*, published in 2003.

**Interpretation D:** This historian suggests that the increased use of the *missi* was an attempt by Charlemagne to improve government.

Although hitherto the role of the *missus* had been an intermittent one, from 802, however, one clerical *missus* and one lay *missus* acted together within a specific territory. The *missi dominici* were carriers of royal authority. They could act as judges in court. They could punish criminals and receive oaths. They were constantly required to inspect and check on the behaviour of both clergy and laity. They were charged with communicating the king's wishes, as expressed in his letters and capitularies, to everyone else. The system appears to have extended across the entire kingdom. It therefore constituted a vital means of co-ordinating communication within the empire. Many of the general themes were reiterated in the capitularies after 802 with the insistence on law and justice and the morality of clerics and laymen. New stipulations were added, such as the insistence that disputes involving violent killings should be brought to the royal officials and dealt with through the courts in an attempt to inhibit the seeking of vengeance by a victim's kindred. The *missi dominici* clearly played a crucial role in promoting greater coherence and administrative links across the empire. How much success they may claim for the relative stability of the Frankish realm after 800 is difficult to demonstrate. There are occasional traces in the narrative accounts of dissidents and rebellions after 800. One such was a revolt by a group of Thuringian nobles. Such evidence is rare yet, coupled with the repeated prohibitions of sworn associations in the capitularies, it indicates that the presentation of complete Carolingian success must be modified by the recognition that some groups resented or even rejected the much-vaunted benefits of Carolingian rule.

From: Rosamond McKitterick, *Charlemagne: The Formation of a European Identity*, published in 2008.

## 2c. Charlemagne and Church Reform

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Charlemagne's church reforms were designed more to enhance his power as ruler than to improve the quality of Christian devotion.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers Charlemagne's attitude to clerical standards.

Charlemagne's fundamental ideals were to improve the education of the clergy and to rectify their behaviour. He felt very strongly that as he was governing Christendom through the grace of God, one of his most important responsibilities was to guarantee the moral and educational standards of the clergy who preached the word of the Lord to his subjects. It was his heaviest responsibility. Christianity is a religion of the book and Charlemagne considered it indispensable that books were corrected. This was not just a question of orthodoxy, but also of language, given that a grammatical error could lead people to pray in a mistaken manner which would not please God. 'Whoever attempts to please God by living righteously must not neglect to please Him also by speaking righteously,' wrote Charlemagne in a circular letter to all the bishops and abbots of his kingdom. Priests were to have a good command of the language in which the sacred texts were written and in which they prayed in order to avoid gross errors when they addressed the Lord. The *admonitio generalis*, the great capitulary of 789, called on the Church to observe the ancient canons that for so long had been forgotten and trampled upon. It stressed that to achieve this aim a proper knowledge of Latin, the liturgical language, was indispensable. Hence priests had to attend good schools and bishops had to be concerned with priests' intellectual training even in the most remote dioceses of the immense empire.

From: Alessandro Barbero, *Charlemagne Father of a Continent*, published in 2004.

**Interpretation B:** This historian assesses Charlemagne's relationship with Rome over Church reform.

In 787 Charlemagne sent to Rome for an authentic copy of the Rule of St Benedict, for the benefit of the monasteries of his kingdom. All monks and nuns were to live by the rule of this 'Roman' abbot, according to a text sent out from the palace at Aachen. For Charlemagne, truth was to be found in the world once inhabited by St Peter, St Paul and St Benedict, and in the city once ruled by Christian Emperors. He strove to correct the cult of God for the sake of unanimity with the apostolic see and the peaceful harmony of God's holy Church. This did not imply any full-scale and detailed Romanisation of the Frankish liturgy, however, although Roman practices with regard to the kiss of peace and Roman usages in Lent were introduced in Francia through royal capitularies. The sermon collection of Paul the Deacon and the *Hadrianum*, the liturgy supposedly written by Gregory the Great, were also used. These were perceived as Roman, and therefore as texts which connected God's people to the early Church. But not all well-informed clerics agreed. When the *Hadrianum* came to Aachen, Alcuin grumbled that he saw no point in such innovations as the Frankish liturgies were certainly good enough.

From: Mayke de Jong, *Charlemagne's Church*, published in 2005.

**Interpretation C:** This historian gives an account of Charlemagne's aims in his Church reforms.

Charlemagne placed great stress on correct texts, proper conduct, rigorous discipline and tidy organisation. His bishops and abbots played a key role in implementing his reforms. His aims were set out clearly in his *admonitio generalis* and reiterated constantly in his capitularies and letters after that, and in the reform councils of 813. The latter added emphasis to the clergy's work for the salvation of the people and further defined the duties of the bishops and priests. The key texts of the Christian faith and for the conduct of a Christian life, often referred to in general terms in earlier royal statements, were specified and the Creed and Lord's Prayer were to be taught to all the faithful. The *admonitio generalis* drew on relevant decisions from early church councils called by papal authority, but it also articulated the king's responsibility for the people of God and the need for everyone in the kingdom, most especially the religious and secular elites, to work towards creating order and a polity worthy of salvation. Two letters can serve to highlight the principal emphases and intent of the ruler's fervour. In 786 Charlemagne wrote to the lectors about the necessity for an improvement in learning and in the provision of the correct books of the Old and New testaments. Another letter from Leidrad, archbishop of Lyon, reported to his master that he had constructed new churches and promoted the liturgy as it was sung in Charlemagne's own palace in accordance with the emperor's expectations.

From: Rosamond McKitterick, *Charlemagne: The Formation of a European Identity*, published in 2008.

**Interpretation D:** This historian outlines Charlemagne's reasons for promoting biblical scholarship.

Charlemagne was an enthusiast for the Scriptures, which were interpreted as providing a convenient basis for his own authority and a portrayal of the way in which superiors should act towards their subjects and the subjects towards their superiors. The last twenty years of the reign, a period which saw a vast expansion and consolidation of the imperial territory, are also a time which sees an accelerated rate of production of biblical texts under ecclesiastical supervision in the scriptoria. The king's new subjects had to be educated in the virtues of obedience through biblical studies, which, like other areas of Carolingian scholarship, followed Charlemagne's utilitarian imperative. This planned national renewal took its cue from the papacy, an institution which had decided that 'of all the kingdoms the Frankish shine forth in the sight of the Lord'. Nation-building involved the Franks' identification with papal policy and a break with the traditions of the tribal Germanic past. They would become a holy nation, consecrated to a new and higher purpose. Clerics and scholars who were recruited to ensure these aims were fulfilled were part of the governmental machine. Scholarship and learning were at the service of the ruler and the kind of literature that was studied served to enhance the ruler's status.

From: Hywel Williams, *Emperor of the West, Charlemagne and the Carolingian Empire*, published in 2010.

### The Reign of Charlemagne 768-814 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
2.1 Assess the view that Charlemagne's wars were motivated mainly by religious objectives. <b>[40 marks]</b>	2a.
2.2 To what extent was Charlemagne's empire on the defensive militarily in his later years? <b>[40 marks]</b>	2b.
2.3 Assess the view that Charlemagne's wars had a more negative than positive impact on his empire. <b>[40 marks]</b>	2a.
2.4 How great a military leader was Charlemagne? <b>[40 marks]</b>	2a.
2.5 Assess the view that the coronation of 800 made little difference to the ways in which Charlemagne ruled his lands. <b>[40 marks]</b>	2b.
2.6 How far was Charlemagne's personal interest the main factor in his promotion of culture and learning? <b>[40 marks]</b>	2c.
2.7 How united was Charlemagne's 'Empire' after 800? <b>[40 marks]</b>	2b.
2.8 How important was the Church to the effective government of Charlemagne's empire? <b>[40 marks]</b>	2c.
2.9 To what extent was Charlemagne's empire unified only by the force of his personality? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
2.10 Assess the view that the period 800-814 was one of dissolution and decay for Charlemagne's empire. <b>[40 marks]</b>	2b.

### 3. Alfred the Great 871-899

#### 3a. Alfred's Reputation

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Alfred's achievements have been exaggerated.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers Alfred's reactions to the Viking threat.

By 886 Wessex had been secured for the English and there was a good prospect that the alliance with Mercia would at least allow the Danes to be confined within the area which they occupied between the Thames and the Tees. The threat of renewed invasion from the south east remained with Alfred for the rest of his reign. Powerful Danish forces continued to rove the Channel at will and in 892 made successful landings in two detachments, one on the northern and one on the southern shore of Kent. These new invaders severely tested the defences of Wessex, but they were the remains of a beaten army, encumbered with their horses and also with their wives and children. They received some support from the Danes in England, but there was never any likelihood of their being able to succeed in the conquest of Wessex where their predecessors had failed in much more favourable circumstances. It was impossible for Alfred to do more than retain his hold upon what had been recognised as his by his treaty with Guthrum. But his military achievement was ample justification for the verdict which posterity has passed on this remarkable man.

From: Peter Hunter Blair, *An Introduction to Anglo-Saxon England*, published in 1959.

**Interpretation B:** This historian considers Alfred's reputation.

For all Alfred's conventional piety, he and the Vikings understood one another. He was what they expected a king to be; a hard man, ruthless, a battle-winner, a king with luck yet generous to his men. He was not at all like the meek Christlike figure of Victorian popular histories. He would, for instance, hang his prisoners at the slightest provocation. Alfred's dramatic reversal of fortune, from the hide-out at Athelney to success at Edington is so extreme that some modern writers have refused to take Alfred seriously, especially as our knowledge is based on the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* account which he sponsored. They have seen its report as an effective piece of dynastic propaganda. To an extent, there is something to be said for this. In the years after Edington, Alfred's subjects had to take on a heavy burden in terms of taxation and personal service. They had to provide for a fleet, a whole system of fortified burhs, a mounted expeditionary force and a general levy which mobilised in two shifts. Alfred may have exaggerated his distress during the dark days of Athelney, in order to create an 'Alfred myth' as it were, but distress there certainly was. Indeed, although he eventually defeated the Danes and had driven them from Wessex, he knew they were to remain in England for good.

From: Michael Wood, *In Search of the Dark Ages*, published in 1981.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers some of the sources on which Alfred's reputation is based.

The fact that, by and large, we have only the West Saxon view of the Viking wars is part of the problem about the sources for Alfred's achievement in general. Whether or not the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* was written under Alfred's auspices, it certainly gives a more detailed and sympathetic account of him than of any previous king, West Saxon or otherwise. Alfred is also the first English king whose will is extant, which more than compensates for there being relatively few charters from his reign. His law code is the first to survive in its original form since Ine's. There are also the books written in Alfred's court, especially the intimate biography of the king written by Asser from St Davids. Above all, Alfred wrote translations himself. He was the only European king of the early Middle Ages known to have written books and they give a unique opportunity to explore the royal mind. The problem with Alfred is that we almost know too much and too much from the king's own circle. It is typical that the beautiful Alfred Jewel is the first treasure that can be connected with near certainty to a particular Anglo-Saxon king. The danger therefore is that one will make him too good to be true.

From: Patrick Wormald, *The Ninth Century*, published in 1982.

**Interpretation D:** This historian explains the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle's* view of Alfred's achievements.

By the summer of 896, when Alfred watched the remnants of the Viking army sail away, he was an old man of forty-seven. He could not have guessed this would be the last army he would ever face. He could never know it but he finally had peace and he would have just three short years in which to enjoy it. The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle's* comment on the end of the war is curious, but it speaks volumes as to how Alfred changed his kingdom. Instead of revelling in the dispersal of the enemy army, it takes a peculiarly downbeat line, saying: 'By the grace of God the army had not on the whole afflicted the English people very greatly; but they were much more seriously afflicted in those years by the mortality of cattle and men.' Noting that disease was a greater enemy than the Vikings may have been true in a way, but to claim that the invaders had not troubled the English 'very greatly' is disingenuous at best. What it does hint at is a certain pride in the manner in which the threat had been dissipated. It was awkward for the chronicler that the war had not ended with a classic set-piece in which his hero, the king, could lead out the men of the fyrd to total victory like a latter-day Beowulf. It was also awkward that the king had not been present at all the major engagements. Alfred could not be everywhere at once so he delegated; he could not win wars like this through personal bravery so he did not try to and hence he could not be made to fit the model of the heroes from the old stories he loved so much.

From: Justin Pollard, *Alfred the Great*, published in 2005.

### 3b. Alfred's Government

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Alfred was mainly motivated by his desire to be a just king.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers the importance of Alfred's laws.

The text of Alfred's laws shows them to be remarkably conservative. In a short preface Alfred stated that he had collected whatever he thought most just in the laws of Ine of Wessex, Offa of Mercia and Aethelberht of Kent and not ventured to propose much new legislation of his own. But there are important features in his laws which are not derived from any known source and may well be original. They include provisions protecting the weaker members of society against oppression, limiting the ancient custom of the blood-feud and emphasising the duty of a man to his lord. Alfred's code has a further significance. In his preface he gives himself no higher title than King of the West Saxons and he names his kinsman Ine first amongst the three kings whose work had influenced his own. But the names of Offa and Aethelberht, which follow in the list, imply that Alfred's code was intended to cover, not only Wessex but Kent and Mercia. It thus becomes important evidence of the new political unity forced upon the various English peoples by the struggle against the Danes. The law code is also a landmark in English legal history, appearing at the end of a century in which no other English king had issued laws. In Europe kings were ceasing to exercise their traditional legislative powers. In England the tradition was maintained by Alfred.

From: Frank Stenton, *Anglo-Saxon England*, published in 1943.

**Interpretation B:** This historian considers the importance Alfred attached to wealth.

Alfred understood the relationship between wealth and effective rule. He saw earthly rule as a divine charge laid upon a ruler and to fulfil that duty a ruler needed wealth. According to Asser he said, 'I never delighted in covetousness and the possession of earthly power, nor longed for this authority, but I desired tools and material to carry out the work I was set to do, which was that I should virtuously and fittingly administer the authority committed to me.' For Alfred 'tools' and 'material' of kingship were a land well-peopled with praying men and the land, gifts, weapons, food, ale, clothing and other necessities to support them. Alfred obtained these necessities by war and by managing the economic resources of the crown. The main sources of his wealth were the profits of the commercial activities and the mints in his burhs, the dues of justice, the tribute he received from client rulers and the revenues generated by his private estates. He needed land to attract and reward warriors and this drove him to appropriate monastic estates recovered from the Vikings, even at the risk of alienating the despoiled churchmen. He also took a practical role in managing the economic resources of his kingdom, appending laws of Ine to his own that the landscape should be carefully divided between what was cultivated and what was pasture. Would-be traders were to bring all the men they planned to take with them before the king's reeve at a public meeting to establish their accountability.

From: Richard Abels, *Alfred the Great*, published in 1998.

**Interpretation C:** This historian explains that Alfred came under criticism at times.

There are signs of strain in the later years of Alfred's reign. Asser acknowledges that the king ruled by force as well as persuasion, sharply chastising those who were disobedient and despising popular stupidity and stubbornness. Nor was he unopposed. His laws prescribe death for anyone who plots against the king's life, either on his own account or by harbouring outlaws. Equally, penalties are laid down for any of the king's men who commit similar offences against their own lords. Asser tells us that one of Alfred's own ealdormen, Wulfhere, forfeited his lands when 'he deserted without permission both his lord King Alfred and his country, in spite of the oath which he had sworn to the king and all his leading men'. As a result he lost the control and inheritance of his lands under the 'just judgement of all the Witan, of the Gewisse and the Mercians'. Criticism of Alfred is voiced by Pope John VIII in a letter to Aethelred, archbishop of Canterbury, written in 878 or 879. He urges the archbishop to 'resist strongly not only the king but all who wish to do any wrong' to the Church. He adds that he himself has written a letter of exhortation to the king, which (unfortunately) has not survived. The monks of Abingdon remembered Alfred as a despoiler of their land 'for the uses of himself and his men'. Tribute to the Danes created heavy demands. Alfred had the resources common to all early kings: the royal estates, his own personal property, the profits of justice and tolls levied on trade. Land forfeited for treason would also come into his hands. Alfred's policies clearly cost money and the need may underlie the discontents, both lay and ecclesiastical, which surface from time to time in his reign.

From: Ann Williams, *Kingship and Government in pre-Conquest England, c.500-1066*, published in 1999.

**Interpretation D:** This historian outlines Alfred's legal role.

Alfred needed his law code for two very important reasons. First it was a signal to the people of England that he was a major figure, a lawmaker, like Ine and Offa before him. With many of the other rulers of England and Wales now effectively his clients, this set a propaganda framework over them all and made a public show of his regality. Second, it was a vital part of his administration – a handbook for the men he chose as judges when he could not be there in person. With the king's influence having expanded over such a large territory, this must have been particularly urgent as the sheer weight of litigation increased beyond that which one king and judge could carry. At the end of the day, however, the highest court in the land remained the king himself. This became clear in the case of Helmstan who had stolen from Aethelred and became involved in a series of claims and counter claims. The suitors brought the case to the king, who was washing his hands in his house at Wardour, but stopped, questioned those concerned and got them to agree a way forward. Such judgements gained Alfred the reputation of a particularly just king.

From: Justin Pollard, *Alfred the Great*, published in 2005.

### 3c. The 'Alfredian Renaissance'

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the cultural developments in Alfred's reign were aimed mainly at improving the literacy of the people.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** These historians argue that religion, learning and military dangers were all linked.

Alfred's practical measures for the defence of Wessex undertaken in the 880s would protect the kingdom from the threat of further Viking attack; but if his military reforms can be regarded as prevention, there is reason to regard his programme for the revival of religion and learning as the intended cure. In one of his own writings, Alfred looked back to the seventh century as a Golden Age when religion and learning flourished, and when kings 'not only maintained their peace, morality and authority at home but also extended their territory outside'. It was clearly felt, however, that the Church had fallen into serious decay during the ninth century, and although some laid the blame on the Viking invasions, others attributed the decline to general failings on the part of the English themselves. The quality of learning in England had also declined, to such an extent that there were not many men capable of understanding Latin north of the Humber, and very few south of the Humber; at the time of Alfred's accession there was not a single one south of the Thames (that is, in Wessex itself). Alfred seems to have regarded the Viking invasions as a form of divine punishment for the decline, and his endeavours to revive religion and learning can thus be seen as an attempt on his part to strike at the heart of the problem and thereby to ensure peace and prosperity in the future.

From: M. Lapidge and S. Keynes, *Alfred the Great*, published in 1983.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the 'Alfredian Renaissance' had a heavy scholarly as well as religious content.

Alfred recruited the Frankish scholar Gimbald from Flanders and John the Old Saxon from eastern Francia to join Asser and the Mercian scholars at his court in the 880s. This 'court school', which was perhaps a conscious imitation of the band of European scholars brought together by Charlemagne, belatedly brought the Carolingian Renaissance to Wessex. To begin with, the Renaissance seems to have been a personal one for Alfred himself, but in the following decade Alfred sought to broaden its effect by making clear to his bishops and secular nobles that new standards of literacy and Christian knowledge were expected of them. Alfred also made available through his own translations and those of his scholarly advisers some of the books which he had found useful in his own personal odyssey and considered 'most necessary for all men to know'. Like Charlemagne, Alfred seems to have believed that many of his problems as king would be solved if his subjects developed a similar consciousness of doing their Christian duty. For according to the way these matters had been interpreted during the Carolingian Renaissance the subjects owed the same kind of obedience to their king that God demanded from the king himself. Alfred's duty was to stand firm against the pagan Vikings; that of his subjects was to assist him by obeying his orders.

From: B. Yorke, *Kings and Kingdoms of Early Anglo-Saxon England*, published in 1990.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that the 'Alfredian Renaissance' had both religious and political purposes.

The religious problem posed by the Danes is in many ways the least expected to modern eyes, but was central for Alfred himself. In his preface to the *Pastoral Rule*, he wrote: 'Remember what temporal punishments came upon us when we neither loved wisdom ourselves nor allowed it to others'. If the relevance of a revival of learning to the defeat of the Danes is scarcely obvious to us, except in so far as literacy might contribute to administrative efficiency, its relevance for Alfred was that, without God's help, no amount of fleets, divided armies or *burhs* would do any good at all; and God's help could only be won by learning to read and understand his word. Alfred had Carolingian example to tell him of his duties as king. The preface to the *Pastoral Rule* is the central document of Alfred's Renaissance. In the first place, it lists the main scholars he recruited to help him: Archbishop Plegmund of Canterbury (890-914), Bishop Asser from St David's, Grimbald from Rheims, and John from continental Saxony. Grimbald and John revived the Carolingian connections of Alfred's father. Grimbald, finally, may well have brought much more. It is not impossible that Grimbald helped to inspire the compilation of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, and influenced Alfred's law code in various ways. Alfred's court of scholars was scarcely as impressive as Charlemagne's, but it probably represented a fair cross-section of the learned resources of late ninth-century Europe.

From: Patrick Wormald, '*The Ninth Century*', an essay published in 1991.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Alfred had several objectives in promoting the revival of learning, and drew on a range of help.

What Alfred hoped to gain by educating his people is expressed most fully in his preface to his first translation, the *Pastoral Care* of Pope Gregory the Great. But that golden age of wisdom and prosperity had long passed. Learning had decayed so thoroughly, Alfred lamented, that few men south of the Humber, and probably north of it as well, could understand the meaning of the divine services they recited or even translate a letter from Latin into English. Alfred did not blame the Vikings for the decay of learning. On the contrary, the Vikings were the consequence of its neglect. They were God's scourge sent to remind those who were only 'Christians in name' where true wealth was really stored. Everyone would have access to the translations and profit from the wisdom contained in them. Those who were to be advanced to holy orders, of course, would continue their study, receiving instruction in Latin. If all this were done, Alfred believed, wisdom would flourish throughout the kingdom and the peace and prosperity of the old days would return. Alfred undoubtedly exaggerated for dramatic effect the abysmal condition of learning in southern England, as he did the decay of ecclesiastical institutions in his letter to Archbishop Fulk. Nor was Alfred completely consistent in his Preface to the *Pastoral Care*. Alfred boasted that he was surrounded by learned bishops, and one wonders where they had been educated if not in monastic or episcopal schools. The presence of Plegmund, Waerferth and the other Mercians in Alfred's court gives proof of the persistence of a tradition of learning north of the Thames.

From: Richard Abels, *Alfred the Great*, published in 1998.

## Alfred the Great 871-899 Investigation Titles

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.
3.1 How far do you agree with the view that Alfred's victory against the Vikings in 878 was the most important factor in his eventual success as a ruler? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	3a.
3.2 Assess the view that the main factor in Alfred's successes against the Vikings was his personal leadership. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	3a.
3.3 Assess the importance of Alfred's military and naval reforms in the successes against the Vikings in the years 892-6. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	3a.
3.4 How successful was Alfred's government of Wessex? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	3b.
3.5 Assess the view that the most significant achievement of Alfred's reign was the cultural and educational revival he inspired. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	3c.
3.6 Assess the view that Alfred's educational and cultural activities amounted to a renaissance. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	3c.
3.7 How far do you agree that assessing Alfred's successes is made the harder by the conscious propaganda of both Asser and the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	
3.8 Assess the view that there was limited unity in the areas of Anglo-Saxon England ruled over by Alfred. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	
3.9 How 'great' were the achievements of Alfred in ruling over Wessex? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	3a, 3b.
3.10 How strong was Wessex at the death of Alfred in 899? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	3a.

#### 4. The Reign of King John 1199-1215

##### 4a. John and Magna Carta

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Magna Carta was a victory for the barons.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian examines the attitude of the Pope.

Rightly or wrongly, John felt no obligation to accept the Charter as permanent, and in this he quickly received valuable support from the Pope. Innocent seems to have regarded the settlement as improperly restricting John's position and as infringing papal rights of lordship over England. While negotiations for the Charter were in progress he had ordered Langton to excommunicate those opposed to the king and had suspended him from office when he refused. He now condemned the Great Charter as 'not only shameful and demeaning but also illegal and unjust'. His Bull was dated 24 August but by the time news of it reached England in September, civil war had broken out. Tempers on both sides were rising, and the Northerners, never very tractable, had become less so after Langton departed to Rome to plead for a more realistic attitude there. But barons much less hotheaded and anarchic than some of the Northerners might well hesitate to disarm, with so unreliable and ferocious a king as John relieved by the Pope from the need to observe the Great Charter. With so much unreason on one side and so much unreliability on the other the inevitable outcome was war.

From: J. C. Dickinson, *The Great Charter*, published in 1955.

**Interpretation B:** This historian considers John's relations with the barons.

The conclusion of peace between John and his barons involved changes in the personnel of royal government. Although no reference to the office of justiciar is made in the Great Charter, it is clear that the removal of Peter des Roches was one of the conditions of the peace. On the day agreement was reached John appointed Hubert de Burgh to this high office. This arrangement was obviously a compromise. Hubert had always been a loyal and, except for a brief period, a trusted servant of John. Yet he was an Englishman and hence more acceptable to the barons than Peter. Moreover, Hubert had the support of the powerful Earl Warren. Although Hubert had no experience as a judge and presumably no great knowledge of the law, he was an experienced administrator. He had been the king's chamberlain, the constable of Chinon and the seneschal of Poitou. John on his side was naturally disinclined to retain in office men who had been active partisans of the rebellious barons. Some were deprived of their positions as sheriffs. Hubert de Burgh was made sheriff of Kent and Surrey and John Marshal in Norfolk and Suffolk. Then Magna Carta provided for the removal from office of certain foreign mercenary captains. Here King John showed no great haste. During July two foreigners mentioned in the Charter were removed as constables of royal castles but another, sheriff of Nottingham and Derby, remained in office.

From: Sidney Painter, *The Reign of King John*, published in 1966.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers the implications of the Charter.

Some of the provisions of Magna Carta are aimed at dismantling John's machinery of control; the expulsion of foreign mercenaries, the return of hostages, the remission of the huge fines and financial obligations into which the barons had been lured. Yet it is much more than a political settlement and most of its clauses have a permanent and general character. The Charter is, indeed, in the form of a royal grant to all free men in perpetuity. In it the king promises to limit his authority and observe certain set procedures. Much of the detail concerns the regulation of the king's feudal rights, matters that were obviously of great importance to his barons. John pledged himself and his successors not to abuse the overlord's right to have custody of minor heirs, to levy inheritance payments, to arrange the marriage of minor heirs, heiresses and widows. He also agreed to lessen the burden represented by the Royal Forest, land under a special, and much resented, law. Moreover, in a clause pregnant with future significance, he promised not to levy the taxes known as *scutage* and *aid* without 'the common consent of the kingdom'.

From: Robert Bartlett, *England under the Norman and Angevin Kings, 1075-1225*, published in 2000.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers King John's reactions to Magna Carta.

Hitherto kings had kept their promises only through fear of God or rebellion, but the barons, rightly, knew that neither of these factors weighed much with John. It was entirely possible that the whole structure of Magna Carta would topple the second John was back in his own castle at Winchester, that he would instantly try to wriggle out of his commitments, as was his habitual practice. In logic, they had, therefore, to put in place some kind of enforcement procedure, so that their labours on the Charter did not turn out in vain. They proposed a system whereby all the barons would take an oath to obey the instructions of their 25-strong executive committee, or a majority if they could not all agree. But the barons sharpened the edge of conflict by insisting that only 'Northerners' or rebel barons could serve on the Committee of Twenty-Five; there was to be no place for any of the moderate barons. John was therefore faced by a committee of his sworn enemies. It did not take a genius to see that if all real decision-making was henceforth to be the prerogative of this committee, and that they could strip the monarch of castles and all the sinews of war without any possibility of appeal against their judgement, then the king had in effect been dethroned. Everyone who knew John knew that he was only negotiating in the first place to buy time and that he would repudiate the Charter once he felt strong enough. But the formation of the Committee of Twenty-Five meant that the differences between him and the barons had now become irreconcilable, and that civil war would break out again sooner rather than later.

From: Frank McLynn, *Lionheart and Lackland: King Richard, King John and the Wars of Conquest*, published in 2006.

#### 4b. John's failure to regain his Norman Lands

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that King John was to blame for the failure to regain Normandy after 1204.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the outcome of 1204 made it hard for John to recover his lost lands.

One of the most interesting political events of the early years of John's reign and one that had important financial implications for both kings was the separation of England from Normandy. This separation deprived Normandy of a large proportion of its major barons. The ease with which Philip and his successors held the duchy was in all probability largely the result of the lack of really powerful lords with whom the English kings could intrigue. After 1204 the greatest lords of Normandy were lesser barons. Philip Augustus had a magnificent opportunity and he made full use of it. William Marshal and Robert, Earl of Leicester made arrangements by which they could stay in England and still keep their Norman lands. But in general the lands of the great barons who chose to stay in England fell into the hands of King Philip. And the king showed no generosity in granting them to his followers. A few Normans were bought with modest grants but, on the whole, the forfeited fiefs seem to have slipped gently into Philip's demesne. King John was in a more complicated position than his rival. As far as Philip was concerned, the separation of England and Normandy was permanent. There was no reason for him to regard his disposal of the lands of the English barons as temporary and he had no strong desire to court their favour. But John did not regard the separation as permanent. He was full of plans to recover the duchy, and the good-will of the Norman lords was very important to him. All grants made by John from the possessions of his vassals who remained in Normandy were regarded as valid only until the recovery of the duchy.

From: Sidney Painter, *The Reign of King John*, published in 1949.

**Interpretation B:** This historian believes that King John faced considerable problems in campaigning in France.

In 1206 John had good reason to be satisfied with the success of his venture in Poitou since it was largely in his hands once more and he had seen what the situation in Aquitaine required. His readiness to conclude a long truce suggests that he realised that great as his effort had been, a greater one was needed if the losses in Normandy were to be recovered. The problems and politics involved in Poitevin operations were formidable. England was the source of adequate resources if he could persuade the barons to release them for his use, but the battlefield was at the far end of a long sea journey. The mere ferrying of supplies would involve armed convoys; the shipment of a large army would be a naval operation of the first magnitude. Command of the Channel and of the approaches to La Rochelle or Bordeaux were essential before an expedition could even be contemplated, and there was always the danger of a French counter-attack while the king was on the western seas. The king's small administrative service had laboured manfully to organise the musters of 1205 and 1206, but it was overworked; several officials were responsible for half a dozen different jobs at once. Operations on the scale necessary for success would have to be planned carefully. It would all cost an unprecedented amount of money. England was rich and prospering, but the traditional sources of crown revenue were inadequate for the king's needs.

From: W. L. Warren, *King John*, published in 1961.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers that John had the financial resources to win back Normandy, despite inflationary pressures.

After 1204 John spent more time in England than any other king since 1066, excepting only Stephen. For ten furious years he lashed his court round the country, rarely staying for more than a week in one place. His aim was to amass the treasure to win Normandy back. His need for money was accentuated by the rapid inflation which occurred at the start of his reign with prices more than doubling. A mercenary knight had to be paid 8d a day under Henry II and 2s a day under John, a threefold increase, although possibly influenced by the need for heavier equipment. Income derived from selling agricultural produce on the market rose with the prices and was thus protected, but a far smaller proportion of royal than baronial income came in that way. Instead with the depletion of the royal demesne under Stephen and Richard, kings relied increasingly on other sources of revenue, which bore down directly on individuals and were far more unpopular. Between 1207 and 1212, John's average income was some £49000 a year, double what it had been between 1199 and 1202. In real terms this was 25% a year more than that of Henry I in 1130. Probably the years after 1207 saw the greatest level of financial exaction since the Conquest.

From: David Carpenter, *The Struggle for Mastery, Britain 1066-1284*, published in 2003.

**Interpretation D:** This historian is critical of King John's actions when trying to regain his lost lands.

Henry II and Richard I acted unreasonably and vindictively at times and on one level John only followed the example of his father and his brother. However his failings were made more apparent to his subjects for various reasons. First, his needs were arguably greater than his predecessors', and he was pushed to extremes in trying to meet them. The task he set himself after 1204 of recovering his lost continental possessions was on a quite different scale from anything Henry II or Richard had ever attempted. Second, confined to England after 1204, John was more of a presence to his subjects than Henry or Richard had been. He knew England better than any previous king. Third, he had a huge appetite for the nuts and bolts of administration, which meant that he got involved in making decisions both great and small. For all these reasons John could be personally identified with the oppressive government he so obviously led. Moreover, he did not help himself, and his conduct regularly shocked contemporaries. He was rumoured to have seduced the female relatives of some of his great men and he was held responsible for the deaths of Matilda de Braose and her eldest son. Such episodes alienated John's subjects and meant they were unwilling to fight for him when the crucial time came.

From: Richard Huscroft, *Ruling England, 1042-1217*, published in 2005.

#### 4c. King John's Personality and his Qualities as King

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that King John's good qualities as king outweighed his deficiencies as king.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian examines King John's methods of government.

John took a thoroughly intelligent and immensely energetic interest in running the country. He intervened frequently in the business of the Exchequer and sometimes attended its meetings. He sat with his barons and judges to try legal actions and his justices deferred legal cases to him. Above all, John travelled about his kingdom as no other monarch had done before. He and his household covered ground with remarkable speed. As king he only once stayed in one place for more than a month and that was in 1215 when he laid siege to Rochester Castle. Even a stay of a week's duration was uncommon. Usually after two or three nights, or frequently only one, he was off again, sometimes covering as much as thirty miles a day, penetrating to the farthest corners of the land. John's journeys signalled government by the King in person in a way never experienced before by those he was governing. Wherever John went he ferreted out infringements of his rights, vigorously imposed the law, castigated and disciplined his officials and impressed the local inhabitants with the dignity of a King. John's activity was, of course, very much centred on his own interests; his main objective was to replenish his treasure. But his administrative interest and activity had far wider results than this. His reign produced or extended administrative experiments and developments which set the course for the rest of the century.

From: J. C. Holt, *King John*, published in 1963.

**Interpretation B:** This historian sums up John's characteristics as king.

John put his deepest trust in men who were completely dependent on him and, in practice, this often meant the clever and able men he had brought over from the continent. He thus had a body of strong-arm agents whom he would move into trouble spots to enforce his will at the point of a sword. Yet he imparted cloak-and-dagger secrecy into his administration. He seems to have expected to be cheated and devised elaborate checks when conveying instructions. His passion for security became almost a mania. Then there was the way John himself went to work. He prowled the country with a nose alert for scandal and misdemeanour. Yet he gave cause for scandal himself. He was adulterous and had five bastards. The peculiar rub of John's lustfulness seems to be that he pursued the wives and daughters of his barons. He was, however, cultivated in his tastes, fastidious in personal cleanliness, industrious, clever and ingenious. At the same time he was hot-tempered, wilful and capricious. He was generous to those who could not harm him and merciless to anyone who could. Above all, he was secretive and suspicious, over-sensitive to the merest flicker of opposition, relentless in revenge and cruel and mocking when he had men in his clutch. Is it any wonder men delighted to tell stories of his wickedness without bothering to establish their authenticity?

From: W. L. Warren, *King John*, published in 1964.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers King John as a ruler.

In many, perhaps in most, respects John was an excellent king. His close attention to the business of government was in decided contrast to the negligent attitude of Richard I. He was intelligent and aggressive in trying to solve the political and financial problems that faced him. He seems to have appreciated the value of able royal servants. He took over the entire administration of his brother with a few exceptions when it would have been easy to replace them with his own. Moreover, John's favourites were clearly men of capacity. No more proof is needed than the success with which they ran the government after the king's death. He was an innovator who sought to develop royal power as had his predecessors. He found the royal revenue nearly static in a time of rising costs and rising baronial incomes and he sought to redress the balance. While John was a far better king than his brother, little can be said in favour of his private character. He was cruel, lecherous and deceitful. His mind was always seething with jealousy and suspicion of his servants and vassals. He was as close to irreligious as it was possible for a man of his time to be. His personal vices continually hampered his political effectiveness. While the policies of John as a king may have kept his vassals in a permanent state of discontent, it was his personal quarrels that supplied leaders for the disaffected.

From: Sidney Painter, *The Reign of King John*, published in 1966.

**Interpretation D:** This historian assesses John's achievements.

John's problems were immense. Richard had left him an empty treasury, a people waking to disenchantment, and a difficult and costly foreign policy. Monetary inflation had added to the task. Professionalised warfare had become ruinous to the crown. A mediocrity in John's position would have retrenched and, by seeking less, have salvaged more. John would rarely bargain and he accepted uncompromising defeat as a springboard to total victory. It may be that John was too clever, too opportunist, too mercurial. Aware of mistrust and dislike, he was suspicious and elaborately careful; but he only aroused greater fear. Although an intelligent diplomatist and general, and always meditating conquest, his diplomacy usually outran his means and his campaigns were too often unlucky. He had his father's gift of finding useful men and handled them even better, possibly because he chose rougher tools. He kept the loyalty of his own creatures and they remained faithful to his family in the years of its greatest danger. He had, too, his father's technical grasp of law and administration, which enabled him to interfere in the government and keep control over his servants. But his impatience, caprice and lack of judgement give an air of improvisation to the whole reign. John lacked most of the special talents needed for success as lord and king, and his undeniable qualities only made his failure seem all the more grotesque, ignoble and complete.

From: Frank Barlow, *The Feudal Kingdom of England 1042-1216*, published in 1999.

## The Reign of King John 1199-1215 Investigation Titles

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.
4.1 Assess the view that the civil war of 1215-16 was more the result of baronial actions than John's own actions. <b>[40 marks]</b>	4a.
4.2 Assess the view that John's personality was the main factor in the breakdown of his relations with the barons. <b>[40 marks]</b>	4a.
4.3 Assess the view that the main cause of the struggle between John and his barons was the failure of his grand plans of 1214. <b>[40 marks]</b>	4a.
4.4 How far do you agree with the view that superior French resources were the main factor in the loss of Normandy? <b>[40 marks]</b>	4b.
4.5 Assess the view that the conflict between John and Pope Innocent III was a conflict more about personalities than high principles. <b>[40 marks]</b>	4c.
4.6 How far do you agree with the view that the protracted nature of the conflict between King John and Innocent III shows how much support John had in England? <b>[40 marks]</b>	4c.
4.7 How able a ruler was King John in domestic policy areas? <b>[40 marks]</b>	4a, 4c.
4.8 How far do you agree with the view that John's ability as an administrator was not matched by his ability as a military and political leader? <b>[40 marks]</b>	4b, 4c.
4.9 How far can <i>Magna Carta</i> be seen as a commentary on feudal practices? <b>[40 marks]</b>	4a.
4.10 How accurate is the representation of John by the monastic chroniclers? <b>[40 marks]</b>	

## 5. The Wars of the Roses 1450-85

### 5a. The ambitions of Richard of York

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Richard of York's motives were entirely selfish.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian believes that Richard of York wanted to be king in 1460.

The victory at Northampton in 1460 determined the duke of York to leave Ireland and make his claim to the throne. He landed at Chester and when he reached Abingdon he sent for trumpeters and gave them banners with the English royal coat of arms. When parliament met, he arrived with 300 armed men and entered Westminster Hall with the sword carried before him. But, when he presented himself to the lords and laid his hand for a moment on the empty throne, there was no acclamation but silence. The tense scene was interrupted by the archbishop of Canterbury who asked him if he wished to go and see the king. The duke's famous reply, 'I know of no one in the realm who would not more fitly come to me than I to him', and his general demeanour in the palace made it perfectly clear to the lords what the duke had wanted. It was equally clear that nobody thought of that moment as a suitable occasion for a change of dynasty. When, after a few days the duke actually sat down upon the royal throne and addressed the lords, claiming that the crown was his by inheritance, he got no encouragement. He then sent the lords a genealogical statement of his claim, making it perfectly clear that he was claiming on the ground of hereditary right alone.

From: E. F. Jacob, *The Fifteenth Century 1399-1485*, published in 1961.

**Interpretation B:** This historian considers that, in 1450-2, Richard only wanted to be recognised as the heir to the throne.

Early in 1452 York issued a personal statement from Ludlow castle that declared unequivocally his allegiance to Henry VI. There is no reason to doubt its sincerity. York's dynastic aim was to secure acceptance as Henry's heir, not as his replacement. But he said that it was a matter of great regret to him that the king was 'my heavy lord, greatly displeased with me and hath in me a distrust by sinister information of my enemies, adversaries and evil-willers'. He was anxious to disabuse Henry and solemnly give the lie to his traducers. Hence he invited the highly respected earl of Shrewsbury and bishop of Hereford to Ludlow to hear his professions of loyalty and his willingness to swear on the sacrament that he was a true and faithful subject. But, having done this, he did make an attempt to induce the king to remove Somerset from his side, and thus as prospective Lancastrian heir and to achieve his own nomination as the king's heir. He wrote again, setting great store by the pride and patriotism of Englishmen, which Somerset had betrayed by his disastrous record in France. He implied that his proposals made in 1450 would have remedied the realm's condition, but Somerset had ensured their rejection. Thus he concluded that Somerset was working to bring about his undoing and to disinherit the duke and his heirs.

From: R. A. Griffiths, *The Reign of King Henry VI*, published in 1980.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Richard tried to provide sound government while he was Protector.

In March 1454 York was made Protector. York possessed serious defects as a political leader. He was a proud, reserved and essentially aloof figure. His self-interested policies were unlikely to win committed noble support. But he presented himself as the champion of justice and destroyer of corruption. His rule reflects some credit on him. He did make some partisan moves such as appointing the Earl of Salisbury as Chancellor, but his Council included all shades of political opinion, reflecting York's lack of committed noble support. York was unable to bring Somerset to trial, but he did replace him as Captain of Calais. He also introduced stringent reductions in the size and expenditure of the royal household and was able to restore some semblance of law and order in the north. Unfortunately in a dynastic sense the protectorate exacerbated the divisions between York and the Lancastrian faction. York may well have interpreted his appointment as Protector as a sign of baronial favour towards his dynastic position and the prelude for a future claim to the crown. Margaret of Anjou certainly saw it as that. She greatly resented York's nomination as Protector and clearly saw him as a direct threat to her son.

From: David Cook, *Lancastrians and Yorkists: The Wars of the Roses*, published in 1984.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers various explanations of Richard of York's actions.

In 1450 the Duke of York proceeded to London and fulfilled the hopes of the commons by demanding action against the men accused of treason and offering his help in achieving this. We cannot know why he did this: fear, grievance, a sense of his own right or honour or greatness could all have played a part. But his subsequent actions were shaped and limited by his decision. His rather sudden hostility to the regime and its personnel was far from being personally motivated. Once York had decided to endorse the popular criticism of the government, while Somerset had undertaken a leading role in that government, they were bound to be placed in direct opposition to one another. Contemporaries were inclined to interpret politics at this time in terms of a personal feud between the two dukes, rather than competing approaches to the problem of law and order. York endorsed the commons' cry against the 'traitors' and said he would personally help the king to bring them to justice. But, despite his large forces, he made it clear he was not in rebellion. He was a petitioner, seeking public justice as the king's humble subject. This assertion of loyalty was a crucial element in his position. It was a justification for action against the government, a group of men who, York claimed, were not at all devoted to the interests of the realm, but it also served as an assurance that York had no designs on the crown. The men York attacked were, he argued, guilty of treason because they had subverted the law, the very basis of royal power and the king's right to rule and had thus placed the king at odds with his people which dishonoured him and made the realm ungovernable. He was acting as a steward of the common interest, upholding the demands of the commons.

From: John Watts, *Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship*, published in 1996.

**5b. The breach between Edward IV and Richard Neville, Earl of Warwick**

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the breach between Edward IV and Warwick was entirely the result of the Earl's uncontrolled ambition.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the responsibility for the clash between Edward IV and Warwick should rest firmly with the Earl.

It would be false to suppose that by a series of calculated insults Edward deliberately drove Warwick into a position from which rebellion was the only honourable escape. In spite of his already massive gains from the Yorkist victory, Richard Neville continued to bask in the golden sun of royal patronage. Nor was royal goodwill confined to an attempt to pacify Warwick's ill-humour through a series of profitable favours. In spite of the earl's truculent opposition to his foreign policy, and accumulating evidence of his dissidence, Edward still wished to allow Warwick an honourable, if not a dominant, place in government. The earl was offered a series of opportunities to share in the work of the council. In general, the king showed remarkable patience with his angry and overbearing cousin. Eventually this forbearance became an almost culpable failure to believe him guilty of treason. The breach with Edward was essentially of Warwick's own making, and was the product of his inability to accept anything less than domination over the king.

From: Charles Ross, *Edward IV*, published in 1974.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that at the root of the breach between Edward IV and Warwick was the King's marriage.

By 1468 Warwick was a very discontented man. Whether or not he had been a kingmaker who put Edward on the throne in 1461, it is clear that this is how he saw himself and that, in consequence, he believed that English policy should be Warwick's policy. A man who saw the world in these unrealistic terms was only too susceptible to flattery, and this made him easy game for a diplomat as wily as King Louis XI. Thus Warwick became an advocate of a French alliance and chose to remain so even when Edward IV began to show unmistakable signs of a preference for Burgundy. But the earl's unyielding attitude to foreign policy was little more than an expression of the extent to which he was out of sympathy with prevailing trends at court. For it must be admitted that Warwick had reason to feel aggrieved. At the heart of the problem was the King's extraordinary marriage. Very early in the morning of 1 May 1464 Edward had slipped away from his entourage and married Elizabeth Woodville.

From: John Gillingham, *The Wars of the Roses: Conflict in Fifteenth-century England*, published in 1981.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues the case for the inevitability of conflict between an increasingly confident King and a powerful noble.

The years 1465-6 are the high point of the first reign. Edward had been learning on the job and had made some mistakes but he had done remarkably well. It is significant that at this time he was able to settle a number of long-running noble disputes. The King was showing himself to be rather more than Warwick's tool, for example, in his intervention in Warwickshire and in the strategy in the north, designed, even though it failed, to make the Nevilles share power there. He showed his independence famously in the marriage to Elizabeth Woodville in 1464, completed secretly and hastily before he went north on campaign, which cocked a snook at Warwick's plans to have him marry a French princess. Even as Warwick came triumphantly south with the captive Henry VI in 1465, he must have wondered how long it would be before Edward was ready to jettison him, or at least to curtail his power severely. There was an inevitability about the collision of these two if Edward was to be in full command of his kingdom, just as there had been between Henry IV and the Percies. In each case, a great noble, in most unusual circumstances, had helped a usurper ascend the throne. In each case, once the usurper began to turn himself into a proper king, he would cease to be reliant on his 'kingmaker' and the latter's power could only wane.

From: Christine Carpenter, *The Wars of the Roses: Politics and the Constitution in England c1437-1509*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that, although he was in awe of Warwick, Edward IV undermined the Earl's foreign policy.

The extent to which Edward IV was in awe of Warwick is revealed by the manner of his secret marriage to Elizabeth Woodville on 1 May 1464. As a widow and the daughter of a lesser English peer, she would not have been considered entirely the appropriate choice for a king. It can only be the case that he married Elizabeth, in the face of convention and in preference to the expected diplomatic match, because he was in love. Matters were made worse by the king's deception. He knew that his marriage was the most important counter he possessed in international diplomacy. Since the autumn of 1463, as England and France grew closer, the idea for a marriage between Edward and Louis XI's sister, Bona of Savoy, had gathered pace. At the negotiations in London in April 1464 between Warwick and Louis' ambassador, the idea seems to have been advanced further. Warwick despatched a letter to Louis which encouraged him to think that Edward was willing and further negotiations between the two kingdoms were scheduled to continue at St. Omer in May. The fact that Edward made his marriage to Elizabeth in secret and did not announce it until the end of September, reveals that he knew he would face the disapproval of Warwick, as well as other councillors. It was the manner of the marriage as much as its fact, which shows Edward's lack of confidence and judgement.

From: A. J. Pollard, *Late Medieval England 1399-1509*, published in 2000.

### 5c. The impact of the Wars of the Roses

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the campaigns of the Wars of the Roses had a limited effect on society.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers the ways the wars affected some groups.

The lords on the royal council seized the opportunity to extend their areas of influence in the absence of strong royal authority and their example was followed throughout the country. Even Henry VI's chief councillor, the Duke of Suffolk, used his position to have the most important of his rivals in East Anglia, the Duke of Norfolk, confined to the Tower of London for threatening one of Suffolk's local agents. Norfolk was imprisoned again when he battered his way into a manor house belonging to another of his rival's supporters. Without firm royal government, law and order collapsed. Lords used their influence to suborn sheriffs and pack juries to favour their clients. They employed their retainers to intimidate the courts and enforce dubious claims to property. The system of retaining grew apace, creating by its illegalities the conditions which prompted increasing numbers of men to seek the status of a retainer. In several counties there were feuds between families of county gentry which, in the absence of adequate government, led to breaches of the peace involving considerable numbers of men. Sir Nicholas Longford was said to have raised a thousand men by enlisting his friends and followers for an attack on the house of his Derbyshire neighbour, Walter Blount. Such quarrelling gentry chose different lords to have the protection of their retainers and the influence required to save such gentry from the consequences of their misdeeds. The Parrs and Bellinghams of Westmorland were at loggerheads for years. They became retainers respectively of the earls of Salisbury and Northumberland and followed their lords in their private wars and on the battlefields of the wider conflict.

From: R. L. Storey, *The Reign of Henry VII*, published in 1968.

**Interpretation B:** This historian outlines the role of the gentlemen and knights.

Amongst the gentlemen and knights, it is likely that those most closely linked by clientage to kings and participating nobles were most active. Chroniclers report how men holding land from nobles were prominent in fighting and kings and nobles tried to secure their active support. Even retainers who would not normally be expected to fight were sometimes caught up in battle. Among the Lancastrians captured at Hexham was a chancery clerk. Knights and gentlemen were probably particularly active in 1459–63 and in 1471. In January 1463 Edward's army included almost the whole English knighthood. In regions where there were risings or where special reliance was placed on opposing risings, a higher percentage of knights is likely to have been recruited. In areas where knights and gentlemen had become especially used to forming political alliances to oppose powerful magnates, as in the north and Wales, they were more prone to joining in revolt.

From: Anthony Goodman, *The Wars of the Roses, Military Activity and English Society 1452-97*, published in 1981.

**Interpretation C:** This historian assesses how far the nobles were involved in the wars.

The issue of peerage participation in the wars after 1462 is important for any assessment of their impact on society. For if indeed the majority of the peerage did hold aloof, leaving the issue to be settled by a handful of magnates and members of the rival royal families, it follows that fewer retained gentry and fewer rank and file were drawn in. The fewer the peers involved, the more the wars were divorced from the day-to-day lives of the majority of the people of England. But our information about who actually fought in a battle is not always complete. Also failure to be at a battle does not necessarily mean aloofness or indifference. Not knowing whether a particular peer fought is not the same as knowing that he was indifferent. Few rushed headlong into war. There was much to lose. It is not surprising therefore that at every stage many peers were opportunistic trimmers by necessity or conviction. The notorious trimmers in 1469–71 were the young John Talbot, earl of Shrewsbury and the older, more experienced Thomas, Lord Stanley. They acted with a circumspection that bordered on deceitfulness, consistently holding back from commitment to either side and always keeping on good terms with the winners.

From: A. J. Pollard, *The Wars of the Roses*, published in 1988.

**Interpretation D:** This historian surveys the problems in assessing how widespread the effects of the wars were.

It is difficult to assess the direct effects of the wars, not least because we are so unsure of the size of the armies. By and large we are probably right not to make too much of them. Campaigns were mostly short. Some battles were not only probably small in scale, perhaps because of the incompetence of some of the commanders, but closer to skirmishes than to genuine military encounters. The forces at Towton do seem to have been exceptionally large, although here also we have no certain figures. One of the reasons for the brevity of the campaigns and the small size of many of the armies was that, without the financial and logistical support that a king could command, opponents of the crown found it hard to keep armies in the field. Thus, in most cases, the full army would only assemble shortly before the battle and, once the battle was over, it would disperse rapidly, leaving concentrated destruction only in the places where the whole army spent the night and where the battle itself had been fought. In 1461, after the battle of Wakefield, when Margaret of Anjou's army did stay together and fed itself as it came south by plunder, the only means it had, the fact was noticed. Equally, because England was such a unified country, there were few sieges, and it was these that could bring prolonged devastation to an area through the besieging army's need to feed itself. One exception where there were sieges and more sustained campaigns was the Scottish border. But this was an area where violence and plunder were considered more normal. Here the wars had some deleterious economic effects, notably on the strained economy of the north-east. But, even here, it does not seem that the wars did more than accentuate existing tendencies.

From: Christine Carpenter, *The Wars of the Roses: Politics and the Constitution in England c 1437-1509*, published in 1997.

## The Wars of the Roses 1450-85 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
5.1 Assess the view that the Wars of the Roses came about as a result of 'an escalation of private feuds'. <b>[40 marks]</b>	5a.
5.2 How important was failure in the war against France in causing the outbreak of the Wars of the Roses? <b>[40 marks]</b>	5a.
5.3 How valid is the judgement that the most important factor in the rift between Edward IV and Warwick was disagreement over foreign policy? <b>[40 marks]</b>	5b.
5.4 Assess the accuracy of the view that Richard of Gloucester's usurpation of power in 1483 is best explained by his fear of the Woodvilles. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
5.5 How convincing is the evidence that Richard III was responsible for the murder of the Princes in the Tower? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
5.6 Assess the importance of the part played by France and Burgundy in the instability of England in the period 1470 to 1471. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
5.7 Assess the view that Edward IV's personal qualities lost him the throne in 1470 but enabled him to regain it in 1471. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
5.8 How far do you agree that in gaining the throne in 1461, Edward IV owed everything to the power and influence of the Earl of Warwick? <b>[40 marks]</b>	5b.
5.9 To what extent was the English monarchy weakened by the Wars of the Roses? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
5.10 How seriously did the Wars of the Roses affect economic and social life in England? <b>[40 marks]</b>	5c.

## 6. Philip II of Spain 1556-98

### 6a. Philip II and the Spanish economy

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Philip II's financial difficulties were largely of his own making.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian looks at some of the effects of the Spanish Armada.

By the early 1580s, matters seemed to be running so well for Philip II that, upon his becoming king of Portugal, he abolished the customs barrier between Portugal and Castile. But the defeat in 1588 of the 'Invincible Armada', with the loss of half its ships, changed everything. In September 1588, Philip summoned the *Cortes*, informing them that the Armada campaign alone had cost him 10,000,000 *ducats*. He asked for a special subsidy, above the customary extraordinary and ordinary grants, to see him through his difficulties, which by now included the running fifteen-year war against the Dutch rebels, a costly war with England, which turned the high seas into a battleground and endangered his treasure supply, and his deepening intervention on the side of the Catholic League into the civil wars of France. As usual, he claimed all of this had been forced upon him by his need to defend religion, his patrimony and his 'reputation'. (Even as the *Cortes* began its sessions, Philip borrowed a million *ducats* from the Spinola family of Genoa and 400,000 from the Fuggers of Augsburg.) Early in 1590, after a year of haggling, the *Cortes* voted Philip the special subsidy (over and above the customary grants voted every three years), to be collected over a six-year period beginning the 1<sup>st</sup> of July, of 8,000,000 *ducats*, known as the *millones*, since it was reckoned in millions of *ducats*, rather than the traditional *maravedís* (which at 375 to the *ducat* would have given an even more astronomical figure).

From: Peter Pierson, *Philip II*, published in 1975.

**Interpretation B:** This historian considers the financial problems Philip inherited from his father, Charles V, in 1556.

In 1554 the Regent Joanna informed Charles V that revenues had already been pledged for the next six years and she could not see how the administration could continue to support his wars. Two years later Philip inherited a state debt of some 36 million *ducats* and an annual deficit of 1 million *ducats*. In fact, Charles had financed his imperial commitments by a series of expedients without ever tackling the fundamental issues. The wealthiest sectors of society were exempt from paying direct taxation and the burden fell on the poorer groups. Although most ordinary revenue came from indirect taxation, the system was unequal and in need of reform; but the landed, clerical and merchant classes resisted any attempt to introduce new taxes or extend existing ones. Outside Castile, the provincial *Cortes* proved even more unwilling to defray the crown's costs, arguing that taxes should be spent where they were raised. Isabella and Ferdinand had also introduced the practice of issuing *juros* (credit bonds) to bankers, thereby mortgaging future state income. By 1556, 68 per cent of ordinary revenue was consumed in servicing and repayment of these *juros*. Far worse was the practice of granting *asientos* (advanced contracts) to foreign and Spanish financiers whereby the crown received a loan in return for bills of exchange. *Asiento* repayments came to over 14 million *ducats* in 1556 and the *Cortes* regularly complained of the vice-like grip foreign bankers had on Spain's finances.

From: Geoffrey Woodward, *Philip II*, published in 1992.

**Interpretation C:** This historian examines Philip's management of his Spanish realms.

Trying to get the states of the monarchy to contribute to expenses was the most difficult task of all. No European state of this time, Spain included, had a central treasury or a uniform tax system. Nor were taxes normally raised directly by the parliament or government. Most taxpayers, even in Spain, paid their taxes to a number of different entities, rather than to the crown. One golden rule, clung to everywhere, was that tax revenue must not be spent out of the country. In these circumstances the king found it extraordinarily difficult to raise revenue for general enterprises, or to persuade each state to contribute to imperial costs. His view was clearly expressed in 1589, when he was asked to reduce his demands for taxes from Sicily. 'Except in pressing cases,' he conceded, 'the burdens of one kingdom are not usually loaded on to another.' However, 'since God has entrusted me with so many, and all are in my charge, and the defence of some preserves the others, it is fair that all should help'. At the same time, he wanted each realm to keep its finances distinct: 'it is better not to mix up the debts and payments of different kingdoms'. Philip was helped by the collaboration of the nobles in each state. He also benefited from the services of the international financiers, who advanced him cash which he repaid out of taxes.

From: Henry Kamen, *Philip of Spain*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers the relationship between Philip II and the Council of Finance in the 1570s.

The growth in the importance of the *Cortes* contrasted signally with the position of the Council of Finance, for the crisis of the 1570s resulted in a diminution rather than an expansion of the Council's role. Even the dismissal of Espinosa (whose overarching power had inhibited the development of the Council) did not lead to a revival in its fortunes. Indeed, in 1573 Philip further undermined the Council by giving overall responsibility for financial affairs to the *Junta de Presidentes*, consisting of the presidents of Castile, Indies and Orders and a number of senior councillors. Such a body could deal with major items of expenditure but by definition it could not oversee the daily management of the whole of the Crown's finances. Philip seems to have realised that he had made a mistake, for in 1574 he appointed Ovando as President of the Council of Finance. However, he could not bring himself to allow Ovando to leave the presidency of the Council of the Indies and so, as the Crown lurched towards the great bankruptcy of 1575, the presidency of the Council of Finance was not even a full-time job. In the time that Ovando was able to devote to financial affairs he soon found out just how inadequate the Council of Finance was; indeed, he was not even able to discover what the responsibilities of the individual officers of the Council were. He therefore brought in some of his own men to help bolster his authority but in doing so he added greatly to the tensions within the Council and did nothing to resolve those between the Council and the *Junta de Presidentes*. Financial management was impossible in these circumstances, and Ovando collapsed under the strain and died.

From: Patrick Williams, *Philip II*, published in 2001.

## 6b. Philip II and Portugal

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Spain's acquisition of Portugal brought more losses than gains for Philip II.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian comments on the opportunities that the possession of Portugal gave to Philip II.

Granvelle appreciated that if the annexation of Portugal had created new difficulties for Spain, it also brought it unparalleled opportunities. It had given Spain a great accession of naval strength, making the combined Spanish and Portuguese merchant fleets the largest in the world: 250,000-300,000 tons, against the 232,000 tons of the Netherlands and the 42,000 of England. It had also given Spain a long Atlantic seaboard at a moment when the Atlantic was becoming the major battlefield between the Spanish Monarchy and the powers of northern Europe. Having providentially secured these wonderful advantages, it would be folly for Philip II to waste them. Yet wasted they were. In 1585 Granvelle urged Philip to transfer his Government to Lisbon. From here he could have directed the operations against England and the intervention in France. But the King elected instead to remain in the heart of Castile, far removed from the area of conflict; and by the middle of the 1590s it was already clear that Spain had lost the battle of the Atlantic. The 'final ruin' prophesied by Granvelle was approaching – a ruin precipitated by the victories of the Protestant powers of the north. The ruin might conceivably have been averted if the strategic opportunities that had come to Spain through the acquisition of Portugal had been more effectively exploited; but the opportunities were ignored, and it was not long before Portugal, with all that it had to offer, became little more than another burdensome addition to the increasingly unmanageable inheritance of the Spanish Habsburgs.

From: John Elliott, *Imperial Spain 1469-1716*, published in 1963.

**Interpretation B:** This historian examines the impact for Philip II of Spain acquiring Portugal in 1580.

The annexation of Portugal brought several advantages to Spain. Her empire comprised Brazil, West Africa, the Spice Islands and the Azores, an important base for the Indies fleet. Her navy contained galleasses as well as galleons and gave Philip greater security in the west of Spain and the opportunity to reach the Netherlands, England and France by sea. Her crown brought Philip enormous prestige. For the first time since the Roman occupation the Iberian peninsula was under one Christian ruler, which could be seen as one of the greatest triumphs of his reign. Certainly, as ruler of 40 million people he was the most powerful man in the world and, according to his court historian Cabrera Córdoba, it was in the 1580s that he began to call himself 'King of Spain'. But unification also brought problems. Portugal's long Atlantic coastline was vulnerable to attack and a prime target for interlopers in search of the East and West Indies trade ships. António also continued to plague Philip. In 1582 France assisted him in an abortive attempt to seize the Azores, and the English twice tried to restore him to the Portuguese throne. It was as well for Philip that France and England only regarded him as an ancillary weapon in their war against Spain and that he died in exile in 1595.

From: Geoffrey Woodward, *Philip II*, published in 1992.

**Interpretation C:** This historian comments on some of the consequences for Philip II of the acquisition of Portugal in 1580.

With the acquisition of Portugal, Spain reached the zenith of its status. Contemporaries in Spain, like Philip himself, saw the union of the crowns as a natural aspiration. To give some meaning to the unity of the peninsula, in 1582 the customs barriers between Castile and Portugal were abolished. The annexation did little to change the practical power or theoretical pretensions of the monarchy. As king of Portugal, Philip could now adopt a broader imperial strategy, but he did not increase his political power, as some Castilian nobles feared he might. Nor did the financial resources of the crown increase significantly. Possession of Portugal gave new confidence to his policies. After Alcazar-el-Kebir his advisers had stressed that his claim to the crown must succeed, for Portugal was the key to success elsewhere. It would facilitate defence against Islam. Above all it was, as Philip's cosmographer Gian Battista Gesio put it, the 'brake on Flanders'. Possession of Portugal, Gesio felt, was 'an absolutely sure way of recovering the states of Flanders'. Others advised Philip that from Portugal he could effectively undermine Dutch trade, and deprive the rebels of access to both spices and salt.

From: Henry Kamen, *Philip of Spain*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian examines some of the ways in which Philip was affected by the acquisition of Portugal.

The conquest of Portugal was the high-point of Philip's reign and he exulted in it. With the conquest of Portugal (and of its empire, which tamely submitted in subsequent months), Philip acquired not just the prestige that went with adding a proud kingdom to his monarchy but also reinforced his own naval strength. Ten prime galleons belonging to the Crown of Portugal added subsequently to Philip's navy while the acquisition of Lisbon provided him not only with a cosmopolitan and sophisticated city but with a large and impregnable harbour that was an ideal and historic watch-tower over the Atlantic coast. It was fitting that as Philip acquired his new country the wealth cascading across the Atlantic should have begun to reach quite fabulous proportions; in September 1580, 14,557,125 ducats of silver were registered at Seville and a year later a further 9,273,208 were recorded. But still it was not enough for Philip's needs; by April 1582 he had spent two and a half million ducats maintaining the army and navy that had conquered Portugal for him. In Lisbon in 1582 Philip had to agree new *asientos* with his bankers to finance his ambitions. It was a portent of what would happen with increasing frequency in the next two decades: a new scale of wealth, new opportunities, new commitments, a new scale of debts.

From: Patrick Williams, *Philip II*, published in 2001.

## 6c. The Spanish Church

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the Spanish Inquisition had a major impact on the people of Spain in Philip II's reign.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the Inquisition brought about a state of anxiety and distrust in Spanish society.

Of all the obnoxious features of the Inquisition, however, perhaps the most obnoxious was its natural tendency to generate a climate of mistrust and mutual suspicion peculiarly propitious for the informer and the spy. There were some 20,000 familiars scattered through Spain, ever on the alert for manifestations of unorthodoxy; and their activities were supplemented by the unpleasant device known as the Edict of Faith, by which inquisitors would visit a district at regular intervals and would have a list of heretical and obnoxious practices read to the assembled population. The reading would be followed by an exhortation to the hearers to denounce any such practices as had come to their knowledge, with severe penalties being threatened to those who kept silent. Since victims of the Inquisition were never informed of the identity of their accusers, the Edict of Faith presented an ideal opportunity for the settlement of private scores, and encouraged informing as a matter of course. In this climate of fear and suspicion, vigorous debate was checked and a new constraint made itself felt. Even if the Holy Office did not interfere directly with most secular works, the effects of its activities could not be confined exclusively to the theological sphere, which was technically its sole concern. Authors, even of non-theological works, would naturally tend to exercise a kind of self-censorship, if only to keep their writings free of anything that might mislead the ignorant and the uneducated, and furnish an additional weapon to enemies of the Faith.

From: John Elliott, *Imperial Spain 1469-1716*, published in 1963.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the impact of the Inquisition on the daily lives of Spaniards has been exaggerated.

Both defenders and opponents of the Inquisition have accepted without question the image of an omniscient, omnipotent tribunal whose fingers reached into every corner of the land. The extravagant rhetoric on both sides has been one of the major obstacles to understanding. For the Inquisition to have been so powerful as suggested, the fifty or so inquisitors in Spain would need to have had an extensive bureaucracy, a reliable system of informers, regular income and the cooperation of the secular and ecclesiastical authorities. At no time did it have any of these. From what we have seen of the often flimsy network of familiars and commissaries, the financial difficulties of the inquisitors and the perennial conflicts with all the other jurisdictions (especially in the fuero realms), we can conclude that the real impact of the Inquisition was, after the first crisis decades, so marginal to the daily lives of Spaniards that over broad areas of Spain – principally in the rural districts – it was little more than an irrelevance. In Catalonia, beyond the major cities a town might see an inquisitor maybe once every ten years, or even once in a century; many never saw one in their entire history. Central Castile excepted, this picture is probably valid for much of Spain. The people supported the tribunal, on this showing, not because it weighed on them heavily and oppressed them, but for precisely the opposite reason: it was seldom seen, and even less often heard.

From: Henry Kamen, *The Spanish Inquisition*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that the Spanish Inquisition was an important agent of the state.

The self-perception of religious and secular leaders in the period of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Europe has been all too faithfully absorbed and propagated by many later scholars, who appear to have little affection for the Christian faith. These writers thus tend to share with so many Catholic and Protestant reformers of the period the view that much of the population was at best only semi-Christian, especially in rural areas but also among the masses who had migrated to the towns as a result of the economic and social upheavals of the sixteenth century. The terms of the debate, such as 'Christian', 'Protestant', 'religion' and 'superstition', are rarely defined afresh, so that the inquisitors' own definitions and categories are normally accepted at face value. For the tribunals of Habsburg Spain, the world was basically a wicked place, in which God's faithful, who were uniquely to be found in the Catholic Church that was in obedience to the bishops of Rome, were constantly under attack by diabolical foes, both within and without. At the same time, the Spanish Crown was not only in the toils of battle against Protestant Christians and Muslims, but was also concerned, like other early modern European governments, to police the thoughts and behaviour of its population. In this task, the Inquisition cooperated with a will, pursuing not only religious dissenters but also those accused of offences such as male homosexuality, bestiality and bigamy.

From: John Edwards, *The Spanish Inquisition*, published in 1999.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that during Philip II's reign, the Spanish Inquisition became more concerned with upholding morality than with persecuting heretics.

The work that the Inquisition did can be analysed in detail, and the realities separated from the myths. The remarkable research of professors Henningsen and Contreras [*The Inquisition in Early Modern Europe. Studies on Sources and Methods*] has demonstrated that in the period 1560-1614 the Inquisition dealt with 27,910 cases. The old enemies had been well and truly defeated; only 6.2 per cent of these processes were concerned with allegations of Judaic behaviour and 8 per cent involved accusations of Lutheran sympathies or behaviour. The two largest categories now were 'Mahommedanism' (31.9 per cent) and those offences defined together as 'Propositions', a term which conveniently incorporated the whole gamut of questionable theological ideas (29.3 per cent). The first of these reflected the continued existence of the Morisco communities of southern and eastern Spain while the second – which covered everything from blasphemy to sacerdotal misbehaviour - increasingly provided the basis for the Inquisition's work among Christians. Under Philip and his son the Holy Office became the policeman of the nation's morals rather than the persecutor of Jews and their sympathisers (which had been its original justification). Executions in this period numbered 637, with a further 545 people being burned in effigy - a total of 4.3 per cent of the cases, or an average of eleven burnings a year. Cases of 'major' heresy were therefore comparatively rare, and the Inquisition concerned itself now with the daily lives of Old Christians – with their ignorance of Church doctrine (which increasingly came to be seen as an offence in itself) and with their blasphemy and sexual misconduct.

From: Patrick Williams, *Philip II*, published in 2001.

## Philip II of Spain 1556-98 Investigation Titles

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.
6.1 Assess the view that the Dutch rebels challenged Philip II's rule primarily in defence of their liberties. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
6.2 To what extent was the acquisition of Portugal the main turning point in Philip II's foreign policy? <b>[40 marks]</b>	6b.
6.3 How far was the upholding of Spanish prestige the main aim of Philip II's foreign policy? <b>[40 marks]</b>	6b.
6.4 How far did the reign of Philip II strengthen the Spanish Church? <b>[40 marks]</b>	6c.
6.5 To what extent did Philip II's policy towards the Papacy fulfil his obligation as 'The Most Catholic King'? <b>[40 marks]</b>	6c.
6.6 Assess the view that Philip II's rule of mainland Spain was characterised more by indecision than determination. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
6.7 How far did the administrative problems faced by Philip II stem from his own character? <b>[40 marks]</b>	6a.
6.8 Assess the view that Philip II was mainly responsible for the failure to defeat the Revolt of the Netherlands. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
6.9 How effectively did Philip II administer mainland Spain? <b>[40 marks]</b>	6a.
6.10. Assess the strength of Spain's finances in the reign of Philip II. <b>[40 marks]</b>	6a.

## 7. Elizabeth I 1558-1603

### 7a. Elizabeth I and Mary Queen of Scots

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Elizabeth I was never seriously threatened by plots involving Mary Queen of Scots.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian assesses the Throckmorton plot.

The Throckmorton plot, uncovered by Walsingham's agents, led in November 1583 to the arrest of Francis Throckmorton, a Catholic cousin of Sir Nicholas, on suspicion of carrying letters to and from Mary. The earl of Northumberland was also placed in the Tower for being implicated. The details of the Throckmorton plot involved once more the invasion of England by Spain, and the release of Mary. Throckmorton, who had acted as messenger throughout, made a very full confession before his execution in which he thoroughly implicated the queen. She was said to have known every detail of the invasion plans. Mary had certainly written encouraging letters to the Spanish ambassador, who was banished for his part in it all; but the true details of this invasion scheme are still obscure, since it seems that Charles Paget in the course of a short visit to England secretly poured cold water on the scheme to Northumberland, having first of all tried in vain to dissuade the duke of Guise from asking for Spanish help. In view of the troubles which Paget was also brewing up in France, it is doubtful whether such a scheme penetrated by a double-agent could ever have come to very much. Nevertheless, the discovery of the plot gave Walsingham an excellent opportunity to excite a wave of popular indignation against Catholics, and their figurehead, Mary.

From: Antonia Fraser, *Mary Queen of Scots*, published in 1969.

**Interpretation B:** This historian comments on the impact of the Ridolfi plot.

While the 1571 Parliament was in session, the web of another plot was being woven around Mary Queen of Scots. Certain ingredients were the same as in 1569. Ridolfi and Norfolk were again involved, while Spain and the papacy promised help. In 1571 Ridolfi received despatches from Rome promising financial backing from the papacy and military aid from Spain. By March the Norfolk marriage plan had been revived, with Norfolk, according to Ridolfi, giving verbal assurances that he was a Catholic. But the plot failed to materialise into an international enterprise, since Philip II showed his usual caution and withheld his help for a 'future occasion'. Among the English Catholics there was a small uprising in Lancashire involving the younger sons of the Earl of Derby, but the loyalty of the Earl himself ensured its failure. By January 1572 the Duke of Norfolk was in the Tower on three charges of treason, and Ridolfi had quietly left the country. The events of 1568-72 had an important effect on English politics. By 1572 the Council had lost two of the old aristocracy, the Earl of Arundel and the Duke of Norfolk, and its general composition was more protestant. The Northern Rebellion, the Papal Bull and the Ridolfi Plot doubtlessly heightened anti-Catholic feeling, though to what degree is difficult to assess, as it seems unlikely that the mood of the House of Commons reflected opinion over the whole country. These years increased the likelihood of a Catholic conspiracy on a European scale now that Mary Stuart could play a central role and that English friendship with Spain had been destroyed.

From: Alan Dures, *English Catholicism 1558-1642*, published in 1983.

**Interpretation C:** These historians consider Elizabeth's reactions to Mary's arrival in England.

Mary's future had rapidly become the catalyst of Court politics in 1568-69. The plan for a marriage between the Duke of Norfolk and the Scottish queen made him the central figure in a conspiracy that gained the support of a group of substantial nobility. The match was suggested to Norfolk by Secretary Maitland, one of the Scottish regent Moray's commissioners, at a conference held at York in October 1568 to try to settle Mary's future. It was taken up by Protestants such as the Earl of Leicester and Sir Nicholas Throckmorton as a sensible solution to two related problems: what to do about Mary and about the succession. By early 1569 it had become part of a Court intrigue to overthrow Cecil, who seemed to more conservative nobles like Arundel and Pembroke to be leading England too close to a confrontation with the Catholic powers. A Norfolk-Mary marriage would enable the queen to settle the succession and make a lasting peace with France and Spain. But Elizabeth refused to consider letting her leading nobleman marry the most dangerous claimant to her throne. Furthermore she dealt firmly with Leicester's attack on Cecil for mishandling policy in February 1569. Norfolk spent the summer progress during August in an agony of indecision. He lacked the courage to be open with the queen, who was by now well aware of the rumoured marriage. Finally on 6 September Leicester confessed. Ten days later Norfolk found he could bear the atmosphere of suspicion no longer and left the Court without leave. When, afraid to obey Elizabeth's summons to Windsor, the duke then left London for his home at Kenninghall in Norfolk, it was assumed that he had gone to raise the north. Elizabeth, expecting a general rising, quickly took precautions to ensure that Mary's captivity was secure.

From: Anthony Fletcher and Diarmaid MacCulloch, *Tudor Rebellions*, published in 2004.

**Interpretation D:** This historian comments on the implications of Mary's letter to Babington.

Mary's letter was finished late in the evening of 17 July 1586. It was posted early next day, when it was quickly retrieved from the beer cask and brought to Walsingham's agent to decode. His deciphered text in English was sent to Walsingham on the 19th. To indicate its urgency and as a token of the decipherer's black humour, a gallows was drawn on the outside. As soon as Walsingham read Mary's letter, he knew it to be far more incriminating than her earlier appeal to her foreign supporters before the Northern Rising. There she had spoken generally and allusively. Here she was almost explicit. 'The affairs being thus prepared and forces in readiness both without and within the realm, then shall it be time to set the six gentlemen to work taking order, upon the accomplishing of their design, I may be suddenly transported out of this place, and that all your forces in the same time be on the field to meet me in tarrying for the arrival of the foreign aid, which then must be hastened with all diligence.' Mary's meaning is perfectly clear. She had consented to Elizabeth's assassination and a foreign invasion.

From: John Guy, *My Heart is My Own: The Life of Mary Queen of Scots*, published in 2004.

## 7b. Elizabeth I 1558-1603

### Elizabeth I and the Puritans

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the Puritans presented a serious challenge to the unity of the Elizabethan Church.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the Queen recognised the seriousness of the Puritan threat to both Church and state in 1584.

The Puritans had ready a flood of petitions from ministers, town corporations, Justices of the Peace, and the gentry of whole counties. They held two general conferences in London during the session of Parliament, and launched their propaganda on the House of Commons, a body beloved by them, and the sounding board of passionate Protestant nationalism. The House was shaken, as also were councillors. Even Elizabeth was perturbed, but she stood firm for conformity, vowing that she would call some of the Commons to account, who had spoken disrespectfully of the bishops and meddled with matters that were above their capacity and outside their province. 'We understand', she angrily added, 'they be countenanced by some of our Council, which we will redress or else uncouncil some of them.' Firmness was never more needed to save the Church, for many of the council – among others, Leicester, Walsingham, and Burghley – sympathised with the Puritans, and bitterly resented Whitgift's treatment of them. Burghley wrote to the Archbishop denouncing his Romish proceedings, exceeding, he said, the devices used by the Inquisitors of Spain to trap their prey. But Elizabeth perceived, as Burghley did not, the nature and seriousness of the Puritan challenge to her state.

From: John Neale, *Queen Elizabeth I*, published in 1934.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that some contemporaries believed that Puritanism endangered the Elizabethan Church.

Puritanism is part of the long story of English dissenting radicalism. Recent historians have tended to emphasise, quite rightly, the contribution made to the sixteenth-century English reformation by the 'Lollard' tradition of the fifteenth-century. What is certain is that Puritanism from the 1560s was associated with innovation and subversion. Archbishop Parker wrote of the Puritans in 1573 as 'pretended favourers and false brethren, who under the colour of reformation seek the ruin and subversion both of learning and religion. Their colour is sincerity, under the countenance of simplicity, but in very truth they are ambitious spirits, and can abide no superiority'. Archbishop Whitgift drew attention especially to Cartwright's emphasis on individualism, equality and 'popularity' (by which he meant government by the majority): 'popularity you cannot avoid, seeing you seek so great an equality, commit so many things to the voices of the people, and in sundry places so greatly extol them.' 'Those new men whom we call Puritans', wrote Archbishop Sandys of York in 1579, 'who tread all authority under foot.' The godly brethren were themselves very sensitive on this point. In 1572 two Puritans, John Field and Thomas Wilcox, criticised their enemies who called them 'Anabaptists, schismatics, sectaries, and such as went about to pluck the king out of his seat'. They regarded the name 'Puritan' as slanderous and odious because it meant schismatic. 'Let us', went a plea of 1586, hold to 'that preciseness and pureness which God commandeth' - but let us not be 'reproached to be heretics, Anabaptists, or Puritans, nor as schismatics in the Church, and as seditious and factious persons in the commonwealth.'

From: H. C. Porter, *Puritanism in Tudor England*, published in 1970.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that despite persistent attempts by Presbyterians to change the Elizabethan Church, they never presented a serious threat.

In the 1570s, there emerged a younger, uncompromising generation of radicals. Under the leadership of Thomas Cartwright, John Field, Walter Travers and Thomas Wilcox they spurned the veteran Puritans as men who had become soft and accepted the established Church in its present condition. They rejected not only the prayer book, 'culled and picked out of that popish dunghill, the mass book', but also the office of bishop, and they even cast doubts on the legitimacy of the royal governorship. This new breed of Presbyterian puritans blew their first trumpet blast against the monstrous regiment of bishops when they produced their two *Admonitions to the Parliament* in 1572. These were, in fact, propaganda pieces designed for a wider public than members of the Lords and Commons. Thereafter their attack was a two-pronged one. They attempted to convert or subvert the Church from within through the prophesying and the classical movement and, at the same time, they sought instant statutory solutions through parliaments. In 1584 Dr Peter Turner inaugurated the 'bill and book' campaign. The bill, which had been 'framed by certain godly and learned ministers', would have replaced the Anglican prayer book by the Genevan liturgy (the *Form of Prayers*) and episcopal government by pastors, lay elders and assemblies. Their failure left the Presbyterians undaunted. In 1586-7 Anthony Cope's book was a revised version of the Genevan prayer book, whilst his bill would have abolished the existing Church courts, episcopate and even the royal governorship and erected a Presbyterian Church in its place. Like its predecessor, Cope's bill and book did not run the course, and thereafter the Presbyterian cause in both Parliament and Church gradually fizzled out. The Presbyterian campaigns were mounted by a handful of members, lacked general parliamentary sympathy and support and were easily smothered by official action.

From: Michael Graves, *Elizabethan Parliaments 1559-1601*, published in 1987.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that the Elizabethan authorities effectively dealt with Puritan separatists.

That the Elizabethan period was a time of religious tension and controversy is undeniable. That there were separatists in Elizabethan England is equally so. But to talk of 'Tudor separatism' is in a sense misleading, and to see such activities as 'gadding to sermons' or attending conventicles as evidence of separatism is misplaced. Not only is there very little evidence of a growing separatist challenge by the end of the century, but such an interpretation plays down the very real self-imposed deterrents to the momentous act entailed in the decision to separate. Separatism in the form of Presbyterianism was defeated as a political movement by the end of Elizabeth's reign and, with the death of John Field in 1588, its organisation and form in the shape of the *classis* system began quietly to disintegrate. Separatism in London had likewise been effectively suppressed, while in the provinces there was little in terms of identifiable separatist activity. A great deal of 'radical' religious activity stemmed from nothing more than the predilection of a minority of the population to listen to edifying sermons either from nearby ministers or from itinerant preachers. Whilst it may be true that going to another parish to hear a godly sermon was *potentially* to undermine the authority of the resident minister, and whilst private meetings to discuss Scripture were *potentially* schismatic, the emphasis, so far as the sixteenth century is concerned, must be on the word 'potential'.

From: Robert Acheson, *Radical Puritans in England 1550-1660*, published in 1990.

### 7c. Elizabeth I and her privy councillors

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that William Cecil, Lord Burghley, remained the main factor in decision-making in government between 1558 and 1598.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian comments on Cecil's role as Secretary to Queen Elizabeth between 1558 and 1572.

As to the Council, it was the Secretary's business to prepare the agenda of matters which should be laid before the Council, directing to other agencies of the government those matters, particularly legal matters, which properly belonged elsewhere. It was his business to impart to the Queen those matters arising in Council of which she should have knowledge. He was to keep a list of all the noblemen, their pedigrees and allowances among themselves and with other gentlemen. This emphasis upon local contacts was a significant factor in Tudor policy. What it came down to was that the Secretary should not only handle the routine business of the Council and its relations to the Queen but should be directly responsible for all administration of foreign policy and should be well informed about all matters of defence, of public finance, of the relations of the Crown to the country, of the Church of England and its enemies. Elizabeth's concept of the office was considerably broader than the concept which governed Cecil's actions when he held office under her brother. But he never could be quite sure of the extent or of the limitation of his powers. Throughout his life he had to deal with jealous colleagues, jealous courtiers and a very temperamental mistress.

From: Conyers Read, *Mr Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth*, published in 1955.

**Interpretation B:** This historian comments on the relationship between the Queen and her Council in policy making.

It was essential to the royal myth that the monarch should be above mere personal or partisan ambition, that her purview should always be the widest possible, embracing the whole interest of the commonwealth, god-like in its Olympian detachment. The political nation at large was kept in a state of mingled awe and delight by this royal performance, while the inner circle of ministers and courtiers were also kept in a very satisfactory kind of subordination. By emphasizing the contrast between an infallible royal judgement and the flawed efforts of even the most experienced and trusted councillors, the Queen kept her servants continually off-balance, always in a humbled and apologetic posture *vis-à-vis* their mighty mistress. All this was invaluable in establishing an unassailable defensive stratagem for a woman ruler in a traditionally male role. It was equally effective in cementing those habits of deference and of obedience to constituted authority on which the Tudor state – so lacking in instruments of coercion – rested its foundations. But there nevertheless remained the problem of fitting these solemn splendours into the more mundane necessities of policy-making and execution in a workaday world. It was here that the Council complemented the Queen. It was her custom when hard-pressed by events to turn to that body with a formal request for their advice. But beyond these formal occasions there was a steady upward flow of informal advice and persuasions from individual Councillors to the Queen. There was, of course, no guarantee that she would accept the advice given or act as her advisers wished; she was careful to reserve every possible freedom of action.

From: Wallace MacCaffrey, *Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy 1572-1588*, published in 1981.

**Interpretation C:** This historian comments on the relationship between Cecil and Walsingham after 1572.

The inner ring at Court in the 1570s and early 1580s centred on Cecil, Leicester, Sussex (d.1583), Bedford, and Mildmay, who were joined by Walsingham, Hatton, and Sir Thomas Bromley (Lord Chancellor, 1579-1587). Walsingham was the most single-minded ideologue in this group, an avowed 'political puritan' who at every opportunity championed the Protestant cause. Leicester, Bedford and Mildmay were less strident but equally militant; Leicester's goal was to lead an English expeditionary force in support of the Dutch Revolt, something which in 1576-7 was tantalizingly close until Elizabeth changed her mind. By contrast, Cecil became cautious in the 1570s. But to accuse him of complacency is unfair. He knew almost as well as Elizabeth that *realpolitik* required England to respond to external events after the Massacre of St. Bartholomew. He also knew that Walsingham's emphasis on a Protestant coalition sprang as much from the latter's urge to see the Anglican Church transformed into a Calvinist reformed church than from objective military calculations. Burghley nevertheless allowed Walsingham after 1572 to assume the dynamic role he himself had played earlier. To some extent Burghley stepped back from the limelight because he was overworked. His expertise was largely in the fields of financial, religious, and socio-economic policy, whereas Walsingham specialized in diplomacy and espionage.

From: John Guy, *Tudor England*, published in 1988.

**Interpretation D:** This historian evaluates Cecil's role after 1572.

Whether you agreed with him or not, William Cecil was a fact of life. At the same time, Elizabeth increasingly confined her search for counsel to those whom she had appointed for the purpose. Gone were the days when Lord Robert Dudley had been a powerful and unpredictable backstairs influence. The Queen was, of course, entitled to talk to whoever she liked, but it was not in her interests to arouse the ire of her councillors by going behind their backs. When extra-conciliar advice was required on some specialist topic, or some subject of surpassing concern, it was better to get the council to make the suggestion itself. The other way for the Queen to obtain advice was for individual councillors to receive, or even solicit it, before passing it on, either at a council meeting or directly to the Queen. Similarly a councillor who was absent from the court for any reason never hesitated to make his opinion known by letters. Sir Francis Knollys, absent in the north in 1568, recorded that he had written thirteen letters since arriving in Bolton; two to the Queen, one to the council and ten to Cecil; that would have been a normal pattern. When Thomas Smith took over the secretaryship in July 1572, he took over some of this burden, but by no means all. Routine communications, for instance from ambassadors, went to the new secretary, but anything politically sensitive continued to go to Cecil. As he complained to Sir Francis Walsingham, then in France, at the end of the month 'now I am out of office of the secretary, and yet I am not discharged of my ordinary cares'. So it would continue to be, because it was not the office but the man which made him the linchpin of government.

From: David Loades, *Elizabeth I*, published in 2003.

## Elizabeth I 1558 – 1603 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
7.1 How far was Elizabeth's failure to marry the result of the attitude of her Council? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
7.2 Assess the view that the survival of Roman Catholicism in England depended on the role of the gentry. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
7.3 Assess the view that Peter and Paul Wentworth had no chance of achieving a Puritan programme and free speech in the House of Commons. <b>[40 marks]</b>	7b, 7c.
7.4 Assess the view that Elizabeth I agreed with her House of Commons more often than she disagreed. <b>[40 marks]</b>	7c.
7.5 Assess the view that William Cecil, later Lord Burghley, was the main influence in decision-making in Elizabeth's government. <b>[40 marks]</b>	7c.
7.6 How serious were the problems facing the Elizabethan regime from 1589 to 1603? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
7.7 Assess the view that the Elizabethan Court was a centre of corruption and intrigue and little else. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
7.8 How far were the Puritans able to alter the Elizabethan Church? <b>[40 marks]</b>	7b.
7.9 Assess the main influences which determined the Elizabethan Church Settlement in 1559. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
7.10 Assess the seriousness of the external Roman Catholic threat to Elizabeth's throne. <b>[40 marks]</b>	7a.

## 8. Oliver Cromwell 1599-1658

### 8a. Cromwell and religious toleration

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Cromwell was a champion of religious toleration.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian evaluates Cromwell's attitude to liberty of conscience.

A clear and firm conception of how religion should be organized existed in Cromwell's mind. He was prepared to allow each congregation to appoint or approve its own ministers, subject to a few overriding qualifications of worth, to allow new churches or chapels to be formed, and even to tolerate the holding of services according to the old Anglican rites or the still older Roman Catholic rites in private houses, so long as such services did not lead to a breach of the peace or afford covers for plotting against national security. He permitted Jews to return and settle in England and to have their own synagogue and cemetery in London. Above all, he insisted that no man should be punished for his private thoughts or beliefs. Secure in his own personal faith, he felt no urge to force his own beliefs upon others. His genuinely tolerant outlook did not stem from indifference but from the opposite. He preferred liberty of conscience to intellectual tidiness; he did not believe that men could be compelled to faith by the sword. Thus Congregationalism, Presbyterianism, Baptism, and the Society of Friends all look back to the Interregnum as a time of growth; they became sufficiently rooted so that the traditions of Nonconformity or Dissent have shaped British political and social history ever since.

From: Maurice Ashley, *Oliver Cromwell and the Puritan Revolution*, published in 1958.

**Interpretation B:** This historian considers Cromwell's views on Roman Catholics in England during the Protectorate.

To the mass of Englishmen any idea of a reconciliation with Rome was utterly abhorrent. They regarded the pope as Antichrist and Roman Catholicism as idolatrous and superstitious and its adherents as traitors. The mere presence of Roman Catholics in England seemed a mark of internal weakness and a constant encouragement to an external foe. Cromwell was voicing a widely held opinion when he said in 1656 that Spain 'had an interest in your bowels. The papists in England – they have been accounted, ever since I was born, Spaniolized. It was so in England, Ireland, and Scotland: no man can doubt of it; this Spanish interest at home is a great piece of your danger'. Hatred of Roman Catholicism was particularly strong among those classes with political power. Consequently parliament was a steady advocate of penal legislation and its enforcement. Even Milton, who detested persecution in general, felt that reasons of state might justify the exclusion of Roman Catholics from toleration.

From: Godfrey Davies, *The Early Stuarts 1603-1660*, published in 1959.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers Cromwell's attitude towards Unitarians and Anglicans in 1655.

The case of John Biddle provided another illustration of the workings of Cromwell's essentially pragmatic policy. Biddle, as a Unitarian and disseminator of radical doctrines, including the dispensing of catechisms for both adults and children, quickly came up against the government laws against blasphemy since among other doctrines he denied the divinity of Christ. He was imprisoned, but in a petition of September 1655 pleaded that the *Instrument of Government* in its Thirty-sixth Article had laid it down that no one should be forced into orthodoxy. Cromwell was at first inclined to listen favourably to the petition, until he discovered that it had been added to after some signatures had been secured; coming to the conclusion that Biddle was merely a stalking-horse for dissidents, he pronounced angrily that the *Instrument* had never been intended to maintain and protect blasphemers from the punishment of the laws in force against them, and neither would he. Biddle was banished to imprisonment in the Scilly Isles, but here he did receive an allowance of one hundred crowns from the Protector, for which he wrote a number of letters of personal thanks. Cromwell's own boast was that 'I have plucked many out of the raging fire of persecution which did tyrannize over their consciences, and encroached by an arbitrariness of power upon their estates'. It was certainly justified by his record and his actions. Yet equally the fact could not be denied that the prayer book had been forbidden once more by the proclamation of October 1655, and that many Anglican clergy experienced not only rejection but suffering. This was particularly true after the Penruddock rising as a result of which the Anglican loyalties to the existing regime were newly suspect. Oliver, as he himself said on another occasion, wished to let all live in peace enjoying freedom of religion and conscience 'but not to make religion a pretence for blood and arms'. But the problem of allowing liberty without letting it lead to outright subversion was one he was incapable of solving.

From: Antonia Fraser, *Cromwell: Our Chief of Men*, published in 1973.

**Interpretation D:** This historian comments on Cromwell's attitude towards religious toleration.

Cromwell's definition of religious liberty was a limited one from the very beginning of his public career and remained so until the end of his life in two important respects. The first is fairly obvious: Cromwell made it clear in the *Instrument of Government* (and on many other occasions) that toleration should not be extended to 'popery or prelacy nor to such as, under the profession of Christ, hold forth and practise licentiousness' and those 'that abuse the liberty to civil injury of others and to the actual disturbance of the public peace'. Cromwell was not unwilling, in practice as well as in theory (especially in the cases of Biddle and Nayler), to exclude some people, including some Protestants as well as Catholics, from the enjoyment of religious liberty. The second limitation on Cromwell's definition of religious liberty is less obvious and has not always been fully appreciated. Cromwell's godly reformation was not intended to bring about religious plurality. His ideal was the maintenance of Protestant unity within a national Church. Cromwell supported the re-admittance of Jews to England in 1655, not because of a commitment to universal religious tolerance but because he (in common with many Protestants) believed that the conversion of the Jews was a necessary, essential preliminary to the establishment of the unity of godly people. Equally important, he denounced the growth of the sectarian fragmentation of Protestantism.

From: Barry Coward, *Oliver Cromwell*, published in 1991.

## 8b. Oliver Cromwell 1599-1658

### Cromwell and his Parliaments

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Cromwell was principally to blame for the parliamentary difficulties in the 1650s.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Cromwell lost patience with the Rump Parliament on account of its political behaviour.

Now and again in 1653 the Rump responded enough to pressure to discuss in a desultory fashion arrangements for future parliaments and its own demise. Every Wednesday in the intervals of amending proposals for the spreading of the gospel, the Rump did contemplate a new franchise based on £200 real or personal property. None of the discussions indicated a willingness of the Rump to fade out completely in anticipation of a new assembly. Rather the reverse. 'Do you intend to sit here till doomsday come?' went a ballad of the day. By now Cromwell was one of those who thought it must be helped to go, though the prospect made his 'hair stand on end'. It was rumoured that a bill would provide for Rumpers to sit automatically in any new assembly. There is evidence of a proposal to dismiss Oliver and to adjourn to November. Cromwell's mind was made up. On 20 April he appeared in the Commons and after listening to the debate for a while, rose to his feet and announced his intention of putting an end to their prating. Troops were called in and the members bundled out as Cromwell complained that it was all their fault, 'for I have fought the Lord night and day that he would rather slay me than put me upon the doing of this work'.

From: Ivan Roots, *The Great Rebellion 1642-1660*, published in 1966.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Cromwell supported conservative MPs' opposition to the aims of the radical MPs in the Barebones Parliament.

The conservative MPs in 1653 were upset by the radicals' reforming programme. They felt, or claimed to feel, that property was in danger. The Presbyterians, a royalist correspondent stated, were alienated by Barebones's attack on tithes, which could lead to an attack on all property. Cromwell came to think of the Barebones Parliament as 'a story of my own weakness and folly'. Though he spoke in favour of law reform in his initial speech to the assembly, he was not prepared for the abolition of Chancery or of ecclesiastical patronage and tithes. Since Barebones proposed at the same time that higher army officers should serve for a whole year without pay, most of the latter were easily persuaded that the dangerous assembly must be got rid of. On 12 December the conservatives got up early, and after speeches denouncing the Parliament for 'endeavouring to take away their properties by taking away the law, to overthrow the ministry by taking away tithes and settling nothing in their rooms', they voted an end to their meeting. Then they marched off to the Lord General, to whom they surrendered the authority they had received from him five months before.

From: Christopher Hill, *God's Englishman*, published in 1970.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Cromwell and some MPs in the Second Protectorate Parliament were responsible for the breakdown in relations.

Cromwell's definition of religious liberty did not extend to those who acted and spoke outrageously as did the Quakers. But that was the extent of Cromwell's agreement with those MPs who had howled for Nayler to be punished. What worried him deeply about what had happened was that, like the Biddle case earlier, this was yet another indication of the alarming discrepancy between himself and opinion represented in parliament about the extent of religious liberty that could reasonably be allowed. Cromwell no more approved of Nayler's views than he did of Biddle's, but what frightened him about the parliamentary reactions to both men were the disturbing indications that many MPs (unlike him) drew no distinction between extremist Socinians or Unitarians, like Biddle, or Quakers, like Nayler, and those moderate groups like Baptists and Independents that Cromwell was willing and anxious to tolerate. This was the point he put forcibly to the meeting of army officers he addressed on 27 February 1657. He asked them, 'if nothing were done to check parliament's religious intolerance, might not the case of James Nayler happen to be your case?' This, however, was a fear that was not new; indeed Cromwell had lived with it since at least 1644, when his quarrel with the earl of Manchester had brought home to him the possible implications of Presbyterian intolerance. What was new about the Nayler case was Cromwell's reaction to it, in that he saw constitutional change as a means of checking parliamentary intolerance. He asked in his letter to the Speaker on 25 December 1656 by what right they had proceeded against Nayler, raising by implication the constitutional ambiguities of the Instrument of Government; and in his speech to army officers on 27 February 1657 he explicitly explained that the constitutional lesson of the Nayler case was that 'the single-chamber parliament stood in need of a check or balancing power (meaning the House of Lords or a House so constituted)'.

From: Barry Coward, *Profiles in Power: Oliver Cromwell*, published in 1991.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Cromwell and some MPs in the First Protectorate Parliament were responsible for the breakdown in parliamentary relations.

Cromwell had used his prerogative powers to establish two religious commissions in March and August 1654, which consisted mainly of Independents assisted by Presbyterians and even some Baptists not inclined to separatism. The first, the 'Triers', operated centrally to accredit preachers and examine their suitability to hold benefices or lectureships. The second, the 'Ejectors', operated in each county to remove those deemed scandalous, ignorant or insufficient from their preaching ministries. However, the reform and redistribution of parliamentary membership under the Instrument of Government introduced a group of MPs intent on demonstrating that parliament was the independent guardian of the propertied interest. Thus, while they shared with Cromwell and the Army a desire to preserve a broad, established Church of England, they were less convinced about tolerating a generous freedom of worship and association for the sects. On a more material level, they remained far from accommodating to any ordinance for the maintenance of accredited preachers that would require the public appropriation of tithes. When the first parliament of the Protectorate assembled on Sunday 3 September 1654, chosen deliberately to commemorate the victory at Dunbar and Worcester, Cromwell and the Army were intent on intimidation as well as self-glorification. Nonetheless, the parliamentarians were determined that the Instrument of Government should be subject to amendment, particularly with respect to Cromwell's control of the Army, his effective veto over constitutional change and his public income.

From: Allan Macinnes, *The British Revolution 1629-1660*, published in 2005.

### 8c. Cromwell and the Major-Generals

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the major-generals were introduced principally to combat royalist uprisings.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers changes in local government.

After the failure of his first Parliament and some unsuccessful royalist and republican conspiracies in the early months of 1655, Oliver accepted his generals' scheme for direct military rule. The country was divided into eleven districts, and over each a major-general was set, to command the local militia as well as his own regular troops. In addition to their defensive military function, one of their main tasks had been to drive local government, to see that JPs and deputy-lieutenants did their job. Many of the 'natural rulers' had already withdrawn or been expelled from local government, and a proclamation at the time of setting up the major-generals also excluded all ex-royalists from the commission of the peace or any share in local government. The major-generals took over many of the functions of Lords Lieutenants, formerly agents of the Privy Council in the counties. But their social role was very different. Lords Lieutenants had been the leading aristocrats of the county. Some major-generals were low-born upstarts, many came from outside the county: all had troops of horse behind them to make their commands effective.

From: Christopher Hill, *God's Englishman*, published in 1970.

**Interpretation B:** This historian comments on the establishment of the major-generals.

In March 1655 a royalist rising in Wiltshire led by Penruddock was easily suppressed by Desborough, who was appointed 'Major General of the West' for the purpose. This, and the discovery of paper plots by the royalists in other parts of the country, was made the occasion for the appointment later in 1655 of eleven major-generals, and England and Wales were divided amongst them. By October they had received their instructions and were on their way to their 'cantons'. Like a lot of other things about the major-generals experiment, though, the reasons for it are not clear. Perhaps hindsight puts the royalist threat in 1655 into a perspective not possible at the time; but John Thurloe and his government spies were always one step ahead of the plotters, and Cromwell knew how divided amongst themselves they were. It may be that, as well as royalist insurrections, the major-generals were designed to solve the Protectorate's growing financial problems. To get the support of the landed classes Cromwell had to reduce taxation, which meant reducing expenditure on the army. This may have been the intention behind the local volunteer militias, to be organized by the major-generals and financed by a 'decimation' tax of one-tenth of the estates of known royalists worth over £100 p.a. in lands and £1,500 p.a. in goods. Not only would the new militia be cheaper than the professional army, but it was to be locally run by commissioners appointed to assist the major-generals. Security would be tightened up, and the standing army replaced by a cheaper, locally run militia.

From: Barry Coward, *The Stuart Age*, published in 1980.

**Interpretation C:** This historian discusses the reasons for the introduction of the major-generals.

The Army leaders had tried to achieve their aims through various civilian assemblies: the Rump, the Nominated Assembly, the first Protectorate Parliament. But in August 1655, they cut loose and imposed direct military rule. England and Wales were divided into 11 regions, each governed by a senior army officer. These 11 major-generals received detailed commissions the following October. Their first duty was to maintain security. They were to suppress 'all tumults, insurrections, rebellions or other unlawful assemblies'; to disarm 'all papists and others who have been in arms against the Parliament'; and to apprehend all 'thieves, robbers, highwaymen and other dangerous persons'. To these ends, Cromwell authorized the major-generals to raise new regional militias totalling 6,000 horse, funded by the Decimation Tax, a ten per cent income tax on all former royalists. But the major-generals' instructions went far beyond this. They were to become the agents of moral reform in the localities. 'No horse-races, cock-fighting, bear-baitings, stage plays, or any unlawful assemblies' were 'permitted within their counties'. Instead, the major-generals were to 'encourage and promote godliness and virtue, and discourage and discountenance all profaneness and ungodliness'. They were required to enforce 'the laws against drunkenness, blaspheming and taking of the name of God in vain, by swearing and cursing, plays and interludes, and profaning the Lord's Day, and such-like wickedness and abominations'. All alehouses were to be closed 'except such as are necessary and convenient to travellers'. Cromwell sought what he termed a 'reformation of manners'.

From: David Smith, *The Struggle for New Constitutional Forms*, published in 1992.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers Cromwell's reaction to the outbreak of royalist conspiracies.

From the spring to the autumn of 1655 Cromwell and the council were very much occupied by dramatic developments in Britain's foreign relations which called for major decisions of peace or war. These help to explain why so many months elapsed between Penruddock's rising and the full establishment, between August and October, of the most controversial phase of Cromwell's rule, the regime of the major-generals. At any rate it was not a hasty decision, or a mere reaction to royalist insurrection. Cromwell was aware of three main problems on the home front, and he hoped that by a single expedient he could go a long way to tackling them all. His most obvious need was for security against further royalist conspiracy, for it would be tempting providence to expect the king's supporters to bungle their opportunities so feebly a second time around. He needed the protection of his army, but his second major problem was that he could not afford to maintain it at its current strength, because he had progressively reduced the monthly assessment from £120,000 to £60,000 and his government was falling steadily further into debt. His third concern was over the lack of progress in 'the reformation of manners', that moral regeneration of the nation that he hoped would result from a better preaching of the gospel. He publicly asserted that the 'suppressing of vice and encouragement of virtue were the very end of magistracy', and he knew all too well that most JPs rarely concerned themselves with lapses in personal morality unless they threatened a breach of the peace.

From: Austin Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution 1625-1660*, published in 2002.

## Oliver Cromwell 1599-1658 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
8.1 How far do you agree that in spite of his lack of military experience, Cromwell quickly established himself as an outstanding general? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
8.2 Assess the accuracy of the view that Cromwell's rise to political power is explained entirely by his military success. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
8.3 With what justification may Cromwell be regarded as a radical in the period 1640-49? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
8.4 Assess the view that by crushing the Levellers in 1649 Cromwell brought an end to the English Revolution. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
8.5 How far do you agree that Cromwell was offered the crown in 1657 mainly because of the need to avoid a military dictatorship? <b>[40 marks]</b>	8c.
8.6 Assess the view that Cromwell refused the crown in 1657 because he believed that to accept would be against God's will. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
8.7 How well does Cromwell deserve his reputation as a champion of religious toleration? <b>[40 marks]</b>	8a.
8.8 Assess the view that Cromwell's principal aim as Lord Protector was to carry out a programme of 'Godly Reformation'? <b>[40 marks]</b>	8c.
8.9 How accurate is the view that as Lord Protector Cromwell relied entirely on the army? <b>[40 marks]</b>	8c.
8.10 How far do you agree that Cromwell failed in his attempt to govern in partnership with the Parliaments of the Protectorate? <b>[40 marks]</b>	8b.

## 9. Peter the Great 1689-1725

### 9a. The 'greatness' of Peter the Great

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Peter deserves the title 'the Great' more for what he attempted than for what he achieved.

[40 Marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Peter saw himself as directly responsible for Russia's greatness.

It is impossible not to admire the unsparing if sometimes misdirected effort which over three decades, Peter devoted to the achievement of a more powerful and more enlightened Russia. Perseverance in the face of setbacks; continual experiment with new institutions and methods; incessant travelling, often in considerable discomfort and sometimes over very long distances: all these present a picture of activity, both mental and physical, which no ruler in modern history can surpass. This passion to be doing marked every aspect of his own psychology and scheme of values. Criticism, if well-meant, he could bear, even when it was severe. What he could never abide was the terrible passivity, the lack of initiative, the placid and unquestioning acceptance of the traditional, which were so fundamental to the old Russia. This prodigal outpouring of energy was inspired by a deep sense of personal responsibility for the country entrusted to his care. He saw himself as the instrument of Russia's greatness, in a genuine sense the first servant of the state. It was because of this that his work mattered, not because it gratified any desire for personal success or glory. His methods were sometimes ill thought-out and poorly adapted to the ends he had in view. Too often, at least in the first half of his reign, expedients were hastily adopted in a burst of unconsidered enthusiasm and as quickly abandoned when they failed to produce the desired results. Yet there was a marked consistency in his general objectives; and in his later years the means by which he strove to attain them became more carefully and fully elaborated.

From M. Anderson, *Peter the Great*, published in 1978.

**Interpretation B:** This historian considers the importance of St Petersburg.

Greatness is often associated with the grandeur of the monarch's environment. This certainly applies to Louis XIV, who consciously aimed to elevate his image by creating a splendid new court at Versailles. Peter's court could hardly have formed a greater contrast in the earlier part of his reign, being strictly functional and devoid of trappings. After visiting Versailles in 1717 Peter began to upgrade his courtly image, employing a variety of foreign artists and architects. Even so, his main emphasis was still practical; the most impressive building of the period housed the senate and colleges, not the court. In one respect, however, Peter's vision was on a far grander scale than Louis XIV's. The French monarch disliked the atmosphere and influence of his capital, and so shifted his court. Peter, on the other hand, broke free from the constraints of his court by building a new capital; the problem of Paris was solved by Versailles, that of the Kremlin by St Petersburg. Peter was also bolder and more confident, taking the unprecedented step of building a capital at the geographical edge of his dominions on territory which had only just been annexed.

From Stephen Lee, *Peter the Great*, published in 1993.

**Interpretation C:** This historian offers a balanced view of Peter the Great.

Peter has been chiefly criticised for creating a lasting division in Russian society between the westernised elite and the mass of Russians who remain essentially Muscovite. If this was so, it was certainly not his intention. His promotion of Western-style education for all failed in part through stiff resistance from the *boyar* class, who withdrew their children from such a socially mixed system. Westernisation certainly produced strains between the different strata, as in twentieth-century developing nations, but it is unfair to blame Peter for failing to break the pernicious, but understandable, influence of the nobility, which his successors were to encourage in order to win support. Peter has also been criticised for promoting too many extravagant wasteful schemes, such as, in the economic field, the canal networks of north and south, and, in the academic sphere, the Academy of Sciences before the supply of students had been assured. Nevertheless, in both of these he charted a course for the future. Others have complained that Peter did little for culture. In fact, once the threat from Sweden was over, he invited architects and artists from Italy, France and the Netherlands to build and finish St Petersburg. Works of art were bought in Amsterdam and Florence, he sponsored Western theatre, he sent artists and architects abroad and encouraged the production of works of history. Given the colossal odds which he faced – particularly the long years of war and the conservatism of old Russia – Peter, despite all his obvious failings personal and political, deserves his place in Russian history and the title accorded him in 1721 of 'Father of the Fatherland, Peter the Great, Emperor of all Russia'.

From William Marshall, *Peter the Great*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation D:** This historian offers a view of Peter's foreign policy.

Ultimately, the sacrifices made by all sections of the population were justified by international success. Peter made Russia a great power, which it remained by and large, until very recently. When the Senate in its address to Peter in October 1721 boasted that Russia had 'joined the community of political nations' it had in mind nations high up in the international pecking order and in control of their own destinies. 'Political' nations concurred that Peter's Russia was a force in world politics, not only its immediate neighbours, but also France, Spain and particularly Britain, which feared the effect of Russian expansion of its Baltic trade. 'Thanks to him Russia, the name of which was unknown not long ago,' wrote Campredon in 1723, 'now has become the object of attention of the greater part of European powers who seek her friendship, some for fear of seeing her hostile to their interests, others for the sake of the benefits which they hope to obtain through an alliance.' But Russia's relationship with the wider world is also one of the most controversial aspects of Peter's legacy. Peter built on or laid the foundations of policies – participation as a full partner in world diplomacy and in European dynastic politics, keeping Poland weak, expansion towards the 'natural' boundaries of coastlines and/or fellow Orthodox populations, probes into alien territory for exploration and trade – which were to bring Russia into conflict with other powers and give birth to the image of the aggressive Russian 'bear'.

From Lindsey Hughes, *Peter the Great*, published in 2002.

### 9b. Peter the Great and the Russian economy

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Peter's economic policies were largely unsuccessful.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Peter took a personal interest in the development of Russia's canals and industry.

The works for the Volga-Don canal had to be abandoned because of the great natural difficulties but toward the end of his reign Peter was successful in giving an excellent start to the canal system of Russia, a task in which he himself took the most intimate part. He sent scientific commissions to study the resources of different areas, and at the end of his reign explorers sent by him investigated the far corners of the empire, as far as the Bering Strait. He was peculiarly careful of the uses to which the by-products could be put; measures of his dealt with the exploitation of peat and potash. Peter was the founder of Russian industry. He conceived it as a national need and pushed it forward with all the authority and initiative of the state. For a given state need, for instance, army cloth or – even more essential – the exploitation of metals, he would form off-hand a ready-made company composed of men of all classes, Russians or foreigners, would grant them a subsidy, give them a government loan, exempt them for so many years from taxation and supply them with free labour by the simple expedient of making them absolute masters of all the peasants in a given area. The peasants were not consulted in the matter, and were left at the unfettered disposal of their new employers. For the employers themselves this was state service which they were not allowed to escape or to question.

From: Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia*, published in 1955.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that progress in Russian commerce was hindered by governmental edicts.

Commerce is a delicate mechanism, and state decrees are not usually the best way to make it work. In Peter's case, it was not simply the element of compulsion that detracted from the success of his efforts – he himself was not always sure what he wanted. When his attention wandered or he was distracted, those below him, uncertain as to his desires, did nothing and all activity stopped. Peter's methods were strictly empirical. He tried this or that, ordering and countermanding, seeking a system that worked, sometimes without thoroughly understanding what was needed or the nature of the obstacles confronting him. His constant changes in direction, his minute regulations leaving no scope for local adjustment, confused and drained initiative from Russian merchants and manufacturers. Once, when the Dutch ambassador was pressing for Russian approval of a new commercial treaty and had been frustrated by repeated delays, he was told by Osterman [an able Russian diplomat], 'Between ourselves, I will tell you the truth. We have not a single man who understands commercial affairs at all'. There were occasions when enterprises foundered simply because Peter was not present to give instructions. His temper could be so fierce and unpredictable that, in the absence of specific orders, people were unwilling to take initiative and simply did nothing. In Novgorod, for example, a large number of leather saddles and harnesses had been stored for the army. The local authorities knew that they were there, but because no order to distribute them had come down from above, they were left until 'eventually, mouldy and rotten, they had to be dug up with spades'.

From: Robert Massie, *Peter the Great: His Life and World*, published in 1981.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that there were few advances in Russian agriculture during Peter's rule.

Peter showed more interest in agricultural development than has generally been acknowledged. He promoted the cultivation of marginal lands in Siberia, the Volga region and parts of the Ukraine, and also imported Spanish and Silesian breeds to improve the quality of Russian sheep. He secured an overall increase in certain types of produce, including cereals, grapes, hemp, tobacco, flax and wool. His efforts were, however, less obviously successful in agriculture than in industry. His reforming edicts were fragmentary and were not part of an overall coherent policy. He was also confronted by massive resistance to change from a large illiterate peasantry and a nobility which saw no need to change an existing system based on freely available serf labour. Hence traditional methods were still widely used, including the old three-field system with its narrow and isolated strips which were subject to periodic redistribution. The agrarian revolution which, in the late eighteenth century, brought innovations to Britain and western Europe largely bypassed Russia: here the wooden plough was widely used up to the time of the Russian Revolution – and beyond.

From: Stephen Lee, *Peter the Great*, published in 1993.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Peter's economic policy was a mixture of success and failure.

Peter's impact on the Russian economy is controversial. The jury is still out on the question of whether he accelerated or slowed the development of capitalism in Russia. On the face of it, he produced success stories – the two dozen or so factories in operation when Peter came to the throne grew to almost 200 by his death. He did not accumulate a foreign debt. Russia was self-sufficient in some areas of arms and textile manufacture and poised to become the world's leading producer of pig iron by the 1740s. The opening of new sea and river routes, the acquisition of ports, the development of a merchant marine – all should have fostered wealth-creating trade. However, private enterprise remained weak, little capital was accumulated, much trade was in the hands of foreigners, as were insurance and banking, and towns were underdeveloped. There was no 'great leap forward'. Peter's economy operated in a traditional framework: war or defence created its momentum; autocracy and serfdom allowed Peter to cope with military demands. It boiled down to making the most of Russia's 'backwardness' by applying absolute power to extract service, labour and taxes from all parts of the population, with the bulk coming from the 90 per cent who were peasants. The state played a disproportionate role in industrial growth and continued to do so for the rest of the tsarist era.

From: Lindsey Hughes, *Peter the Great*, published in 2002.

**9c. Peter the Great and his opposition**

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Russians opposed Peter the Great mainly because the pace of change was too rapid.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian comments on the impact of Peter's reforms in Russia.

It is easy to imagine how numerous were the elements of opposition and how instinctive was the deep resentment which Peter aroused by his changes. Both in the clergy and in the rest of the community one must distinguish, as far as one can, between the vast majority who were fully permeated with hostility and obscurantism, and that more enlightened section of the public which was all in favour of learning from the West but would have been happy if the slow growth of education had been continued under Peter on the same amiable lines as under Alexis and Fedor II. But this last section was almost as much opposed to Peter as the rest. It included many of the best of the boyars who saw their class drowned in a new motley ocean of so-called gentry, in most cases men from nowhere. It is true – as one of these boyars, Prince M. Shcherbatov, writes later – that if Peter had not bullied Russia into civilisation the work which he did would have taken a hundred years, and would almost certainly have led to such civil strife as would have put the country at the mercy of some invading power. The question was, how much that was good was destroyed by this levelling hand. It was not so much what Peter did that gave the shock to the Russian consciousness, but the way in which he did it and the pace at which it was done. By racing against the wind, as Klyuchevsky puts it, Peter increased the velocity of the wind against him. The quiet man was everywhere affronted.

From: Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia*, published in 1955.

**Interpretation B:** This historian considers Peter's treatment of Russian peasants.

The peasants, in contrast to the other classes, received no benefits, only weightier burdens. The Czar was, indeed, aware of their misery, and he did something to encourage the establishment of almshouses, orphanages and hospitals and ordered that serfs should not be sold separately from their families. But serfdom to him was a necessary evil, and the increased demands of the state for money, men and labour, together with the desire of the landowners for more serfs, strictly under their control, meant that the majority of peasants were bound more closely to their masters while bondage was extended to include groups which had hitherto escaped. The demands in particular of the tax-collectors and recruiting officers occasioned great distress: agrarian disturbances and peasant flight were frequent. Those who escaped were mercilessly hunted down and in 1722 Peter ordered that no serf could leave his master's estate without written permission, in other words, a passport. During the eighteenth century, while other European states were moving towards greater freedom for the individual, the situation of the peasants in Russia grew worse and the gulf between the classes even wider: the ultimate result was revolution.

From: Jill Lisk, *The Struggle for Supremacy in the Baltic 1600-1725*, published in 1967.

**Interpretation C:** This historian examines the Russian Church's opposition to Peter the Great.

The Time of Troubles (1598-1613) had made many Russians realise that some form of transformation or rejuvenation was essential, but though an increasingly vociferous and influential minority looked to the West, the majority still wanted renewal from the old Russian roots, from the old Orthodox tradition. However, in a quarter of a century of frenetic energy Peter's dynamic changes swept along all, even conservatives, often against their will. To extreme traditionalists Peter's answers were wrong: Holy Russia's duty was to shun not only infidels in the East and foreigners in the West, but even the so-called 'Greek' reform of Nikon. For them Peter's call for Westernization had a religious connotation. Seen in this light, Peter's insistence on Western dress and beard shaving was a tactical blunder, for these reforms focused on the vital external symbols that marked out Holy Russia. The Fathers of the Church had used Old Testament sources to support the kaftan and the beard: indeed a shaven man was denied a funeral mass. Whether the Orthodox fathers were theologically correct or not, these traditions were engrained in Russian lives. Some shaven men even carried their beards under their coats in case of sudden death, so they could be buried by Orthodox rites. Symbols are more potent than theories, and Peter's enforcement of symbolic change was as dangerous as any of his practical policies.

From: William Marshall, *Peter the Great*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation D:** This historian looks at the reaction of Russians to the introduction of western fashions.

The new dress codes caught on quickly at court where it was difficult to evade the tsar's eagle eye, and in Moscow generally, where inspectors went around collecting fines and chopping off the hems of robes which exceeded the required length. Gone were the tall-hatted bearded boyars in flowing robes and women in high-necked, waistless garments with hair-concealing headdresses. As for beards, the only ones tolerated at court were on priests or false ones for masquerades and theatricals. Away from Moscow, however, there was opposition to the new fashions. In the town of Belev an official attempted to close shops selling Russian clothes, but they were open again the next day. He reported that even the governor and officials were all bearded and dressed in Russian style. In 1708 an informer reported that when the tsar was in Moscow everyone wore German dress but in his absence the wives of some of the tsar's leading officials wore old-fashioned gowns to church, even though they put skirts over them, 'cursing the sovereign's decree'. The harsh climate, the high cost and the shortage of suitable tailors, as well as resistance to change *per se*, continued to hamper the spread of the new fashions in the provinces. The new dress codes, it should be stressed, did not apply to the mass of the peasants, most of whom had little contact with these alien beings in 'German' clothes.

From: Lindsey Hughes, *Peter the Great*, published in 2002.

## Peter the Great 1689-1725 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
9.1 How far do you agree with the view that Peter the Great's religious policies represented a decisive break with the past? <b>[40 marks]</b>	9c.
9.2 To what extent can it be argued that Peter the Great transformed the economy of Russia? <b>[40 marks]</b>	9b.
9.3 How widespread was the opposition in Russia to Peter the Great's reforms in government and administration? <b>[40 marks]</b>	9c.
9.4 Assess the view that the Russian nobility was mainly responsible for the opposition to Peter the Great. <b>[40 marks]</b>	9c.
9.5 How far do you agree that Russia had already been 'westernised' at the accession of Peter the Great in 1696? <b>[40 marks]</b>	9c.
9.6 Assess the importance of Peter the Great's military and naval reforms in strengthening Russia. <b>[40 marks]</b>	9a.
9.7 Assess the view that Peter the Great's foreign policy was essentially defensive. <b>[40 marks]</b>	9a.
9.8 Assess the view that Peter failed to establish a sound educational system in Russia. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
9.9 Assess the view that Peter the Great's foreign policies were an over-reaction to external dangers. <b>[40 marks]</b>	9a.
9.10 Assess the claim that Peter I can be described as 'Great' more for what he attempted than for what he achieved. <b>[40 marks]</b>	9a.

## 10. Louis XIV 1661-1715

### 10a. Louis XIV and religious groups

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Louis XIV's religious difficulties were of his own making.

[40 Marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Louis XIV inherited problems with the Papacy.

The Church of France or the Gallican Church was only a part of the universal Roman Catholic Church and as such it acknowledged with certain limitations the authority of the pope. The king recognised but in his early days resented this, for it qualified his ability to carry out reforms. To unify the French Church by eliminating all discordant elements required not merely the approval but the active assistance of the Bishop of Rome, 'a foreign power', for the papacy at that time ruled a sizable independent state. Consequently the history of Church and State during Louis XIV's reign comprised two aspects: first was the king's intention, inspired both by a desire to reinforce the unity of his kingdom and by genuine, if crude, notions of crusading zeal, to impose religious conformity on all his subjects; secondly, there was the anxiety of the monarchy to avoid recognising the claim of the popes as heads of the Catholic Church to interfere with the internal administration of the French Church. In both these policies the king had the backing of the majority of the French clergy, for the tradition of an independent and unified Church was an old and understandable one. But these two policies were in conflict. For not only did the suppression of heresy and schism demand the support and approval of the Pope, but the independence of the French Church was contrary to its nature as a branch of the Church Universal.

From: Maurice Ashley, *Louis XIV and the Greatness of France*, published in 1946.

**Interpretation B:** This historian considers Louis XIV's views about his right to the *régale*.

In the early years of his rule Louis had taken up a strongly anti-papal attitude, encouraged by Lionne and Colbert. The Parlement of Paris strongly supported Gallicanism, more so than the King. It constantly opposed papal interference in France, whereas the King made use of the Pope whenever it was convenient and possible to do so, and dropped Gallicanism altogether during his last struggle with the Jansenists. Throughout most of France the King exercised important rights, known as the *régale*. When a bishop died and before his successor was installed, he could collect the revenues of the see, and nominate to certain benefices within the gift of the bishop. Colbert persuaded the King to issue a decree extending the *régale* to the whole of France, and even the Jesuits supported him. The outstanding opponents of this decree were the bishops Pavillon of Alet and Caulet of Pamiers, both Jansenists of Languedoc, who eventually appealed to Rome, where Innocent XI, the Pope elected in 1676, combined Jansenist sympathies with vigorous opposition to the King's rights. After Pavillon's death Caulet kept up his defiance, and in 1678 the King seized his temporalities. Innocent XI issued three briefs condemning the King's claims and actions. When Caulet died in 1680 the intendant installed a royal administrator at Pamiers with the help of an escort of cavalry, and the Pope excommunicated the administrator and threatened the King.

From: W. E. Brown, *The First Bourbon Century in France*, published in 1971.

**Interpretation C:** This historian comments on how Louis XIV dealt with his religious problems.

Louis was obsessed with his own salvation, but not easily persuaded to excess. He remained moderate in matters of religion until his death, admiring Mme de Maintenon's piety whilst not always sharing her zeal. He listened to the advice of pères de la Chaize and Le Tellier, but by no means always followed their more intemperate advice. In the final analysis, common sense, rather like that of Henry IV, preserved Louis from exaggerated piety, puritanism and superstition. He had not really changed since the day in 1682 when he begged the queen, the Dauphin, the Villeroys, and several others to stop attributing the recent earthquake in France to the anger of the Almighty, with God thereby validating the declaration of the Four Articles. Louis and Bossuet displayed the same good sense in dealing with the so-called 'Quietism' affair. The King and the best theologians in the kingdom did not try to stifle mysticism; rather they sought to demonstrate Fénelon's imprudence, the dangers of popularising (as in the case of Mme Guyon) a religion freed from all dogma, and the folly of trying to lead unprepared souls onto higher spiritual planes. As regards Protestantism, however he had little margin for manoeuvre.

From: François Bluche, *Louis XIV*, published in 1990.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers Louis' treatment of Huguenots.

From 1661 Louis determined to confine the Protestants ever more closely within the original limits imposed by the Edict of Nantes. Thus, everywhere that new churches had been built they were destroyed, to the extent that about half of the existing Huguenot churches were pulled down from 1663 to 1665. Restrictions were placed on Protestant pastors, preventing them from visiting the dying in hospitals, for example, or teaching in schools, and from 1663 no more conversions to Protestantism were to be legally permitted. At this stage there was no project to revoke the Edict; it was more a question of making its revocation unnecessary. Louis felt keenly his role as king of an ordered society, and the existence of two faiths was naturally anomalous for His Most Christian Majesty. The Dutch War led to a relaxation of the repressive policy, but after the Peace of Nijmegen Louis was more confident than ever in his role as absolute monarch. The measures taken to destroy rural Huguenot churches had left thousands without the formal exercise of any religion. It was widely thought that a little pressure would bring them back to fold. Civil persecution was therefore renewed with redoubled vigour, and the first *dragonnades* took place in Poitou in 1681. The 30,000 or so conversions resulting from this billeting of violent soldiers in Protestant communities were certainly numerically impressive. The state's methods encouraged Catholics to increase their own local violence. The year 1683 saw extensive *dragonnades*, 1684 the same, and in the first months of 1685 some 300-400,000 conversions took place. Many historians have asserted that Louis never approved this policy, but this is a partisan defence: it is not credible that Louis was ignorant of the extent of the violence.

From: Peter Campbell, *Louis XIV*, published in 1993.

### 10b. Louis XIV and Versailles

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the creation of Versailles weakened Louis XIV's power as King of France.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers the impact of Versailles upon the administration of France.

In 1682 Versailles became the official home of the King, the Court, and the government. One wing of the palace was an administrative block. From this time bureaucratic government developed rapidly. The vigour of the ministry declined and the King took more matters into his own hands. Councils, apart from the *Conseil d'en Haut*, became purely administrative bodies. The King dealt directly with officials and individual ministers; but he was overworked and had many interests and concerns other than the administration, and the result was that officials, entrenched in their growing departments, became more and more their own masters, and at times the initiators of policy. The same process was of course going on in the provinces. By the time of Colbert's death the intendants were all-powerful in most regions, and in defiance of his regulations had built up their own bureaucracies of *sub-délégués* and clerks. More and more they tended to remain for years in one *généralité*. The King's government had ossified. Louis encouraged hard work, routine, and formalism. Faced with large issues he was apt to plunge in out of his depth without realizing the consequences of his actions. His first great ministry had been a guiding force, but after the deaths of its members, and of Louvois, the King's ministers were little more than clerks. Louis was almost indomitably complacent, his pride excluded criticism, and he believed in his divine inspiration.

From: W. E. Brown, *The First Bourbon Century in France*, published in 1971.

**Interpretation B:** This historian looks at how Versailles affected the French nobility.

As far as the 'uprooting' of the nobility by the king is concerned, it did happen that nobles became too attached to courtly life and cut themselves off from their familial and local attachments. The Comte de Tessé, having decided in 1710 to visit the estate which gave him his title, wrote: 'I had not been there for thirty-two years and I found it without doors or glass in the windows, except in one tower, where there was only one room up five sets of stairs.' Establishing the most powerful men in the kingdom at court meant uprooting their propensity for revolt. Not that we are dealing here with the nobility as a whole, a group numbering 12,000 families and some 200,000 individuals, but only with 'the great personages of the realm'. If, at the end of the reign, Versailles and its dependencies housed around 10,000 people, half of them commoners, the court was therefore composed of about 5,000 nobles. The system of seasonal 'quarters' meant that active service lasted not for a year but for three months twice yearly, and therefore these 5,000 nobles represented as many nobles again in effect. But if the king retained 10,000 members of the nobility at court, he was still 'uprooting' only five per cent of the whole class.

From: François Bluche, *Louis XIV*, published in 1990.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Versailles fulfilled many functions.

In style and conception Versailles was a part of a vast project to exploit the arts in the service of the King. The buildings and gardens created a classical world, illustrated and reinforced by painting and sculpture, in which a certain image of royalty was projected. Great emphasis was put upon the virtue and the power of the King, ruling over an ordered universe. The arts contributed to the grandeur of the King, and transmitted the memory of his exploits to future generations. In fact, without this memory there could be no true grandeur. This was not a new conception; what is new about the artistic patronage of Louis XIV is its scale, for Versailles is distinguished by its gigantic proportions. The display of power could therefore take place in theatrical surroundings that were designed to overawe the spectator. Foreign ambassadors, in particular, were extremely impressed. This courtly grandeur should be seen as a vital aspect of Louis' baroque state, as display, representation and pageant created an aura of power. The court of Versailles was at the centre of the governing system, the meeting point for King, courtiers, ministers, ambassadors and deputations from the provinces. But the grandiose château lends itself to interpretation on many levels. It also reflects a move by King and court from Paris, that turbulent capital, where the Louvre stirred unpleasant memories for Louis as well as presenting aesthetic problems of remodelling and joining-up to the Tuileries, because of its awkward angled ground plan. In contrast, Versailles was a palace of unparalleled grandeur befitting a king obsessed with his *gloire*; the fact of its construction in a marshy valley only emphasised his power.

From: Peter Campbell, *Louis XIV*, published in 1993.

**Interpretation D:** This historian reflects on various reasons for the building of Versailles.

Versailles transferred the mythico-historical deification of the monarch, already the basis of so many ceremonies and public displays, into permanent structures. When its designers built the palace of the Sun for the royal Apollo they sought to give the impression that he had created universal harmony; in the process it was not dynamism that they celebrated, but the triumph of a reason and order which had always existed, and of which the prince had supposedly rediscovered the secret. The palace and gardens became an autarchic universe, a pure expression of the will of the prince; they were also a kind of theatre set confronting Paris. The king compensated for his inability to create universal monarchy through a symbolic conquest of the world, as for example re-created in miniature in his gardens, where he could mould the model to his fantasy. There are good reasons to think that there was an inverse relationship between this process and the pursuit of genuine power. After the middle 1670s the imaginary and real worlds of the monarchy grew apart, with serious implications. The king who could do no wrong was deified in his own person, as his decisions progressively lost touch with the reality of a country he never saw. By definition the golden age and the sun-king represented an apogee incapable of improvement or development, symbolized by the repetitious rituals of the court at its centre. King, ministers, and courtiers alike were led to see any problems as minor defects, to be remedied by mere administrative action.

From: Robin Briggs, *Early Modern France 1560-1775*, published in 1998.

### 10c. Louis XIV's Foreign Policy

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Louis XIV was more concerned with personal glory than the needs of France.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that Louis XIV was motivated by personal reputation and not national defence in shaping his policy towards north-eastern France.

Neither his *Memoirs* nor his correspondence provide any support for the assumption that Louis felt the need for a more securely-defended frontier and strove to obtain it. On the contrary, Louis approached the problem not from the starting-point of national security, but of personal reputation and the extension of French influence; and the only contemporary who appears to have thought of the problem of defence was Vauban. It would be idle to condemn Louis on the ground of his inability to perceive that France might one day be obliged to exchange the offensive for the defensive; but on the other hand it is definitely untrue that his wars had for their object the attainment of national security. In the course of his wars he captured outlying fortresses such as Freiburg, Breisach, and Philippsburg; by purchase and annexation France had also acquired Pignerol and Casale; but the cost of upkeep entailed by these places was out of all proportion to their strategic value, and their retention helped to make the French frontier still more artificial. This was the opinion of Vauban, who was in the unique position that, while more than any other man he was the agent by which Louis scored his military successes, he yet expressed regret that these successes were not dictated by any coherent policy, and still left Paris and the north-eastern frontier dangerously exposed.

From: David Ogg, *Louis XIV*, published in 1933.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that Louis was an aggressor who was willing to use war as a means of achieving his aims.

Louis' ambitions soared higher than mere frontier gains. Like his contemporaries, he saw Europe as an ordered hierarchy of kingdoms under a head; but unlike them he saw himself, not the Emperor, as the head. 'The Kings of France', he said, 'hereditary Kings...can boast that, without exception, there is not in the world today a better house than theirs, nor a more ancient monarchy, nor a greater power, nor a more absolute authority.' His mouth began to water at the prospect of the declining kingdom of Spain. Philip IV died in 1665, leaving everything to his already moribund heir, Charles II, the son of his second wife. Louis' queen was the eldest daughter of Philip's first wife, and certain clauses in the Treaty of the Pyrenees had been so skilfully drawn up by Mazarin's men, that Louis' lawyers were able to concoct quite a reasonable claim, first of all to sections of the Spanish inheritance (such as the Netherlands and Franche-Comté), and eventually to the entire kingdom itself. Louis' foreign policy from 1667 to practically the end of his reign is the story of the glories, and then the miseries, of perpetual diplomacy and war in pursuit of these lands.

From: E. N. Williams, *The Ancien Regime in Europe*, published in 1970.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Louis XIV's foreign policy was essentially defensive but often resulted in aggression.

The European situation never remained stable, and since the position of France in Europe was, traditionally, the chief concern of its ruler, foreign affairs increasingly occupied Louis' time and energy, while four wars (1667-68, 1672-78/9, 1688/9-97, 1702-13/14) interrupted reform work at home. The reason was not far to seek. France had extended northern and eastern borders which could easily be invaded – along the river valleys which led from Southern Netherlands and the lower Rhineland territory deep into France, through Lorraine and the Belfort gap in the Burgundy region, over the Savoy passes and Barcelonnette further south. Problems could and did arise which were independent of France in their origins but which profoundly and immediately affected French strategic interests. In this respect Louis' foreign policy reactions may be labelled defensive in intent, even where war ensued. But the very recovery of France and the determination of Louis and his ministers to exploit France's resources created problems for other European powers. Louis' concern to strengthen his northern and eastern strategic position caused fear in his German neighbours; his drive to catch up with the Maritime Powers in trade and colonial ventures met with counter-measures. In this respect Louis' initiatives had aggressive implications which brought fear of France as an exorbitant power and became catalysts of war.

From: Ragnhild Hatton, *Louis XIV and his World*, published in 1972.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Louis was motivated in his foreign policy by a search for glory.

A common reproach of the Sun King is to point out the length of 'his' wars: six years for the Dutch War, ten for the War of the League of Augsburg, thirteen for the War of the Spanish Succession – the war for the queen's rightful inheritance (1667-8) being regarded as 'no more than a military manoeuvre'. Clearly, to some, there is a mystical proportion between the number of years that a war lasted and the number wounded or killed. If it were accepted that the wars ascribed to him took place in circumstances favourable to France and with beneficial results, these criticisms would have little force. It is also often forgotten that Louis' predecessors fought or engaged in 'their' wars in circumstances which were much more desperate, with internal security in question and the realm threatened with invasion. Nor should the results of these conflicts be ignored. It is still widely believed to be the case that France lost much in terms of territory by the terms of the Peace of Utrecht (1712-13); but it is a simple exercise to draw a map of the limits of France in 1715 and subtract the frontier limits of 1661: the difference is a measure of the results of war. In 1667, warfare was discussed in terms purely of the king's glory, not even distinguishing it from that of the realm. The search for glory, in and for itself, did not then seem to be an empty quest. As Montesquieu said, monarchy was founded upon honour – nothing in its pursuit could be regarded as fruitless.

From: François Bluche, *Louis XIV*, published in 1990.

## Louis XIV 1661-1715 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
10.1 Assess the view that Louis XIV's rule of France was more autocratic than despotic. <b>[40 marks]</b>	10b.
10.2 How far do you agree that Louis XIV's policies towards the nobility made for more effective government by the monarchy? <b>[40 marks]</b>	10b.
10.3 How far did Colbert achieve his economic objectives? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
10.4 How far do you agree that the gains for France outweighed its losses in the War of the Spanish Succession? <b>[40 marks]</b>	10c.
10.5 Assess the view that the only aim of Louis XIV's foreign policy was to increase his own glory. <b>[40 marks]</b>	10c.
10.6 To what extent do you agree that Versailles served the interests of Louis XIV rather than those of his subjects? <b>[40 marks]</b>	10b.
10.7 How far did France influence European culture in the period from 1661 to 1715? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
10.8 How successful was Louis XIV's religious policy? <b>[40 marks]</b>	10a.
10.9 Assess the view that Louis XIV's policies towards the Papacy caused more problems than they solved. <b>[40 marks]</b>	10a.
10.10 Assess the view that the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes was necessary because the Huguenots presented a serious problem to the French monarchy. <b>[40 marks]</b>	10a.

## 11. British India 1784-1878

### 11a. The British advance in India

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the British aim in India was to gain control to advance their own interests.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian believes that under Wellesley the East India Company was bent on conquest.

The Marquess Wellesley was appointed to India in 1797: his mind was stored with ideas quite different from those of his predecessor, Lord Cornwallis; Cornwallis had acted in the light of Pitt's India Act; he was a reformer who had studied the career of Warren Hastings. Wellesley saw India as a theatre in the world war with France; he was a statesman who feared the conquests of Napoleon. By temperament he was, in any case, imperious, arrogant and splendour-loving. It is said that he even wore his decorations on his night attire. He was aware, as everyone was, that the East India Company had not yet solved the problem of balancing its books. But, whereas Charles Grant, the chairman of the Company, urged that honest administration and no expansion was the best course morally, legally, and for the dividends, Wellesley and Dundas seem to have decided that the intentions of Pitt's India Act should now be disregarded. It seems likely that their unconfessed objective was to expand British rule and to make the larger empire pay for itself by opening up the trade to interests outside the old Company. By 1801, Wellesley the expansionist could claim to have ousted French influence from southern India. For, in addition to gaining the Carnatic and destroying Mysore he had reduced Hyderabad to a subject state where the Nizam had been forced to disband his own army and to cede territory to pay British costs in defending him.

From: J. Steven Watson, *The Reign of George III*, published in 1960.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the British were interested in conquest to preserve British India.

The boundaries of India under British rule were effectively established in the first half of the nineteenth century. This was the consequence of several phases of war and annexations with the East India Company's frontiers moving forward more rapidly at some times than at others but with few prolonged periods of peace. These wars were rarely planned or sanctioned in Britain. Wars often began on the initiative of men in India itself, above all of those who held the office of Governor-General. Some governors-general made little secret of their willingness to extend British rule on almost any pretext. This was true of the Marquess Wellesley between 1798 and 1805, of the Marquess of Hastings between 1813 and 1823, and of Lord Dalhousie from 1848 to 1856. Others professed their abhorrence of war, above all because of its effect on the finances of the government of India. Yet few avoided war altogether. For all its immense military power, British India was constantly apprehensive about its security. Stable relations with states on the British frontier must be maintained at all costs. Any Indian state that appeared to offer a challenge to the British or to be lapsing into disorder as the British interpreted it must be brought under control before it spread its contagion into British India. Official explanations for British policy constantly portray the British as reluctantly intervening to stabilize their frontiers or remove unsatisfactory rulers. What such accounts do not explain is that the instability that the British deplored and feared was often produced by British pressures for military alliances, for financial contributions or for commercial access.

From: Peter Marshall, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation C:** This historian sees the British as aiming to bring fair government to India.

Public opinion in the late eighteenth century refused to tolerate a tyranny run in Britain's name and had insisted, in the teeth of the Company's opposition, on extending to India the framework of honest and fair government. While British politicians were seeking for some kind of ethical basis for the new empire, officials in India were groping towards a moral justification for the fledgling Raj. The result was a compound of pragmatism and idealism. Experience showed that for the time being Indians lacked that sense of public responsibility which was necessary if a people were to govern themselves. John Shore, a member of the Calcutta Council who became Governor-General in 1793, justified what amounted to an alien autocracy on the grounds of the superiority of the British character. 'A sense of Humour and Virtue' and a reputation for 'Bravery, Clemency and Good Faith' were the distinguishing marks of the Company's servants, which ideally qualified them to rule over those without these virtues. This vision of a benign Raj, actively promoting the happiness and prosperity of its subjects went a long way towards satisfying Burke's demand for an Indian Empire governed in accordance with British principles of equity and respect for the rights of individuals. A new generation of Company servants were coming into prominence at the end of the century. They shared with their predecessors, the nabobs, the conviction that the Indians were 'wholly devoid of Public Virtue'. Thus British government could be defended on moral grounds because it was disinterested, just and directed by men of the highest integrity, who placed public duty before self-interest.

From: Lawrence James, *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers that the British appreciated Indian civilization.

The period of the British Raj lasted roughly 200 years. It is a long and tortured story. In the open-minded atmosphere of the eighteenth century there were many meetings of minds. General Charles 'Hindoo' Stuart in Calcutta bathed daily in the Ganges, recommended English ladies to wear the sari, and made the first collection of Indian art. With striking foresight, Stuart also argued for native customs to be allowed in sepoy army regiments. In his *Vindication of the Hindoos* he scathingly deprecated European missionaries and praised Hinduism as a religion that 'little needs the improving hand of Christianity to render its followers a sufficiently correct and moral people for all useful purposes of a civilized society'. Such 'White Mughals' had their counterparts in the intellectual sciences. William Jones, James Prinsep and Francis Buchanan, for example, were leading lights in the rediscovery of ancient Indian history; nor should one forget Warren Hastings, the troubled first governor general of British India, who knew native languages and played an instrumental role in the cultivation of scholarship in Bengal. This meeting of cultures led to a prodigious multilingual flowering of Bengali civilization.

From: Michael Wood, *The Story of India*, published in 2007.

**11b. The nature of the disturbances in India in 1857**

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the unrest in India in 1857 was motivated more by social and economic grievances than a desire for political change.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian sees a revolutionary movement in India by 1857.

The secret organization of the Revolution, which was first started in Brahmavarta was now growing at a tremendous rate. Nuclei had been established in various places in Northern India and regular communication had been established between them. The palace at Brahmavarta was the focus of the activities at Cawnpore; the same function was performed for Delhi by the Dewan-I-Khas. Ahmad Shah had woven the webs of jihad – the war of independence – through every corner of Lucknow and Agra. Kumar Singh had taken the leadership of his province and in consultation with Nana had been busy gathering materials for war. The seeds of the Jihad had taken root in Patna and the whole city was a haunt for the Revolutionary Party. Landowners, farmers, merchants and students were ready to give their lives for freedom and independence. Near Calcutta, the Nabob of Oudh had persuaded the Sepoys to act. The Muslim population of Hyderabad had begun to hold secret meetings. The states of Patwardhan were ready to fight under the banner of a united nation in the coming war. In Madras, in the beginning of 1857, the following proclamation began to appear from the walls of the city ‘Countrymen and faithful adherents of your religion, rise up!’ To link together the innumerable groups of the various provinces which were working separately, men were employed to travel secretly and letters were rarely used. While everywhere activity of this kind was going on, the blunder of the cartridges, born of the criminal desire to spite the religious feelings of the sepoy, was committed by the English.

Vinayak Damodar Savakar, *The Indian War of Independence*, 1909.

**Interpretation B:** This historian considers the role of the traditional rulers in 1857.

The impact of the military mutiny was magnified by a simultaneous series of rural rebellions reflecting peasant resentment at loss of land control to new men or urban money-making castes and also local grievances against excessive taxation. In North India ‘rajās’ like Devi Singh in Mathura and Adam Singh Beer in Meerut emerged overnight to rally a generally reticent peasantry to rise up against authority. Some districts however remained loyal enough to collect revenues which were transmitted to the British Raj, even during the revolt. No nationalist leadership (in the modern sense) emerged; the revolt had several sub national Indian currents, the most powerful of which was the reassertion of tradition-bound monarchies. The greatest landed magnates of Oudh, like Man Singh and Rana Beni Madho, had virtually been feudal monarchs before the annexation; now they saw themselves stripped both of their traditional martial lordships and of substantial village revenues. In such regions the ‘mutiny’ is more accurately seen as a ‘post-pacification’ revolt. The traditional inability of Indian rajās and nawabs to subordinate personal ambitions and jealousies to national goals plagued rebel ranks from the Great Revolt’s inception. The British on the other hand never seriously doubted their military capacity to win back the ground they had lost and never lost faith in their Raj. It was the last desperate struggle of many an Indian ancient regime, united by their fears and their hatred of the foreigner, whose Western Raj had become too powerful to destroy. It was far more than a mutiny, yet much less than a first war of independence, as some Indian nationalists like to call it.

Stanley Wolpert, *A New History of India*, 1977.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers hostility to British rule before 1857.

Even though the Awadh mutineers once referred to themselves as ‘the Army of India’, there is nothing in what they said or did to suggest that they could have comprehended, let alone wanted, an equivalent to the Indian state that emerged during the twentieth century. Individually and collectively, Indians were not bent on the creation of a unified nation state. Instead what came out of the mutiny was a fragmentation which would have gathered momentum if more men like Devi Singh had been free to emerge. The old ways returned in the district around Mathura almost the moment that British authority dissolved. In some places, domestic slavery and sutis made a comeback. Where national consciousness was evident among the rebels, it was defined as a loathing for the British which, at times, seemed so intense that it appeared that they were waging a racial war of extermination. There was wholesale destruction of all things British including railway engines which were shattered by cannon fire at the orders of the rioters at Allahabad. Intelligent Indians shared the British horror at this manic Luddism. The barrier and prejudices created by religion, caste, clan and tribes were still too strong to allow the cultivation of national sentiment or cohesion even if the rebels attempted to do so. The princes were unwilling to commit themselves to a rebellion. Once the war began to swing in Britain’s favour, it was prudent to show active support.

Lawrence James, *Raj. The Making and Unmaking of British India*, 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers the nature of the upheavals of 1857.

The events of 1857 have often been taken to mark a watershed in both British rule and the Indian response to it. But the interpretation of these events remains controversial, and so does their title. Known to the British as ‘the Sepoy’, ‘Bengal’ or ‘Indian Mutiny’, to Indians as the National Uprising or the First War of Independence, and to the less partisan as the Great Rebellion, what happened in 1857 defies simplistic analysis. Equating the rebellion with the traditional, even ‘feudal’ form of reaction, whose failure would usher in the new age of nationalism, and politically organised protest is no longer acceptable. Many different groups with different grievances became aligned with either side in the Great Rebellion. The rights and wrongs of British rule were not always a decisive factor and the frontier between the two sides sliced through both agrarian and urban communities, both settled and nomadic peoples, both high caste and low, both landlord and tenant, Muslim and Hindu. There was something of a national character in both those who opposed the rebellion as well as in that of those who supported it.

John Keay, *India: A History*, 2000.

**11c. The impact of British Rule after 1857**

Using the four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that effective and successful direct British rule in India was established by 1878.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian sees British rule as more conservative after 1857.

Fears concerning 'native' sensitivities to social and religious changes of any sort inaugurated an era of social and religious *laissez faire* which put an end to reform legislation in India for more than three decades after 1858. There was an indifference to the plight of women, untouchables, and exploited children. Missionaries were instructed to cut back their attempts at conversion. With the government of India pressed to pay back the entire cost of the British military operations, spending on education was the first to be cut. The one institution in which reforms were made was the army. The ratio of Indian to British troops was reduced. The British were given exclusive control over artillery. Princes and lesser gentry were wooed. Dalhousie's egalitarian policy of treating all natives as equal was reversed, but his policies of technological modernization were continued. The post-war era was a period of unprecedented capital investment. Railway construction advanced rapidly. Perhaps the most pervasive impact of the war, however, was the psychological wall of racial distrust it raised between Britain's white and India's native populations. The bitter legacy of atrocities in 1857 remained to poison the memories of Englishmen and Indians alike. The wall that insulated white sahib society from the natives loomed impervious to any but a handful of princes and landed gentry. By 1877 Britain's new order had taken such firm hold over the subcontinent that Disraeli was able to convince Queen Victoria of the wisdom of adding 'Empress of India' to her regalia.

From: Stanley Wolpert, *A New History of India*, published in 1977.

**Interpretation B:** This historian sees Indian interests being sacrificed to those of Britain after 1857.

The British preferred to emphasize their investment in infrastructure, especially railways and irrigation works ('trains and drains'). They pointed to the country's generally favourable balance of payments. Critics, though, were less impressed by India's theoretical prosperity and more exercised by Indians' actual poverty. As early as 1866 Dadabhai Naoroji, a future Congress leader, had begun to wonder whom the trains benefited and where the drains led. His 'drain theory' maintained that India's surpluses, instead of being invested so as to create the modernized and industrialised economy needed to support a growing population, was being drained away by the ruling power. The main drain emptied in London with a flood of what the government called 'home charges'. These included salaries and pensions for government and army officers, military purchases, India office expenses, debt repayments and returns to investors in Indian railways. These came to nearly a quarter of India's annual revenue. It was not surprising that Indians lived in such abject poverty or that famines were so frequent. Lord Lytton's 1877 Imperial Assemblage at Delhi was the sort of wasteful extravaganza to which Indians of almost every perspective took exception. It coincided with the worst famine of the century which claimed perhaps 5.5 million lives in the Deccan and the south.

From: John Keay, *India: A History*, published in 2000.

**Interpretation C:** This writer sees the British rule of India as beneficial.

The British rule saw a uniformity being established in India. Laws were framed that applied to all and taxes like Jizzia (the land tax) were abolished. For the first time the Hindus regained their religious freedom. The British and foreign scholars also started a study of the Indian scriptures and the result was a concerted effort to save Indian heritage, such as the temples at Khujaraho which were in decay were restored. The British also set up colleges and universities and a fair and efficient judicial system that traces its origin to British rule. In addition they set up the framework of administration by setting up the Indian civil service and the police service. These are now the backbone of Indian democracy. The British created an excellent road and rail network that crisscrossed the entire country and for the first time a resident from Lahore could travel to Calcutta or the Deep South without hindrance. Not content with these achievements, the British also abolished the evil practices like Sati and thuggism which were the bane of Indian society. For this alone the British rulers deserve our admiration. The British also created the postal services and the armed services. The British rule brought in knowledge and enlightenment and for the first time the concept of India as a nation took shape. The monuments to British rule are legion. Suffice it to say that India progressed more in 200 years of English rule than in 600 years earlier. The concept of equality and fair play is something we learnt from the English as well as the concept that an officer of the Indian army was also a gentleman. There were no doubt some aberrations, but when we consider everything it is not hard to appreciate that this period was almost close to the earlier Golden Age of India. Later historians will probably give due credit to the Raj as a period of development and enlightenment after the dark period of Mughal rule.

From: M. G. Singh, *The British Rule Over India, an Assessment*, published in 2005.

**Interpretation D:** This historian sees British rule in India after 1857 as inconsistent.

Since 1857 the British in India had been on the horns of an East/West dilemma. In order to maintain stability they felt obliged to rule an oriental despotism by the sword and support the old order. On the other hand, enlightened Victorians could hardly deny that good government was the *raison d'être* of the Raj. 'Sanitation, Education, Hospitals, Roads, Bridges, Navigation', intoned Lord Mayo who became viceroy in 1869, 'We are trying to do in half a century what in other countries has absorbed the life of the nation.' Moreover, conservative as well as liberal Viceroys helped to foster the growth of Indian nationalism. This was partly because the British, despite their proclaimed genius for government, ruled India badly. On the one hand, Mayo took advice from Florence Nightingale about hospitals; he promoted public works such as ports, railways and canals and irrigation schemes, and encouraged his lonely officers to establish a 'pure, powerful and just regime'. Every year he travelled thousands of miles, wearing out his breeches. Yet, on the other hand, he involuntarily presided over a subcontinental muddle. Even during the famines that ravaged India, humanity was sacrificed to economy. British civil servants, often pig-sticking, gin-swilling public school men were impossibly remote from their subjects.

From: Piers Brendon, *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire 1781-1997*, published in 2007.

**British India, 1784-1878 Investigation Titles**

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
11.1 Assess the view that government intervention in India from 1784 was vital in maintaining British interests there. <b>[40 marks]</b>	11a.
11.2 Assess the view that the activities of the East India Company in India up to 1813 were beneficial to Indians. <b>[40 marks]</b>	11a.
11.3 Assess the importance of the reforms of Dalhousie in bringing unrest to India in 1857. <b>[40 marks]</b>	11b.
11.4 Assess the view that the Christian mission in India was unrealistic in its aims. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
11.5 How serious a threat did the Thugs pose to Indian society? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
11.6 How far can the events of 1857 be validly described as a 'War of Independence'? <b>[40 marks]</b>	11b.
11.7 Assess the view that the main British aim in India after 1813 was to improve its administration. <b>[40 marks]</b>	11a.
11.8 Assess the degree to which Indians gave consent to the government of India from 1815 to 1857. <b>[40 marks]</b>	11b.
11.9 Assess the judgement that Indian governors-general were despots in all but name with reference to any individual governor-general from 1800 to 1857. <b>[40 marks]</b>	11a.
11.10 How far can the career of Warren Hastings in India be seen as an example of self-aggrandisement? <b>[40 marks]</b>	

## 12. Napoleon I 1795-1815

### 12a. The nature of Napoleon's rule

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Napoleon introduced a 'police state' into France.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers the nature of changes made by Napoleon as First Consul.

Napoleon engineered new machinery of justice in which judges and presidents of courts became cogs obeying the levers of appointment and promotion pulled by the First Consul. In 1802 the jury system, with its mechanically inefficient tendency to slow down the judicial apparatus by acquitting prisoners Bonaparte wished to see condemned was suppressed in a large part of the country. From the beginning, Bonaparte busied himself extinguishing what yet remained of the freedom of expression won during the Revolution. Intellectuals – or, as he jeeringly called them because of their lack of realism, 'ideologues' – were his special demons. They were so inconveniently prone to discuss such fundamental questions as liberty, conscience and human values. In 1803 he ordered that bookshops be prohibited from placing new works on sale until seven days after a copy had been submitted to the censor. The systematic opening of private correspondence, the ubiquitous police spies, and imprisonment without trial completed Bonaparte's practical interpretation of the 'sacred right' of liberty. With regard to royalist rebels, Bonaparte pursued a Corsican vendetta, shooting one of their leaders, the Comte de Frotté with six companions, despite a safe conduct. In December 1800 it was the turn of Bonaparte's Jacobin opponents. He attributed an attempt on his life to the Jacobins, though in fact the royalists had planted the bomb. Nine Jacobin prisoners were shot or guillotined in January 1801, followed by the royalist bombers themselves in April. One hundred and thirty five leading Jacobins were deported; for good measure, a hundred royalists were arrested and either sent to prison or interned without trial. Bonaparte the egotist was screwing his heel on those who actively opposed him.

Correlli Barnett, *Bonaparte*, published in 1978.

**Interpretation B:** This historian considers the nature of the Napoleonic state.

The Bonapartist dictatorship maintained its control of public opinion through careful policing and censorship of the written word. The apparatus of control was not fully developed until well after the establishment of the Empire – the policing of the book trade, for example, was only systematised in 1810-11 – but the extension of police powers was a characteristic feature of Bonapartism. The administration of political police depended heavily on one man – Fouché. He reorganised the Police Ministry with the help of his associate, Demarest. Together they established a network of informers and a team of agents who intercepted and copied suspicious mail. The policing of the labour force was an important task of the repressive apparatus. The dictatorship tightened control of the workforce in the interests of the employers. In so doing it revealed the class interests of the Bonapartist state. The censorship of literature, the theatre and the newspaper press was not completely effective, but it remained an important instrument of Bonapartism. The regime was extremely sensitive to public criticism and had a great respect for the power of the press. It believed, however, that opinion could be moulded into an attitude of conformity and obedience. Napoleon tried to bully editors into subservience. In 1811 legislation restricted Parisian journals to four only; and the departments were only allowed one political journal each. Bonapartist censorship of the press was primarily concerned at establishing political conformity.

Martyn Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation C:** This historian reflects on the originality of Napoleon's measures of social control.

Much of Bonaparte's appeal was that he seemed to be continuing an existing but unfulfilled trend within the government of the Directory for a stronger executive power. The draconian views he soon exhibited on freedom of the press and freedom of association had already been prefigured by the Directory's repressive attitude towards newspapers and political associations on the fringes of the Left and the Right. His reduction of the elective principle was less resented than might appear likely: the low ballots of the late 1790s suggested that the country could either take democracy or leave it. Beneath the frothy oscillations of Directory politics, growing centralization through a bureaucracy more effective than either the Bourbons or the earlier Revolutionaries had been able to assemble – prepared the way for the Napoleonic regime. The wide use of military justice under the Directory to control brigandage and highway robbery, for example, presaged the tough policies of Napoleon in pacifying France and creating a kind of 'security state'.

Colin Jones, *The Great Nation, France from Louis XV to Napoleon*, published in 2002.

**Interpretation D:** This historian offers a view about the scale of repression by Napoleon.

The Napoleonic police and the judiciary structures of repression are regarded as infamous, and rightly so. Gendarmes, agents and special tribunals dealt with arbitrary arrest, preventive detention, internal exile and deportation. There were several competing police forces during the Empire, though this multiplicity did not aid their effectiveness. A few spectacular cases drew attention. Napoleon wished to have General Dupont thrown into prison and to bring him to a trial for treason which would have led to his execution. Fouché and Cambacérès dissuaded Napoleon from committing blatant infringements of justice as had been committed in the abduction and execution of d'Enghien. Looking at the forest instead of a few well-known trees, one cannot help being struck by how sparse it is. In a nation of 30 million, the number of political prisoners detained in state prisons by 1814 was relatively limited. Two thousand five hundred prisoners were criminal enemies, spies, foreign agents, Chouan rebels and brigands. Another three to four thousand people suffered internal exile. None of this is to deny flagrant injustice, but when one puts it into context of the era, it is surprisingly mild. Between 300 000 and 500 000 people had been imprisoned by the Convention. A similar statistic might surprise those who compare Napoleon lightly with Stalin or Hitler: the budget of one branch of the secret police in 1811 was 75,000 francs – a derisory sum. To call the regime a police state is to exaggerate; there was no terror, no kidnapping of political opponents, no torture, no gulags. The Empire displayed the 'liberal authoritarianism' of a 'security state'.

Steven Englund, *Napoleon, A Political Life*, published in 2004.

## 12b. Napoleon's Rule of France

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Napoleon was principally motivated by the desire to benefit himself rather than to benefit the people of France.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian sees Napoleon trying to reconstruct historical greatness.

In assuming the imperial title Napoleon was swimming with a strong if turbid tide. Public opinion accepted the change, if not with exultation, then at least without demur. Few agreed with Beethoven that when he reached for a crown, Napoleon was degrading himself: 'He aspires to descend.' Of all the vast shadows evoked by the magic word Empire, the most substantial was that of Charlemagne. It was Charlemagne whom Napoleon had before his eyes as a pattern and exemplar. He spoke with deep conviction when he referred to Charlemagne as Emperor of the French and 'our illustrious predecessor'. It was Charlemagne's precedent that made him want to be crowned by the Pope. But the Pope was not allowed to crown the emperor. Napoleon was convinced that he ruled by the direct grace of God and the will of the people. He was beginning to feel himself the Vicar of God. The Pope was but a minister, to be dismissed if need be. Every totalitarianism is theocracy, and the Napoleonic state was totalitarianism in absolute purity. He aimed to dazzle Europe, to reward the loyal, to bridle the hesitant, to spur the ambitious. And also to temper or dilute the pretensions of the old nobility. He welcomed the aristocrats of the *Ancien Régime* but did not want them to swamp his court. Republican simplicity was discarded for the gorgeousness of a brand new regime.

From: Albert Guérard, *Napoleon I*, published in 1957.

**Interpretation B:** This historian examines some elements of Napoleon's rule.

On the whole, the dictatorial nature of Bonaparte's government was both disguised and mitigated by a genuine determination to make use of the ablest men available, regardless of their political past, to create a strong, united, prosperous France. Jacobins, Royalists, all were to put aside sterile ideology and become simply Frenchmen. The word 'positive' constantly recurred in Napoleon's utterances. Everybody had to be positive – that is to abstain from negative criticisms. However, Napoleon was by no means intolerant of criticism expressed in the limits of his councils. Nowhere does he appear in a more favourable light than in the transcripts of the meetings of the Council of State. This was Napoleon's own creation and its very organization testifies to his extraordinary grasp of the essentials of modern statesmanship. Its members were chosen on the sole basis of their ability, experience and efficiency. The meetings were informal and freewheeling, even after Napoleon became Emperor. In 1804 no fewer than 3,565 subjects were discussed. Each councillor was free to state his opinions. Napoleon displayed an astounding ability to direct discussion towards the core of each point at issue.

From: J. Christopher Herold, *The Age of Napoleon*, published in 1963.

**Interpretation C:** This historian looks at the nature of Napoleonic government.

The dictatorship of public society, inspired by Ancient Rome, and the enlightened despotism had been succeeded by a hereditary monarchy. The personalisation of power put an end to the proper functioning of regular political institutions, and liberties disappeared. Napoleon did not believe in 'constitutions'; he believed that vanity and not the desire for liberty had caused the Revolution. For him, strength was the essential principle of all government. Only an authoritarian regime could overcome the crisis inherited from the revolution. An authoritarian regime would not be responsible to a parliament. He wrote to Lebrun who had taken over the administration of Holland, 'I have not taken over Holland in order to consult the rabble of Amsterdam or to do what others want'. The influence of absolute power accentuated one of Napoleon's characteristics: self-confidence destroyed any critical faculty. From self-importance it was an easy step to cynicism. He became more and more convinced that the aristocracy should be the principal support of the hereditary monarchy which he intended to found and he relied on his family. But his family did him a disservice because of the picture it presented of a clan exploiting France in order to build up enormous fortunes and to satisfy its dubious appetites.

From: Jean Tulard, *Napoleon, the Myth of the Saviour*, published in 1977.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers Napoleon's reforms.

Bonaparte discarded the youthful radicalism which once had given him the reputation of a Jacobin; his experiences in Italy in 1796-7 had left him with a deep distrust of the politics of principle. Indeed, he was opposed to politics of any kind, looking instead for sound government with policy being decided at the centre by a single directing will and then being implemented by professional bureaucrats. This was a view shared by a country which had for ten long years been force-fed with an overdose of ideology. If wounds were still raw and nerves still stretched, only extremists at either end of the political spectrum wished to prolong the struggle between right and left. At the heart of Bonaparte's success, therefore, was his ability to combine two apparently irreconcilable ideals: liberty and order. He managed this by giving the semblance of liberty, but the reality of order. Behind the revolutionary rhetoric was an autocratic will stronger than anything an old regime monarch could boast. The new regime had the characteristics of a modern administration, its officials being uniform, professional, salaried and trained. The new system worked. It can safely be said that France had never been better governed. Almost everyone could be pleased by the dramatic improvement in public order which followed Bonaparte's seizure of power.

From: Tim Blanning, *The Pursuit of Glory*, published in 2007.

**12c. The Fall of Napoleon**

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Napoleon himself was most to blame for his own downfall.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian sees Napoleon's fall being brought about by conspiracy and internal opposition.

On at least six occasions between early 1813 and July 1815 Napoleon came within days or hours of inflicting a decisive defeat on the Allies – a defeat that was essential if he were to regain control of the lands of his lost Empire. Had he succeeded, alliances would have been reshuffled and once again he would have dominated Europe. His fall was not brought about by military failure, even at Waterloo, but by a series of betrayals. When Napoleon, Emperor of the French, finally abdicated after more than twenty years of unparalleled military and diplomatic successes, France fell once more into a dark age. To the people of France he was their Emperor, created by their will and unbeaten in war. Betrayed in 1814 by Talleyrand's conspiracy, aided by Marmont and Augereau and the Senators. Betrayed again in 1815 by Fouché, La Fayette, Davout and the members of the Chambers. Betrayed by his father-in-law, Emperor Francis, and by his wife. But not by the people of France. All the British money, Allied military occupations, atrocities and depredations could not break the bond between the people and the man who personified their Revolution. You cannot kill an ideal. And Napoleon was the ideal. Had he not said it himself? 'I am France! And France is me!'

From: David Hamilton-Williams, *The Fall of Napoleon*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation B:** This historian offers an evaluation of the role of nationalism in the fall of Napoleon.

Authors once portrayed the wars of liberation of 1813-14 as a manifestation of emergent mass nationalism, allegedly the main offspring of the Empire. As evidence they pointed to the civil war in Spain, and the massive rebellions in the Tyrol and various parts of Italy. On the whole, though, the Empire does not appear to have been much threatened by internal rebellion, and recently historians have cast doubts on whether mass nationalism was much in evidence. Popular resistance is now more frequently attributed to the defence of particular interests and local customs from state intervention. Attention thus shifts from nationalism to which European regimes adopted the Napoleonic model. From this perspective, modernisation of the state and society emerges as the main consequence of the Empire. Ultimately, the Empire fell because Napoleon failed to extricate himself from Spain prior to taking the Grand Army deep into Russia. The Imperial edifice then rapidly collapsed because it had been hastily cobbled together, but the key to liberation lay in Coalition regular armies. Britain's doggedness counted for much, although her ambitions were apparent to all, making the 'vampire of the seas' as much a source of allied discord as unity. The Sixth Coalition, composed progressively of Russia, Sweden, Britain, Prussia, Austria and various smaller states, expanded through 1813 and held in 1814. This was largely due to Napoleon's unwillingness to settle for anything less than victory. When he was forced to abdicate on 6 April 1814, the odds against Napoleon salvaging his rule were very long indeed. Yet, because of treachery, it was possible to maintain that defeat was due to betrayal. The marshals lied when they told Bonaparte that their troops would no longer fight. Talleyrand said that it was Bonaparte who had betrayed France by jeopardizing the Revolution with warmongering.

From: R. S. Alexander, *Napoleon*, published in 2001.

**Interpretation C:** This historian stresses the serious consequences for Napoleon of the Russian campaign.

On 22 October 1812 a deranged general Claude de Malet had escaped from a Parisian mental institution and claiming that Napoleon had perished in Russia, tried to proclaim a republic. Although this bizarre coup was quashed within hours, it highlighted the political nervousness engendered by the Emperor's prolonged absence from the seat of government. Realizing that his retreat would lead to Prussia's defection, Napoleon resolved to return to Paris to prepare for a new war. By the closing days of 1812 the full extent of the catastrophe which had befallen Napoleon's Grand Army was gradually being revealed and yet another diplomatic alignment of the European powers was under way. The precise numbers of men, horses, guns and other pieces of equipment which the Emperor had lost on the Russian Steppes will never be known. One authority puts them at 570,000 personnel, 200,000 cavalry and draught horses, and 1050 cannon. Nor were many of the troops who did survive in any condition to take up arms again. One eyewitness who saw remnants of some units stagger into Berlin recalls that 'One saw no guns, no cavalry, only suffering men crippled by frightful wounds, men with hands, arms or feet missing or else completely destroyed by frostbite'. Indeed, of the I Corps which commenced the campaign with 70,000 personnel, only 2281 men could be mustered in mid January 1813. So great were the losses of men and *matériel* that all of Napoleon's gains over the preceding eight years now stood in jeopardy. Just as Napoleon had feared, Prussia's defection from his cause began almost immediately.

From: David Gates, *The Napoleonic Wars 1803-1815*, published in 2003.

**Interpretation D:** This historian sees Napoleon misjudging the options open to him in 1814.

The French army in 1814 was outnumbered by the Prussian, Russian and Austrian forces by factors of two, three and four to one – with the promise of endlessly more Coalition, but not French, reinforcements. Napoleon alone kept his faith and his cool, perhaps at the price of his realism. The Emperor's generalship in the Campaign de France stands comparisons with that of Hannibal, but the fact remains: his defeats of the allies were never pulverizing, only demoralizing and humiliating for them – and most often more costly in French casualties than Napoleon could afford. Sharp temporary reverses inflicted on this or that Coalition general – even as late as the French recapture of Reims on March 13 1814 – sorely tested Allied nerve and resolve. The peace conference sitting at Châtillon even offered the French emperor terms in February 1814, but Napoleon preferred to gamble on complete victory. Given the crushing numbers he faced that was as remote as the hope that his father-in-law Francis I might detach from the allies. The coalition had been fragile, but Napoleon, true to form, kept it intact. He did so, not least, because he insisted on changing the terms that he would accept, as his military position improved. This went on into March, exasperating the powers and ultimately resulting in Napoleon failing to negotiate while he had anything left to negotiate with.

From: Steven Englund, *Napoleon: A Political Life*, published in 2004.

### Napoleon I 1795-1815 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
12.1 Assess the view that the Civil Code was the greatest achievement of the Consulate. <b>[40 marks]</b>	12b.
12.2 How far is it appropriate to refer to Napoleonic France as a 'police state'? <b>[40 marks]</b>	12a, 12b.
12.3 To what extent did Napoleon's successes as a general before 1807 owe more to the mistakes of his enemies than his own abilities as a commander? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
12.4 Assess the view that the main reason for the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815 was Wellington's leadership. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
12.5 Assess the view that the 'Spanish Ulcer' was the main reason for Napoleon's downfall. <b>[40 marks]</b>	12c.
12.6 Assess the view that the Hundred Days stood no chance of success. <b>[40 marks]</b>	12c.
12.7 To what extent was Britain responsible for the fall of Napoleon? <b>[40 marks]</b>	12c.
12.8 With what justification can Napoleon be seen as a significant figure in the growth of nationalism in Europe? <b>[40 marks]</b>	12c.
12.9 Assess the view that the success of the coup of Brumaire owed little to Napoleon's personal abilities. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
12.10 To what extent does a study of any one region confirm the view that Napoleon's Empire brought few benefits to his subjects outside France? <b>[40 marks]</b>	12a, 12b

### 13. Gladstone and Disraeli 1865-86

#### 13a. Conservative Social Reforms

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the Conservative social reforms of 1874-1880 broadened support for the party.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers that the Conservatives could not pass radical reform for fear of losing gentry and middle class support.

Disraeli and the more clear-headed members of the government in 1874 realised that the Conservative party had now to appeal more directly to the working-class electorate and that social reform could be one means towards that end. Yet they could not afford to alienate their traditional supporters in the country or in the Commons. The plain fact about the Conservative party in 1874 was that, despite the growing number of industrialists in its ranks and the appointment of a bookseller to the Cabinet, it was still primarily the party of the country gentry. 200 out of 350 Conservative MPs returned in 1874 were associated with the landed interest. It was their ethos that inevitably dominated the party and they were often unsympathetic to the new problems that faced the party leadership. What often inhibited a bold Conservative social policy were the pressures of prejudice and vested interest within the party, especially blind opposition to anything such as votes for labourers, higher rates, elected school boards or trade unions that would upset the established order of the English shires. In addition, the Second Reform Act, while it had created a mass working-class electorate that could be won for the Conservative Party, had also, by its invocation of democracy, helped to arouse fears and apprehensions among the middle classes which would drive them away from Liberalism. The Conservatives were thus compelled to appeal more and more to the middle, rather than the working, class. Social legislation could be used to win over the workers but it must not be so radical as to frighten away the middle class.

From: Paul Adelman, *Gladstone, Disraeli and Later Victorian Politics*, published in 1970.

**Interpretation B:** This historian believes some social reform was directed at the working classes.

Most of the social reforms were introduced and enacted in the 1875 session. Like the factory and licensing legislation of 1874, they were not restricted by a permissive approach, but showed considerable willingness to develop State compulsion. Nevertheless there was a decided element of *laissez-faire* about most of the reforms, perhaps reflecting the fact that the Conservatives were looking for increased middle class support. The combination of compulsory and permissive elements reflected the mixed approaches of nineteenth century social legislation. Sclater-Booth's Sale of Food and Drugs Act, to establish standards of nutritional and medicinal content and to prevent adulteration was inadequate in its compulsory powers until these were extended in 1879. Florence Nightingale may have been initially over-optimistic in writing 'poor baby will have a better chance of getting beyond babyhood than now, we hope'. Also of compulsory application were the labour laws of 1875. Disraeli, jubilant at their passage, expected them to 'gain and retain for the Tories the lasting affection of the working classes'. In fact the social legislation of Disraeli's ministry proved disappointing as a means of winning substantial support from the recently enfranchised skilled workers. The large cluster of acts was designed to deal with a range of particular problems, not least in the hope of gaining support from different sections of society.

From: Ian Machin, *Disraeli*, published in 1995.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that the social reforms were not that successful in increasing support for the party.

It is questionable how far Disraeli was justified in his supposition that measures like the labour laws would damp down social discontents and 'gain and retain for the Tories the lasting affection of the working classes'. In the sense that they removed a major cause of friction in the relationship between the Trade Union leaders and the Liberal Party, the labour laws, although highly appreciated by labour leaders, were hardly an unmixed Conservative gain. In general, it is doubtful how much the government's social legislation counted to the political credit of the Conservative party, even when it was welcomed by those it was supposed to benefit. Working people were not necessarily eager to see their rookeries demolished, or their children's earnings taken away by enforced school attendance. Also, many of the reforms were so bi-partisan as to seem to be hardly linked to any one party. Liberal speakers like Samuel Plimsoll addressing his Derby constituents in November 1877 could applaud the measures of these years as though they had nothing particular to do with the Conservatives. Disraelian social reform was possibly more satisfactory to middle-class opinion looking for a turn away from political upheaval to moderate social improvement than it was immediately appealing to working men and women. It was, however, an essential part of Disraeli's promotion of the Conservatives as the national party.

From: Paul Smith, *Disraeli: A Brief Life*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation D:** This historian suggests that the Conservative reforms followed traditional lines.

In 1874 there was strong pressure, especially from Lancashire MPs for a statutory maximum of nine hours as a working day in factories. The ministry brought in a bill imposing a maximum of 56.5 hours per week for women and children. This was bound to have an indirect effect on the hours of men, particularly in the textile industry where women and children made up the majority of the workforce. The bill thus went a long way towards satisfying the demand for a nine-hour day, but without statutorily regulating the conditions of work applying to men, as this was considered by many as an unacceptable form of State interference. There was no question of the Conservatives embarking upon a systematic programme of paternalist reform inspired by the sort of 'One Nation' policies Disraeli had laid down in his Young England days. Disraeli may still have occasionally used language reminiscent of his earlier views, such as his assertion in 1872 that 'the condition of the people' was an issue of prime importance, but, in reality, his government's response to such matters was influenced by the prevailing beliefs of the time. Conservative administrators like Cross were steeped in the teachings of *laissez-faire*, in much the same way as the Liberals were. There were also going to be serious financial constraints, limiting their scope for action. Nevertheless, it is right to acknowledge the impressive record of the Conservatives in the session of 1875, and to a lesser extent in 1876, which shows that limited intervention by the State was accepted as expedient when the purpose was to encourage individual responsibility.

From: Terry Jenkins, *Disraeli and Victorian Conservatism*, published in 1996.

### 13b. Gladstone's First Ministry

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Gladstone's domestic reforms did more to divide his party than to help the working classes.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian assesses the Trade Union legislation.

Between 1868 and 1874, the Liberal government passed a number of statutes, often as a result of backbench pressure, aiming to demonstrate parliament's responsiveness to the requirements of new electors. The most significant was legislation affecting working conditions. Pressure for trade union reform came from both workmen and 'New Model' masters. From the 1850s magistrates, taking a narrowly free-market view of employment contracts, declared that unions' activity was a restraint of trade and debarred them from legal protection of their funds. Parliamentary supporters of the unions and the Trades Union Congress lobbied for a change in the law. The result was the Trade Union Act of 1871, which protected union members and their funds from the threat of prosecution for restraining trade. At the same time, the Criminal Law Amendment Act confirmed that threatening or obstructive behaviour by masters or workmen was an offence. This was construed by some magistrates as outlawing peaceful picketing; seven Welsh women were imprisoned for saying 'Bah!' to a blackleg. In reaction to such decisions, Liberal pressure for further change built up in 1873 but no action was possible before the dissolution in 1874. The emergence of trade unions as political bodies also facilitated the settlement, in 1872, of the long-standing radical demand for the secret ballot in parliamentary and municipal elections. The ballot seemed to safeguard the purity of the voter against Conservative dictation in the counties and it also served to diminish the danger of intimidation of inexperienced voters in the larger towns by powerful trade unions.

From: Jonathan Parry, *The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian England*, published in 1993.

**Interpretation B:** This historian discusses the Licensing Act.

Licensing reform was a subject which brought the Liberal government nothing but trouble, as it succeeded in offending both of the interest groups involved. The Home Secretary brought in a complex bill in 1871, which would have prevented any increase in the number of public houses, as well as leaving the long-term security of publicans' licences in doubt. The bill provoked a series of angry meetings in the country and made little progress in the House of Commons. As the *Annual Register* observed, 'It proved unnecessary to discuss a bill for which no borough member could have voted without forfeiting his seat'. Even so, the unpopularity of the bill was probably a contributory factor in the loss of Liberal seats in by-elections during the summer. Having alienated the drink interest, the Home Secretary proceeded in 1872 to disappoint the temperance movement by bringing in a much milder bill, which only regulated the granting of new licences and restricted the opening hours of public houses. Consequently, the United Kingdom Alliance, a nonconformist-dominated pressure group campaigning for temperance reform, was provoked into condemnation of the Gladstone ministry, and even went so far as to intervene against the official Liberal candidate in certain by-elections in 1873.

From: T. A. Jenkins, *The Liberal Ascendancy*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers the Education Act.

In 1870 Forster's Education Act reflected the growing demand that local authorities be allowed to use taxpayers' money to establish new elementary schools. But the religious curriculum to be used in such schools proved a controversial issue. The establishment of the National Education League in 1869 at the instigation of the Unitarian mayor of Birmingham, Joseph Chamberlain, led the call for a free, compulsory and secular education. But churchmen within the Liberal party feared the rise of such Godless schools. Gladstone himself favoured giving extra money to the existing 'voluntary' agencies, mainly the Church of England, to expand educational provision. But the demands of the National Education League prompted impassioned debate as nonconformists, fearing Anglicanism more than secularism, joined the attack. As some of the government's supporters feared the bill was 'rudely handled'. Indeed, it was noted that the Conservatives seemed to be more favourable to the ministerial plan than the radicals. Hence the debates exposed ominous divisions within the Liberal parliamentary party. Moreover, the divisive vehemence of the debate was no less damaging to the Liberals in the country. Deep divisions in the constituencies and at Westminster over educational reform during 1870 caused the impetus of Liberal reform to falter.

From: Angus Hawkins, *British Party Politics, 1852-1886*, published in 1998.

**Interpretation D:** This historian explains how the Ballot Act came to be passed.

Gladstone accepted the view that British voters should do their duty and vote fully in public view. Secret ballot was seen as 'unmanly' or even 'unEnglish'. But changing political realities brought a change of view in their wake. It is possible that John Bright only accepted a seat in the cabinet on the understanding that the ministry would bring in a bill for the secret ballot. With the extension of the suffrage in 1867, Gladstone and many of his colleagues came to believe that the newly-enfranchised poorer voters were less likely to be independent than the wealthier ones of old. A back-bencher's bill to introduce the secret ballot was introduced in 1870, but made no progress and was withdrawn, but Gladstone took the opportunity to declare publicly that he had changed his mind. The more the measure was opposed, the more determined Gladstone came to be to see it through. In 1871 it was reintroduced, this time by Forster, a recent convert like Gladstone to the secret ballot. After a long debate, and eighteen days devoted to the committee stage, Gladstone helped to secure its passage, only for it to be defeated by the Lords on the plea of lack of time. Gladstone was now determined not to give in. He warned the House of Lords that 'very serious evil' might arise should they again reject the measure and that there would have to be a general election unless they toed the line. A suitable compromise was worked out – the Act would only be effective for a few years and would have to be renewed – so the Peers agreed, by a mere nineteen votes, to accept the bill on 18 July 1872.

From: Michael Partridge, *Gladstone*, published in 2003.

### 13c. Imperial Affairs

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that both the Liberals and the Conservatives were expansionist regarding the Empire.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian comments on Liberal and Conservative policies.

Many Radicals were strongly opposed to what appeared to be a continuation of Disraeli's imperialism in South Africa and, more shockingly, in Egypt and the Sudan in Gladstone's Second Ministry. In South Africa the government at first hesitated to restore independence to the Transvaal after the successful conclusion of the Zulu War. But the shock of the Boer uprising and the British defeat at Majuba Hill, together with pressure from the Radicals in government, pushed Gladstone to a quick settlement and the Boers gained their independence subject to a vague British suzerainty, in the same year. Thus in the Transvaal conciliation appeared to have triumphed. In Egypt, on the other hand, a quick, neat solution seemed beyond the government's grasp. There, British influence had already increased under the previous Conservative administration. Ironically, it was the Liberals who now blundered into direct military intervention. This was the result of a confused and often contradictory set of motives – strategic, financial and humanitarian – following the outbreak of a nationalist revolt in Egypt, the withdrawal of the French and the death of about fifty Europeans in anti-foreign riots in Alexandria. As a result of General Wolseley's victory at Tel-el-Kebir the Liberal government found itself, to its own astonishment and embarrassment, the master of Egypt.

From: Paul Adelman, *Gladstone, Disraeli and Later Victorian Politics*, published in 1970.

**Interpretation B:** This historian discusses Disraeli's imperial policies.

In 1878 concurrent wars against Afghans and the Zulus were the last thing Disraeli wanted. Privately he thought that Frere 'ought to be impeached' for his ultimatum to the Zulu king. But the colonial secretary, Carnarvon, and the Queen both supported Frere so he bowed to their pressure and, in public, resisted all demands for Frere's recall. Far from being the product of an aggressive intent, the Zulu War was the product of Disraeli's weakness as prime minister; his failure to oversee ministers and control men on the spot led to costly and unforeseen complications. His public defence of Frere, however, convinced many contemporaries that he was a warmonger intent on a policy of aggressive expansion overseas. Disraeli certainly did not have the insatiable greed for territory that Gladstone alleged and he remained decidedly averse to the annexation of Ashanti, the Malay States and Zululand. He had little interest in Africa and his contribution to policy was nothing more than a few letters of encouragement to a difficult colleague. Nor was the policy of Carnarvon one of imperial expansion. In the West Indies and South Africa consolidation was his watchword. In the tropics he followed a policy of minimum intervention. True, things did go wrong and some expansion did occur, but it was not part of a new philosophy of empire and was certainly not presided over by Disraeli. Even when Carnarvon was keen to restore British garrisons overseas and Disraeli assured him of the prime minister's support, Disraeli did nothing to promote the policy, about which he had spoken much in the past, and it was subsequently throttled in Cabinet.

From: C. C. Eldridge, *Disraeli and the Rise of a New Imperialism*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers the policies of the Liberal government.

In 1881 Gladstone led the cabinet in the withdrawal from most of Afghanistan, against the advice of the Queen and many others. The evacuation of troops from Afghanistan was by no means an abandonment of the area, merely an abandonment of the 'forward policy' method of safeguarding it. A stable government in Afghanistan was better than an imposed one, especially if it could give effective British control without direct responsibility. Beyond this there was no attempt to meddle with Russia, which in 1885 took over the ancient city of Merv and so was effectively on the Afghan border. Gladstone's view was that Russia's expansion in Central Asia was natural and, with respect to India, benign. There was, in his view, no Russian plan or intention to invade British India; an independent, unified and guaranteed Afghanistan was a sufficient bulwark. Despite constant Conservative charges of negligence and weakness, the Afghan policy was a notable success. In the spring of 1885, without annexation, the Russians were halted at a viable frontier. For the rest of the Imperial period they never crossed it.

From: Colin Matthew, *Gladstone 1809-1898*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian explains Disraeli's priorities.

The part of the Empire to which Disraeli attached most importance was India. He was fascinated by India and thought its possession was Britain's chief claim to being a great world power. He therefore supported the growing trend by which the protection of Britain's interests in India shaped its foreign and imperial policy. The routes to India had to be protected from rival powers, especially Russia. The purchase of the Suez Canal shares, the Royal Titles Bill and the Eastern Question were all manifestations of concern with Britain's position in India. A more specific concern was with the North West frontier between India and Afghanistan. For centuries invaders had entered India by this route and the British feared that Russia could eventually occupy Afghanistan and so threaten British rule in India. The question then, was what to do about Afghanistan? There were two schools of thought. Firstly was *masterly inactivity* whereby Britain should keep out of Afghanistan, with its inaccessible mountains and warring tribes, and take its defensive position on the Indus River. Secondly was the *forward policy* whereby Britain should take an active role in Afghanistan and effectively dominate its foreign policy. Disraeli feared Russian domination and favoured a forward policy. Thus, when the Viceroy of India, Lord Northbrook, resigned in 1876, unhappy with the pressure to push Britain's presence in Afghanistan, Disraeli sought to place at the head of the Government of India, someone capable of carrying forward an interventionist policy. His choice fell upon Lord Lytton. Disraeli remarked to Salisbury in 1877, 'I have no doubt whatever as to our course. We must completely and unflinchingly support Lytton. We wanted a man of ambition, imagination, some vanity and much will, and we have got him'.

From: Ian St John, *Disraeli and the Art of Victorian Politics*, published in 2005.

## Gladstone and Disraeli 1865-86 Investigation Titles

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.
13.1 Assess the view that the Second Reform Act of 1867 illustrates Disraeli's consistent commitment to parliamentary reform. [40 marks]	
13.2 How far can Gladstone's Irish policy be validly described as <i>too little, too late</i> ? [40 marks]	
13.3 How far was Disraeli committed to a 'forward' policy in the Empire? [40 marks]	13c.
13.4 How valid is it to argue that Disraeli brought back <i>Peace with Honour</i> from the Congress of Berlin in 1878? [40 marks]	13c.
13.5 <i>Moral maybe, but hardly realistic.</i> How valid is this judgement of Gladstone's foreign policy? [40 marks]	13c.
13.6 How far did the domestic reforms of Gladstone's first ministry disappoint his supporters? [40 marks]	13b.
13.7 Did Gladstone lose the 1874 election or did Disraeli win it? [40 marks]	13b.
13.8 How far were the domestic reforms of Disraeli's second ministry 'piecemeal and opportunist'? [40 marks]	13a.
13.9 Did Gladstone and Disraeli have more similarities than differences in their imperial policies? [40 marks]	13c.
13.10 Assess the reasons why Gladstone decided to introduce a Home Rule Bill for Ireland. [40 marks]	

## 14. Bismarck and German Unification 1815-71

### 14a. German Nationalism by 1849

Using the four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that German nationalism was a potent force in the period from 1815 to 1849.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian assesses the nature of nationalism in Germany.

The first movement of a popular nationalism had been generated during the German response to the French Revolution and Napoleon. There were popular protests and riots, but also a more systematic patriotism built round societies and associations. The general national language of opposition was widespread throughout Germany; the membership of patriotic clubs was narrower. There were student fraternities (*Burschenschaften*) and gymnastic clubs (*Turnvereine*). Popular nationalism wilted in the 1820s under the Carlsbad Decrees. The Revolutions in 1830 began a new wave of German nationalism. This was shown by the Hambach festival in 1832. Between 20,000 and 30,000 people assembled in a revolt of youth. They looked back to an older, legendary Germany. From 1833 membership of the *Burschenschaften* was proscribed, but in the 1830s and 1840s a new wave of nationalist feeling swept in to attack Metternich's control. The *Turnvereine* attracted a much larger membership, from a wider range of social backgrounds. The Gothic nationalists imagined they could appeal to a wider audience. Each successive generation of patriots believed their predecessors had not been close enough to the people. German nationalism became more anti-intellectual. 'The people' and the Gothic love of the romantic ideal past were to replace nationalism based on education and classical ideas. To most Germans, because German nationalism was the first romantic nationalism, it was superior to other national movements in Europe.

Harold James, *A German Identity 1770-1990*, published in 1990.

**Interpretation B:** This historian considers the development of German nationalism.

The 'German war of Liberation' became an important element in later nationalist myth-making. In fact, many Germans cooperated with the French. Those who resisted the French did so for a mixture of motives, in which a sense of German identity did not play an important part. There were some nationalist organizations formed during and after the war of 1813-15. A wide range of festivals and anniversary celebrations could cultivate a sense of nationality. Yet only minorities of fairly well educated, young and mostly male Germans belonged to these associations and took part in these festivals. They tended to be more important in Protestant than Catholic parts of Germany. Many were repressed after 1819. However, the possibility of a national culture did exist. The methods and content of education, especially in grammar schools and technical schools, converged between different German states, though Catholic areas did still retain distinctive education. People all read the same standard German (*Hochdeutsch*) language. The schools increasingly expressed a pride in German nationalism. Reading encouraged common interests in literature; art societies developed to promote an interest in German Art; music societies adopted repertoires of mainly German song. Associations with more practical purposes developed among German workers and in many areas of the countryside. There were specialist professional associations, such as those of German lawyers and German economists. There were local history societies. They helped to develop a deeply historical view of German nationalities. The political potential of these German associations first became clear during the 1848 revolutions. Yet in a world where mass political parties and media did not yet exist, it was often an appeal to local traditions which could evoke support. This pointed to the continued appeal of local identity; radicals found it difficult to make state-wide or national appeals.

John Breuilly, *The Foundation of the First German Nation-State, 1800-1871*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation C:** This historian assesses the strengths and limitations of German nationalism.

The intensity of ‘patriotic’ sentiment was probably greater in 1806-13 than in later decades, though the French threat to the Rhine in 1840 did stimulate national feeling. Nationalism was a product of the print and communications revolution and a cause of the educated middle class, who defined (even created) the idea of a German nation with their grammars, dictionaries and collections of German folk tales. Writing on German law, customs and history helped to develop the idea of a linguistic and cultural nation. These ideas represented a further development of the anti-French feeling that had emerged in the early nineteenth-century liberation struggle. However, nationalists owed some debt to French ideas, especially more radical elements like Young Germany who were sympathetic to similarly inspired nationalist aspirations of others like Greeks and Poles. While the latter struggled against foreign oppressors, German nationalists saw their enemies in the discredited German Confederation and the narrow, selfish German princes. They saw a narrow, petty, stultifying preoccupation with local concerns. The nationalist cause and the Liberal cause, unity and liberty went together. In 1848 and 1849 however, there were multiple divisions among the revolutionaries. There were conflicts over the national question, issues of sovereignty and power, and the social question. These were overlaid by religious, regional and other divisions. When a united Germany and a permanent national parliament came into being, they did so by sterner means, from above, not from below.

David Blackbourn, *Germany 1780-1918, The Long Nineteenth Century*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation D:** This historian comments on the importance of nationalism.

As 1848 neared, the lands of the German Confederation were threatened by overlapping and interrelated crises. The industrial and cultivated bourgeoisie was growing in wealth, numbers and political assertiveness. The middle class squared off for political struggle with the governing elites. Industrialisation had also created a new and troubling social question. Another lower class of workers was beginning to protest and strike. These crises were linked to another which would also surface in 1848 and 1849. National enthusiasm was increasing throughout Germany. The movement clearly affected middle-class politics and was also rooted lower in society among small-town burghers and handicraftsmen organised in gymnastic clubs, singing societies, and single-issue organizations like that which raised funds for the nationalist memorial, the *Hermannsdenkmal*. Germany’s social crises of the 1840s were phenomena separate from nationalism – but they were also related. For the anxiety and uncertainty generated by this age of transformation found definite release in a nationalist cause which was seen as a panacea by many Germans. There was the belief that Germany’s time of troubles would end when the nation was again strong, united and well-led.

Eric Dorn Brose, *German History 1789 to 1871*, published in 1997.

**14b. Nationalism and Unification 1866-1870**

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that nationalism had little impact on the creation of the German Empire in 1871.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers the influence of nationalist feelings.

Bismarck after 1866 had to reckon with French and German national sentiment. On both sides of the frontier, the high explosive of national passion was stored up in large amounts and any political trifle might detonate it. The extreme irritability of French public opinion was caused by anger, humiliation and fear. The irritability of German public opinion was due to pride and the consciousness of strength. Great things had been accomplished, but they were only the beginning. The supremacy in Europe was at last passing into German hands. The injuries of the past were not yet obliterated and the one veto which German nationalism was not prepared to tolerate was a French veto on the completion of German unity. Things could simply not remain as they were in 1866. The completion of German unity was Bismarck's task.

From C. Grant Robertson, *Bismarck*, published in 1918.

**Interpretation B:** This historian reflects on the nature of German Unification.

At the time the Prussian victories were regarded as proof of the strength of nationalism and by a strange chain of reasoning Bismarck himself was decked out as a national enthusiast. In fact German Nationalism had little more to do with the victories of 1866 and 1870 than those of 1813. In 1866 German national feeling, in so far as it existed, was almost united against Prussia. National wars were fought by a Prussian officer class for whom national feeling was repugnant. The Prussian soldiers brought the irresistible spirit of the crusaders. But in what cause? In nothing higher than the cause of conquest. German nationalists had long regarded the weakness of Germany as evidence of their lack of freedom; therefore if Germany were powerful, Germans would automatically be free. Dispirited by the political failures of the nineteenth century, the Germans sought freedom in the conquest of others. The Germans, it was argued, were merely conquering France as, seventy years before, Napoleon had conquered Germany, but Napoleon's armies marched under the banner of an idea, the German army had none. Prussia for the sake of Prussia; Germany for the sake of Germany; ultimately world power for the sake of world power: such was the creed of the new crusaders. The highest faculties of the mind, and these the Germans possessed, were put to the service of a mindless cause.

From: A. J. P. Taylor, *The Course of German History*, published in 1945.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers the role of Bismarck in the creation of the Reich.

Bismarck received gratifying demonstrations of support for the national cause from southern Germany. Particularism and distrust of Prussia were swept aside on the flood of patriotic exaltation that welled up in all parts of the nation in July 1870. In face of what was believed to be a premeditated French assault motivated by arrogance and envy, who could stand idly by? There was no hesitation about carrying out the terms of the military treaties concluded with Prussia in 1866, and army reservists rallied to their units with enthusiasm. Thanks to the promptness of the response 1,830,000 regulars and reservists passed through German barracks within a period of eight days. Within a few days annexation of Alsace and Lorraine was being widely discussed in the country, especially in southern Germany where a threat of French invasion recalled the history of French aggression since the days of Louis XIV and encouraged determination to end it once and for all by acquiring a protective glacis. Bismarck could not ignore this popular clamour but it did not determine his policy which had been for annexation from the first. After the French defeat, a fair percentage of Germans thought that it was a natural reward for German moral and cultural excellences and it was a forerunner of other triumphs to come. One could compose a reasonably plausible argument that the German Empire of 1871 was the creation of the German people, or at least that the Reich would never have come into being if it had not been for the persistent and growing popular desire for unification. Certainly the German people had a better claim to authorship than the German princes. Yet Bismarck was little interested in their actual historical role. There was to be no nonsense about popular sovereignty in the new Empire. It was to be clear from the outset that the Reich was a gift that had been presented to them. The constitutional theory was that the Reich was the creation of Germany's dynastic houses.

From: Gordon Craig, *Germany 1866-1945*, published in 1978.

**Interpretation D:** This historian reflects on the extent of national feeling.

The elections to the *Zollparlament* in 1868 became a demonstration of the surviving strength of particularism. In Baden the national party had always been strong. In Bavaria and Württemberg particularism triumphed. In the latter, particularists won all the seats, in Bavaria 27 against 12 nationalists. The roots of anti-Prussian feeling in the South were diverse. There was fear of the autocratic, military side of Prussianism; in particular of the consequences of the military alliances with the north. They entailed longer periods of military service and higher expenditure which was widely resented. To be taken over by Prussia meant 'pay taxes, become a soldier and keep your mouth shut'. There was the Catholic suspicion of the Protestant north and the survival of *Grossdeutsch* as well as particularist sentiment. The social groups disadvantaged by the spread of the market economy, mostly to be found in the Catholic regions, feared the spread of the national market. There were many Prussian Conservatives as well as northern Catholics and opponents of the takeover of Hanover and other states by Prussia, among them the leaders of the Centre Party. Bismarck had to step with extreme caution and his frequent remarks that the completion of German unity was not on his immediate agenda could come as no surprise. It was the general view that in the two years following the *Zollparlament* elections the prospect of German unity had receded.

From: Edgar Feuchtwanger, *Bismarck*, published in 2002.

**14c. Liberalism and the New Germany after 1867**

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that in the new Germany created in 1867 there was very limited liberalism.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian sees the dominance of a military elite after 1867.

The German Empire of 1871 did not stand in the line of continuity emanating from the mediaeval empire, as the name might suggest, but in that of the state of Brandenburg-Prussia, which the Bavarian historian Karl Alexander von Müller described in August 1914 as an 'heroic-aristocratic warrior state in which everything – taxation, officialdom, economy, society – revolved round the army, was determined by the needs of the army. It had defeated the Revolution of 1848 and in the army and constitutional conflict of 1862-6 it had once again repulsed parliamentary government and democracy as well as the subordination of the army to parliamentary control. Even the introduction of manhood suffrage for the parliament of the North German confederation proceeded from an anti-democratic calculation on Bismarck's part. Federal elements thinly disguised the dominance of Prussia, just as the liberal constitutional elements merely served the purpose of masking the dominance of the crown, the aristocracy (holding the leading positions in the army, the high bureaucracy and the diplomatic service) in an age of liberal ascendancy. A pre-industrial elite retained political power.

From: Fritz Fischer, *From Kaiserreich to the Third Reich*, published in 1979.

**Interpretation B:** This historian sees different elements in the Constitution of the new Germany.

The structure of the Empire reflected the way it had been created. It represented the promise rather than the achievement of the nation state. The constitution of the Empire differed little from that of its predecessor, the North German Confederation. It was federation, though a highly asymmetrical one. It contained elements of democracy, limited monarchy and autocracy. The democratic element was the Reichstag elected by full adult male suffrage. The element of limited monarchy lay in the relationship between the Emperor and the chief minister, the Chancellor and the considerable prerogatives the two possessed. The autocratic element lay in the Emperor's all but unqualified control of diplomatic and military affairs. Dominating all three was the deferral character of the Empire which underlined the continuities in political structures that straddled the events of 1871. The twenty five states that made up the new Empire retained their existing constitutions that dated in the main from the post-revolutionary period of 1849-50. Some of these, like those of Baden and Bavaria were relatively liberal and others less so. The grand duchies of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz were still governed by the Estates Settlement of 1775 and until 1918 these states had no elected parliaments. The parliaments of the other states were all elected by restricted franchises. Typical of these was the three class franchise of Prussia. In many constituencies east of the Elbe the local landowner, as the chief taxpayer had one third of the votes. In the city of Essen the head of the firm of Krupp enjoyed the same privilege. The democratic element – the Reichstag – was far from powerless. All imperial legislation needed its consent as did the annual Imperial budget. So did the military budget which initially accounted for nearly 90% of Imperial expenditure, though this needed to be passed every seven years. In all matters of domestic policy, the Emperor's acts required the Chancellor's counter signature. The making of treaties and the declaration of war required only the consent of the Bundesrat.

From: Peter Pulzer, *Germany 1870-1945*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that there was strong potential for a liberal Germany by 1871.

Unification has often been presented as a more or less willing liberal capitulation. But that is one-sided, and ignores those aspects of the process that liberals could welcome. After all, anything that was disliked by conservative ultras, particularists and Catholics was bound to have positive features in liberal eyes. Unification finally answered the question of where Germany was located, a question that the Confederation fudged. It created a sovereign, territorially defined national state, with a constitution, a parliament and a German chancellor. Nor did the liberal nationalists simply sacrifice 'liberal' values to the 'national' cause. The new Germany embodied much that was central to contemporary liberal programmes: the rule of law and the legal accountability of ministers, freedom of movement, a liberal commercial code, the harmonizing of currency and patents. These were not trivial matters to liberals, but an institutional foundation on which they hoped to build a genuinely liberal state. They did not choose unity over freedom, but looked to extend freedom through unity. True, the centralizing North German Confederation was rather closer to liberal conceptions of the modern state than the Empire of 1871, with its greater concessions to states' rights and generally looser, federal features. But the National liberals were the most powerful political party in Germany and there was good reason to think they would place their own imprint on the state-building process.

From: David Blackbourn, *The Fontana History of Germany*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian sees strong representative elements in the Constitutional arrangements made in 1867 and 1871.

The historic force of particularism was too important in Germany, however, to allow Prussia a dominant position in the new federal structure of the North German Confederation – especially if the wary and vigilant South German states were to be coaxed into membership. Hence, legal jurisdiction and matters of religion and education were left to the states. Bismarck also conceded the Federal Council (Bundesrat) a central role in the legislative process and stipulated that federal laws required only a simple majority, thus balancing Prussia's veto power (it had 17 out of 43 seats) to constitutional issues which needed a two thirds majority. The legislative accomplishments of the first North German Reichstag and its successor the first diet of the German Empire were impressive. A national currency, a central bank, a standard set of weights and measures, a unified postal system, a liberal German industrial code and elimination of remaining toll barriers. Along with the creation of the Reichstag itself, these reforms and enactments were more than tactical sop to a subdued bourgeoisie. They were, writes Lothar Gall 'the expression in political terms of a highly realistic understanding of the way things were going economically, socially and politically'. Unlike the conservatives, Bismarck had a keen sense of the *Zeitgeist* (The Spirit of the Age).

From: Eric Dorn Bose, *German History, 1789-1871*, published in 1997.

**Bismarck and German Unification 1815-71 Investigation Titles**

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
14.1 Assess the view that the economic growth of Prussia made the victory of 1866 inevitable. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
14.2 Assess the view that Austrian errors were the key to the outcome of the war of 1866. <b>[40 marks]</b>	
14.3 Assess the view that the importance of the Zollverein in German unification has become a historical myth and cannot be sustained by a study of the evidence. <b>[40 marks]</b>	14a.
14.4 Assess the view that Bismarck intended a war against France from 1866. <b>[40 marks]</b>	14b.
14.5 Assess the view that France, not Prussia, was more to blame for the War of 1870-1. <b>[40 marks]</b>	14b.
14.6 Assess the view that German liberalism was doomed after the success of the 1866 war with Austria. <b>[40 marks]</b>	14c.
14.7 Assess the view that the new German state which emerged between 1867 and 1871 had substantial liberal elements. <b>[40 marks]</b>	14c.
14.8 Assess the view that the strength of the German nationalist movement between 1815 and 1849 has been exaggerated. <b>[40 marks]</b>	14a.
14.9 How far do you agree that the Revolutions of 1848-9 failed because of the strength of opposition against them? <b>[40 marks]</b>	14a.
14.10 To what extent did Bismarck's survival as Chancellor from 1862 to 1866 depend mostly on his political skill? <b>[40 marks]</b>	

## 15. Russian Revolutions 1894-1924

### 15a. The importance of the First World War to the collapse of the Tsarist Regime

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the weaknesses of the Tsar were the main reason for the Revolution of February 1917.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the First World War was of major importance in bringing about the fall of the Tsar.

After 1914 an unbridgeable chasm was opening up between the government and the people. In fact, who or what was the government? It changed so quickly, no-one could be quite sure. In the first two years of war four prime ministers came and went. The railway system in the western provinces and Poland proved inadequate. Through the closing of the Baltic and Black Sea ports, Russia was cut off from her allies. The low level of technical and economic development produced an army suffering a paralysing shortage of equipment and trained personnel. Many soldiers often had no weapons at all: they were expected to arm themselves from the discarded rifles of the killed and wounded. Shells had to be rationed to the artillery batteries. Hospital and medical services were so thinly spread that they had no practical value. The call-up operated irrationally, amounting in 1917 to some 15 million – around 37% of the males of working age. Chaos piled upon chaos with the influx of refugees. Inflation, food shortages and a fall in real wages produced an increasing ordeal for the mass of the population. A mounting wave of strikes gave voice and vent not only to economic demands. ‘Down with the Tsar’ was the ominous cry beginning to be heard. In a word, the war had utterly destroyed any confidence that still remained between the Government and the people.

From: Lionel Kochan, *The Making of Modern Russia*, published in 1962.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that circumstances left Nicholas little option but to abdicate.

Russia without a Tsar in the people’s minds was a contradiction in terms; for them it was the person of the Tsar that defined and gave reality to the state. In view of this tradition, one might have expected the mass of the population to favour the retention of the monarchy. But two factors militated against such a stand. The peasantry remained monarchistic. Nevertheless in early 1917 it was not averse to an interlude of anarchy, sensing it would provide the opportunity finally to carry out a nationwide ‘Black Partition’ (a wholesale redistribution of land). The other consideration had to do with the fear of punishment on the part of the Petrograd populace, especially the troops. The February events could be seen in different ways, as a glorious revolution or as a sordid military mutiny. If the monarchy survived it was likely to view the actions as mutiny. When he arrived at Pskov on March 1 1917 Nicholas had no thoughts of abdicating. In his diary of the previous day he noted he had sent a message to General Ivanov in Petrograd ‘to introduce order’. In the twenty four hours that followed, Nicholas heard from everyone that as long as he remained Tsar, Russia could not win the war. He paid heed to the generals. Telegram after telegram from the military commanders urged him, for the sake of the country, first to allow the Duma to form a cabinet and then to abdicate. All the evidence is that Nicholas abdicated from patriotic motives to spare Russia a humiliating defeat. If his foremost concern had been to preserve his throne, he could easily have made peace with Germany and used front-line troops to crush the rebellion in Petrograd and Moscow. He chose instead to give up his crown and save the front.

From: Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution 1899-1919*, published in 1990.

**Interpretation C:** These historians see inadequacies at the heart of government.

When the Emperor left to assume command of the army, the government, or what passed for the government, came under the direction of the empress, Alexandra. Nicholas wrote 'Wifey, dear, don't you think you should help hubby while he is away?' 'Wifey' took up the new assignment with enthusiasm. She constantly urged Nicholas to be more autocratic. 'Smash them all', she wrote when Duma leaders questioned the administration. She looked for direction to her 'man of God', Rasputin. With the Emperor's departure, Rasputin came to exercise near dominant influence in the making of military as well as civilian policy. When Nicholas left for the front, the cabinet consisted momentarily of exceptionally honest and, apart from Goremykin, liberal men. Rasputin and the empress changed all that. The contemptible Boris Stürmer assumed the office of Prime Minister and foreign minister. The capable minister of the interior gave way to the craven and nearly insane Protopopov. The government simply let things drift. Financial scandals came to light implicating Stürmer and the scheming toadies who surrounded him. He was forced from office and the new Prime Minister Trepov offered Rasputin a bribe if he would consent to the dismissal of Protopopov, but Rasputin scorned the offer. There seemed little other recourse but violence. In 1916 Rasputin was murdered by Purishkevitch, the Duma leader, Grand Duke Dmitri and Prince Felix Yusopov. General Krymov reported to Duma leaders that the army would welcome a coup d'état. The Grand Duke Alexander wrote 'it is the government which is preparing the revolution'.

From : Melvin C. Wren and Taylor Stults, *The Course of Russian History*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation D:** This historian records the chaotic and violent nature of the demonstrations in Petrograd in February 1917.

Larger crowds came onto the streets on Saturday 25 February, in what was virtually a general strike as 200,000 workers joined the demonstrators. Even at this point the authorities could have contained the situation. There was still some reason to suppose that the anger of the demonstrators was mainly focused on the shortage of bread. Shalapnikov, the leading Bolshevik in Petrograd said 'Give the workers a pound of bread and the movement will peter out'. Whatever chance there was of containing the disorders was destroyed by the Tsar who sent a cable to General Khabalov ordering him to use military force to put down the disorders. The mutiny of the Petrograd garrison turned the disorders into a full-scale revolution. The crowd violence of the February days was not orchestrated by any revolutionary party or movement. It was a spontaneous reaction to the bloody repression of 26 February and an expression of the people's long-felt hatred for the old regime. The crowd exacted a violent revenge against officials. Policemen were hunted down and killed brutally. Hundreds of naval officers were killed gruesomely by the sailors. According to official figures 1443 people were killed or wounded in Petrograd alone. It seemed to the writer Gorky that it was not revolution, but chaos.

From: Orlando Figes, *A People's Tragedy*, published in 1996.

### 15b. The causes of the 1905 Revolution

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the Tsar was mainly responsible for the 1905 Revolution.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian reflects on the personality and policies of the Tsar before 1905.

It was the decisions of the sovereign that decided the course of events in Russia. In 1896 The Zemstvo of Tver had expressed the hope that he would hear the voice of the people's needs. The Young Tsar declared that he would maintain the principle of autocracy just as firmly and unflinchingly as his father. What was lacking was the willpower and personality of the father. The sovereign might be as weak as water, he might change his mind every five minutes, but the thing which he said last was the thing done and the government of the empire reflected in full every variation of his will. The policy of the early years was a simple continuation of what had gone before – with one big difference – the will of the autocrat had dropped out. The assassination of Plevhe, together with the war against Japan set going a new national movement. On the Japanese side, army and nation worked in closest cooperation throughout, but with Russia it was just the opposite. The war showed the bankruptcy of the vain hope that Russia could evade all questions of reform at home by plunging her head into Asia to realise a dream of imperial expansion. The Emperor debated the demands for a representative national assembly. He issued two pronouncements: in one he ordered the Zemstva who had made the demands to mind their own business; in the other, he announced his intention of initiating a programme of reforms himself. It was obvious that he could only do this through the machinery of the bureaucracy, which was exactly what the country wanted to see reformed.

Bernard Pares, *The Fall of the Russian Monarchy*, published in 1939.

**Interpretation B:** These historians explain the Soviet view of the 1905 Revolution.

Lenin explained the nature of the first Russian Revolution of 1905, and outlined its specific historical features. The character and objectives were those of a bourgeois-democratic revolution aimed at the overthrow of the tsarist monarchy, the abolition of landed proprietorship and the other survivals of serfdom, and the establishment of a democratic republic. Notwithstanding its bourgeois-democratic nature, however, the leader and chief motive force in the revolution was the proletariat. It was supported by the peasantry as an ally and by the working people of non-Russian nationalities in the border regions. The proletariat was the leading force. This was the first people's revolution to take place in the new historical conditions, when the bourgeoisie had already become a counter-revolutionary force and the proletariat had grown into an independent political force, capable of leading the revolutionary struggle against tsarism. The historical development of the proletarian class because of Russia's economic development was at the heart of the Revolution.

A group of historians in the USSR, *Lenin, A Biography*, published in 1965.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers the measures taken by the Tsarist regime in 1905.

The effect of Bloody Sunday on political consciousness among workers and peasants alike was apparently traumatic. In February an attempt was made to placate working class anger. The Shidlovsky commission summoned representatives to be elected by the major factories to the capital. The Commission was never able to begin its discussions, so radical were the demands of the workers, but the elections generated great excitement among the proletariat. In May the efforts of V. N. Kokovtsov, the Minister of Finance, to persuade representatives of the industrialists to improve the conditions of labour failed ignominiously. The employers, with new-found spirit, informed the Minister that labour unrest was the result of political, rather than economic conditions. The Tsar's invitation in February for peasant communes to petition their 'little father', far from providing the safety-valve the authorities expected, stimulated peasant activity and heightened their expectations. Peasants all over the country drew up demands – first and foremost for land, but also for an end to arbitrary and insulting treatment by officials, for legal equality and free education and full representation in the Zemstva. By February the Tsar felt compelled, not least by the need to improve the confidence of Western creditors, to commit himself to summoning a Consultative Assembly. In August 1905 the new Minister of the Interior published details of the restricted suffrage for the Assembly. The same month the storm of strikes at last abated, peace was made with Japan and it seemed possible that the government would recover. But the worst unrest was still to come.

Edward Acton, *Russia, The Tsarist and Soviet Legacy*, published in 1986.

**Interpretation D:** This historian looks at developing opposition in Russia before 1905.

Huge resentments existed in Imperial society by 1905. The secret police of the Tsar, the Okhrana, patrolled the trouble with the limited financial and human resources available to it; the Russian Empire was, indeed, a police state in the making. But it was not a state that found it easy to keep its people in check. Poor harvests in the new century had made the peasants restive. The workers, as ever, resented the absence of organizations through which they might represent their case to employers. Several national groups, especially the Poles, had underground organizations looking for a chance to confront the Russian Imperial government. And a whole range of clandestine political groupings were operating. Not only the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, but also the party of Socialist Revolutionaries were working to undermine the regime. The Socialist Revolutionaries managed to assassinate the Minister of the Interior, V. K. Pleve, in summer 1904. Even the liberals were becoming active. A Union of Liberation had been formed under the leadership of Peter Struve. Its main mode of challenge was to hold public banquets and to facilitate the delivery of speeches that obliquely attacked the monarchy. Nicholas II was under assault from virtually all sides. For Lenin, Tsarism stood on the edge of a precipice.

Robert Service, *Lenin*, published in 2000.

**15c. Lenin as leader**

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the nature of Bolshevik rule from 1917 to 1924 was shaped more by circumstances in Russia than by the party's ideology.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers Lenin's relationship with his party.

To stress the responsiveness of the Bolshevik Party to pressures from below is not to deny the significance of the lead given by Lenin. His ability to combine theory with practice was unique. On the other hand, he was in no position to impose policy on the party. Again and again, his colleagues on the central committee showed themselves capable of opposing him. His vision of the future was closely based upon Marx's celebration of the decentralised and direct democracy of the Paris Commune of 1871 and he spelled it out in *State and Revolution* in the summer of 1917. It demonstrated his enormous faith in the creativity and initiative of the masses. It gave little prominence to the role of the party after the establishment of soviet power. Not that he believed that its role would cease after the revolution. It would continue to provide ideological leadership. But the masses would create precisely the multinational socialist society to which the party was dedicated. Whatever verdict is passed on Lenin's personal sincerity, an analysis of his thought is an inadequate base to rest the charge of Bolshevik cynicism. The party was neither at the beck and call of Lenin, nor was it an elite group of intellectuals divorced from the masses. The great majority were workers and soldiers.

From: Edward Acton, *Rethinking the Russian Revolution*, published in 1990.

**Interpretation B:** This historian discusses the attitude of Lenin towards the nationalities.

Lenin addressed the problem of the nationalities in April 1917. He declared that all the nations in the old empire had the right of secession, although he expected that such a policy would win the trust of the non-Russians who would want to remain in a multi-national Soviet state which cared for the interests of all working class people whatever their nationality. Immediately after taking power Lenin issued a decree conceding the right of self-determination to all nations inhabiting Russia. He appears to have been surprised by the strength of national feeling which emerged, because he quickly came round to the idea that a federal state was a possibility. The national groups would not accept a total union which would imply Russification, a subordination of their own interests and character to Russian interests. Lenin created the People's Commissariat of National Affairs to manage relations with the nationalities. It was under Stalin. His task was to mediate in disputes between national groups. Although the Republics exercised theoretical powers, in practice Russia dominated the federation. Which was precisely what Stalin wanted. Lenin became increasingly concerned about the way that Stalin rode roughshod over national aspirations in Georgia. Lenin complained about 'Great Russian Chauvinism' but was too ill to fight for his cause. Lenin's influence was evident in the 1923 Constitution which deliberately referred to a 'Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' without specifically mentioning Russia. But Lenin had not fought hard enough. Stalin's perception of the Constitution prevailed. However, the reality of Soviet Russia under Lenin was that the State was never as totalitarian as it appeared on paper. Local centres of influence remained and Moscow could never exercise complete control over the provinces.

From: John Laver, *Lenin*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers the success of Lenin's policies.

Once it had proven impossible to export Communism, the Bolsheviks in the 1920s dedicated themselves to constructing a socialist society at home. This endeavour failed as well. Lenin had expected through a combination of expropriations and terror to transform his country in a matter of months into the world's leading economic power; instead he ruined the economy he had inherited. He had expected the Communist party to provide disciplined leadership to the nation: instead he saw political dissent which he had muzzled in the country, resurface within his own party. As the workers turned their backs on the Communists and the peasants revolted, staying in power required unremitting resort to police measures. The regime's freedom of action was increasingly impeded by a bloated and corrupt bureaucracy. The voluntary union of nations turned into an oppressive empire. Lenin's speeches and writings in the last two years reveal, besides a striking paucity of constructive ideas, barely controlled rage at his political and economic impotence: even terror proved useless in overcoming the ingrained habits of an ancient nation. The question of how such a flawed regime succeeded in maintaining itself cannot be met with the answer that it had the support of the people.

From: Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime 1919-1924*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers Lenin's ideology.

Lenin's greatest institutional innovation was the inception of the one-party state. In fact he had no blueprint for this. Once created, the one-party state was held rigidly in place by Lenin; and he would allow not the slightest derogation from its precepts. Lenin also had an influence at a still deeper level - at the level of attitudes. His thought incarnated intolerance. He advocated dictatorship and terror. In *The State and Revolution* (written in 1917) he went out of his way to disown any absolute commitment to either 'democracy' or 'freedom'. 'Democracy', according to Lenin, was simply a transitional form of state organization. The ultimate objective of Marxism was a society in which the state had 'withered away'. In such a society the principle would be enshrined: from each according to his talents, to each according to needs. This would involve a total absence of exploitation or oppression. The very need for any state, even a democratic one, would have disappeared. Similarly he had no commitment to freedom. Civic rights grounded in constitution, law and customary tolerance were a matter of indifference to Lenin. This ideological heritage left a deep imprint upon Bolshevik consciousness.

From: Robert Service, '*Lenin*' in *Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution 1914-1921*, published in 1997.

## Russian Revolutions 1894 – 1924 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
15.1 Assess the success of Stolypin's reforms in the period 1906-11. [40 marks]	
15.2 How strong was Tsarism in 1914? [40 marks]	15a.
15.3 Assess the view that it was mainly the failure of the Provisional Government that made possible the Bolshevik takeover of October 1917. [40 marks]	
15.4 How important was the 'Red Terror' to Bolshevik success in the civil war of 1918-21? [40 marks]	15c.
15.5 How important was Trotsky in the achievement and maintenance of Bolshevik power in the period late 1917-1924? [40 marks]	15c.
15.6 Assess the view that Lenin's rule between 1917 and 1924 was merely a brutal dictatorship. [40 marks]	15c.
15.7 Assess the view that the First World War was the main cause of the collapse of Romanov rule. [40 marks]	15a.
15.8 To what extent did the NEP of 1921 represent a humiliating reversal of Lenin's policies? [40 marks]	15c.
15.9 Assess the view that serious defeat in the War of 1904-5 was the main factor in the outbreak of revolution in Russia in 1905. [40 marks]	15b.
15.10 Assess the view that Nicholas II survived the Revolution of 1905 mainly because of the divisions of his opponents. [40 marks]	

## 16. America between the Wars, 1918–41

### 16a. The reasons for the booming economy in the 1920s

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the impact of the First World War was the main reason for the booming economy in the USA in the 1920s.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers the impact of the First World War.

The First World War gave an impetus both to agricultural and industrial expansion. From 1917, with the enrolment of some 4.5 million men into the armed forces, labour shortages were felt and attention was directed particularly to improvements in productivity through intensive capital investment. The experience of wartime administration in the years 1917-19 initiated the first major experience of government control over the American economy. A new class of public administrators cut their teeth in these years, working in co-operation with the business community. Similarly, a new generation of businessmen came to the fore to whom co-operation between government and business, as developed out of war needs, appeared not merely necessary but also desirable. It is also to be remembered that governmental activity in the United States is not confined to the federal government. The degree of *laissez faire* is always exaggerated if one examines only the federal government. It is to be noted that the 1920s saw a considerable increase in the role of state and city governments in both promotional and regulatory activities. The former included the building of some 300,000 miles of state highways to meet the new needs created by the motor-car.

From: Jim Potter, *The American Economy Between the World Wars*, published in 1974.

**Interpretation B:** This historian analyses the importance of the development of mass production.

The key to the boom was a tremendous increase in productivity resulting from technological innovation and the application of Frederick W. Taylor's theory of scientific management. Although the population increased by only about 16% during the decade, industrial production almost doubled. The gross national product soared from \$72.4 billion in 1919 to \$104 billion in 1929, and annual per capita income rose from \$710 to \$857. Whereas the industrial expansion of the late nineteenth century had been based on railroads and steel, the prosperity of the 1920s rested on the growth of newer industries and on a building boom. The cutting-off of foreign supplies during World War I boosted the American chemicals industry and encouraged the manufacture of synthetic textiles and plastics. During the 1920s artificial silk (rayon), bakelite, and cellulose products like celanese, celluloid, and cellophane all became important industries. More striking still was the rise of the electricity industry. There were revolutionary technical advances: the development of new sources of power, such as steam turbines and hydroelectric plants, improvements in generator design and in methods of transmitting power, the adoption of the grid system. Electricity consumption more than doubled during the decade, mainly because of increased industrial demand. But domestic consumption shot up too. Whereas in 1912 only 16% of the population lived in electrically lit dwellings, the proportion had grown to 63% by 1927. With the price of electricity falling steadily, electrical household appliances came into general use. For the first time electric cookers, irons, refrigerators, fans, toasters, and other gadgets were mass produced. Thus refrigerator production increased from 5,000 a year in 1921 to about one million in 1930.

From: Maldwyn A. Jones, *The Limits of Liberty: American History 1607-1992*, published in 1995.

**Interpretation C:** This historian evaluates the nature of the 1920s boom.

Despite the strains placed on the U.S. economy after the First World War, it remained strong and innovative during the 1920s. The nation had not suffered the loss of factories, roads, and electrical lines that Germany and France had experienced. Its industries had emerged intact, even strengthened, from the war. The war needs of the Allies had created an insatiable demand for American goods and capital. Manufacturers and bankers, with prodding and promises of profits by the government, had exported so many goods and extended so many loans to the Allies that by war's end the United States was the world's leading creditor nation. New York City challenged London as the hub of world finance. At home, the government had helped the large corporations and banks to consolidate their power. Corporate America had responded by lifting productivity and efficiency to new heights through advances in technology and management. Capitalists boasted that they had created a 'people's capitalism' in which virtually all Americans could participate. Gone were the days in which capitalism had enriched only a lucky few. Now, everyone could own a piece of corporate America. Now, everyone could have a share of luxuries and amenities. Poverty, capitalists claimed, had been banished, and the gap between rich and poor had been closed. If every American could own a car and house, buy quality clothes, own stock, take vacations, and go to the movies, then clearly there was no longer any significant inequality in society.

From: Gary Gerstle, *Liberty, Equality and Power*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation D:** This historian evaluates the policies of Andrew Mellon, the Secretary of the Treasury during the 1920s.

By March 1923, there prevailed a general impression that the nation's prosperity was being rapidly restored. The 'Roaring Twenties' were in sight: in 1923, many economic indexes reached levels that would not be surpassed until the spring of 1929. To be sure, there was much of this for which Mellon could take no credit and there were still parts of the country, especially in the South and Mid-West, that would never be reached by this prosperity. But for unprecedented numbers of Americans, the good times were indeed beginning to roll, and Mellon was seen as the man who had turned things around through a mastery of complex fiscal issues seldom seen in public life before – or since. Mellon was a brilliant banker, with a rare creative genius for business and an eye for opportunity, who became a transformative figure in America's economic growth during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As a result of his efforts, many thousands were gainfully employed who might otherwise have found no work, and America's economy was greatly strengthened. He was also an outstanding Secretary of the Treasury, who rightly understood that what was good for business was ultimately good for America, who presided over the greatest boom in the nation's history and who helped restore the stricken post-First World War world to something resembling financial stability.

From: David Cannadine, *Mellon, An American Life*, published in 2006.

**16b. The New Deal.**

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the success of the New Deals (1933-41) has been much over-rated by historians.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that the New Deal brought some relief and reform during the 1930s.

The basic goals of the Roosevelt administration were relief, recovery and reform. The New Deal's greatest success was in the area of relief. It employed a bewildering number of 'alphabet agencies', the most prominent being the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Works Progress Administration, the Public Works Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps. They co-ordinated the work of state, local and private organisations. The administration brought relief to most of the destitute and jobless. Yet despite the scope and imaginativeness of the New Deal's relief program, not everyone was taken care of. There was never sufficient money available, and even those on relief seldom received enough. The New Deal reforms were many and far-reaching. Deficiencies of the stock market and banking were remedied. Bargaining by trade unions was made vastly more effective under the National Industrial Recovery and Wagner Acts. The Federal government and the States assumed some on-going responsibility for the needs of the aged, dependent mothers and children, the handicapped, and the unemployed. The relief given to the needy was substantial and reform significant. Far less effective were the Federal government's efforts to promote recovery.

From: David McCoy, *Coming of Age*, published in 1973.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the New Deal had some serious faults, brought only a partial recovery in the 1930s, yet had achievements.

Not even the staunchest admirers of the New Deal could claim that it had brought about more than partial recovery. By 1939 there had been great improvement in some sectors of the economy. Manufacturing production, for example, had returned to the level of 1929 – though critics alleged that this had occurred in spite of New Deal policies, not because of them. But investment still lagged and there remained nine and a half million unemployed – 17% of the working population. Not until 1941 would full employment and prosperity return, and only then because of the war and rearmament. Some New Deal policies did more harm than good: the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) for example, the New Deal's social welfare program, was seriously deficient. There were also major omissions, notably the failure to embark on a large-scale housing program like that in Britain; Federal government built only 180,000 homes during the Depression. Yet for all its failures and limitations, the New Deal can claim achievements which have stood the test of time and become part of the national consensus. It laid the foundations of the welfare state and created a new legal framework for industrial relations. It introduced controls on banks and stock exchanges. It established the principle that government had the primary responsibility for regulating the economy. And although it is too much to claim that Roosevelt saved America from revolution – there was never a real danger of one – he restored national morale.

From: Maldwyn A. Jones, *Limits of Liberty: American History, 1607-1992*, published in 1995.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that the New Deal both continued Hoover policies and had a very mixed impact.

It was Roosevelt's greatest constructive triumph, and won him the regard of the liberals and the progressives, which continues to this day. But as Walter Lippmann pointed out at the time (1935), in all essentials the New Deal continued the innovatory corporatism of Hoover, using public money to bolster private credit and activity, what Lippmann called the 'permanent New Deal'. If Hoover-Roosevelt interventionism was thus a continuum, the question arises, why did it not work better? Pro-Roosevelt historians argue that the additional elements FDR brought to the continuum worked the miracle, enabling the New Deal to initiate recovery. Pro-Hoover historians argue that Roosevelt's acts, if anything, delayed what Hoover's were already bringing about. A third possibility is that both administrations, by their meddling activism, impeded a natural recovery brought about by deflation: from the perspective at the end of the century, that seems the most probable explanation. The truth is, the recovery was slow and feeble. The only reasonably good year was 1937, when unemployment at 14.3 percent dipped below 8 million; but by the end of the year the economy was in free fall again – the fastest fall so far recorded – and unemployment was at 19 percent in 1938. In 1937 production briefly passed 1929 levels, but soon slipped below again. The real recovery from the boom atmosphere of the 1920s came only on the Monday after the Labor Day weekend of September 1939, when news of the war in Europe plunged the New York Stock Exchange into a joyful confusion which finally wiped out the traces (though not the memory) of October 1929. Two years later, with America on the brink of war itself, the dollar value of production finally passed the 1929 levels for good. If interventionism worked, it took nine years and a world war to demonstrate the fact.

From: P. Johnson, *A History of the American People*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that the New Deal's significance should be viewed in a wider context.

Radicals could mourn; but their works remained, enormous and irreversible. Later critics have blamed the New Deal for not going further, faster: it is always so easy to demand the impossible, and so tempting to play down the importance of starting something. FDR and his team had started a lot, and as he himself said after the 1938 elections, 'It takes a long, long time to bring the past up to the present.' Rather than comparing the New Deal to Utopia, it is better to bring out its actual achievements. Of these unquestionably the most important was the preservation of American democracy, the American Constitution and American capitalism. His task entailed adaptation and sacrifice, and hence aroused fierce opposition. But in the end he prevailed, even in defeat: for if the Supreme Court reminded him, forcibly, of the limits of his own power, he taught the Court itself an even more salutary lesson – not to stand in the way of necessary change – and so equipped it for its important role in modern American democracy. He also accustomed Congress, and the country, to the necessary activism of modern government, so that the stream of statutes, which seemed so astonishing in the Hundred Days, has become the norm of Congressional life (though few of the laws passed have anything like the importance of the first New Deal legislation). Thanks to Franklin Roosevelt, in short, six years (1933 to 1938) transformed America from a country which had been laid low by troubles which its own incompetence had brought on it, and which it was quite unable to cope with, to a country, as it proved, superbly equipped to meet the worst shocks that the modern world could hurl at it.

From: H. Brogan, *The History of the USA*, published in 2001.

### 16c. The introduction of National Prohibition

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the introduction of National Prohibition in the USA was inspired mainly by Protestant religious idealism.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian examines the influence of religion on temperance reform.

The greatest single force in the temperance movement was the power of evangelical Protestantism. Through Congregationalism, through the far-flung Methodist and Baptist societies, and to a lesser degree through Presbyterianism, the reform was given a religious significance. Intemperance, the reformers believed, was of the devil; it marked a person as belonging with the unregenerate. The spirit of God could not dwell in him until he had abandoned his sin and been converted. Consequently, in the thinking of many a religious zealot, the temperance reform and the prohibition movement became integral parts of the Church's earthly mission. But, for an ever-increasing number of reformers, the chief concern was not the suffering and cruelty which drink caused, or the souls which it sent to perdition, but the economic waste which it involved. Drink lowered the worker's efficiency, reduced production, decreased consumption, increased taxation and endangered business prosperity. As workers were slowly but steadily concentrated in larger factories, the relation of intemperance to labour efficiency became a problem of growing concern to factory-owners; a concern increased by the constant infiltration of foreigners into the United States.

From: John Allen Krout, *The Origins of Prohibition*, published in 1925.

**Interpretation B:** This historian explains fears about crime and vice in the cities in the years before the introduction of National Prohibition.

For every decent saloon that filled a need in the community, there were five that increased poverty and crime among working people. Immigration, artificial refrigeration to preserve beer indefinitely, and the incursion of the English liquor syndicate into the American market led to the phenomenon of too many saloons chasing too few drinkers. By 1909, there was one saloon for every three hundred people in the cities. Proliferating drinking places in industrial cities occupied most street corners and some of the block in between. The Chicago Vice Commission of 1910 found that there were, at a conservative estimate, 5,000 regular prostitutes and 10,000 occasional ones in the city. Their chief hangouts were the saloons, the brothels, and the dance halls, all of which sold liquor. Similar red light districts fouled all the major cities. Under the pressure of the reformers, frequent and ineffective raids were made by the police on these areas of vice. But the raids did no more than levy a small fine on the saloonkeepers, pimps, and madams, who returned to their trade when the hue and cry was stilled. These vice statistics provided fuel for the fire of the 'drys' against the saloon and the fashionable doctrines of environmentalism seemed to promise a dramatic decrease in crime and poverty and evil if only the breeding places of these ills, the saloons and the brothels, could be eliminated. There is also truth in the 'wet' excuse that the increasing efforts of the 'drys' to suppress the saloons increased the degeneracy of the saloons. No sensible businessman was going to invest money in properties that might be closed up without compensation within a year. The fact that the prohibitionists were winning made the drinkers drink more frantically and the saloonkeepers try to gouge out a maximum profit while they could.

From: Andrew Sinclair, *Prohibition: The Era of Excess*, published in 1962.

**Interpretation C:** This historian looks at the situation in the USA at the time of the debates over National Prohibition.

A small but powerful political pressure group foisted prohibition upon the country without warning while its attention was distracted by World War One. Before 1917, prohibition was primarily a regional grass-roots movement, not one that truly expressed the national will. Of the 26 dry states, 24 lay either west of the Mississippi or south of Ohio and two in the rural northern part of New England, whereas the 13 predominantly industrial states from Massachusetts to Missouri included only two that the dries had captured – Michigan and Indiana. Significantly, in Michigan (which held a referendum) its only big city, Detroit, voted wet. In sum, it appeared that rural, agricultural America, with its large Protestant, native-born population thrust prohibition upon urban, industrial America, with its heterogeneity of races, religions and foreign backgrounds. It is also true that during the Congressional debate over the 18th Amendment and the state legislative actions following it, neither press nor public paid much attention. A deeper concern overshadowed the issue. America had entered the war; its sons were fighting alongside the Allies.

From: John Kobler, *Ardent Spirits*, published in 1973.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers the role of women in the temperance movement.

Although the Women's Christian Temperance Union was essentially middle and upper-class in its national leadership, lower-class women were able to find a meaningful niche in the Union. The more deeply one looks at the membership of the WCTU the more one perceives its diversity. Temperance touched a chord that united women of many backgrounds. While membership in the WCTU covers a broad spectrum, all studies agree that the women who led the WCTU in the nineteenth century were primarily white, well-educated, economically prosperous native-born Protestants of Anglo-Saxon ancestry. In assessing why individual women joined the temperance movement it has to be remembered that nothing was as destructive to a powerless woman's existence as a drunken husband. He could destroy both her and her family. The wife and mother has no legal remedies. She has no political remedies. She is forced to suffer from this lack of control. In the WCTU women were taking control. The women who marched in Ohio shut down saloons. Mary Hunt (one of the WCTU's leading activists) and her cohorts successfully compelled legislatures to enact laws that required temperance education in the schools. Local options to close saloons became an alternative in hundreds of communities because of laws the WCTU shepherded through state legislatures. The WCTU was the major vehicle for the women's movement in the last quarter of the nineteenth century not only because of its impressively large membership, but also because it got things done. Women were taking real control over a part of their lives and the society to which they belonged. Temperance became the medium through which nineteenth-century women expressed their deeper, sometimes unconscious, feminist concerns.

From: Ruth Bordin, *Women and Temperance*, published in 1981.

## America Between the Wars 1918-41 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
16.1 How far were the economic policies of the Republican government mainly responsible for the collapse of 1929-33? <b>[40 marks]</b>	16a.
16.2 Assess the view that the New Deal promised much but achieved little of real substance. <b>[40 marks]</b>	16b.
16.3 Assess the view that it was the Second New Deal and not the First that represented Roosevelt's major domestic achievement. <b>[40 marks]</b>	16b.
16.4 Assess the success of the New Deal in bringing about economic recovery by 1941. <b>[40 marks]</b>	16b.
16.5 How isolationist was American foreign policy in the period 1920-41? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
16.6 How convincingly can it be argued that Roosevelt's foreign policy was in the best interests of the USA in the period 1933-41? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
16.7 How important was the strength of opposition to the New Deal in the period 1933-37? <b>[40 marks]</b>	16b.
16.8 Assess the view that the policy of National Prohibition (1919-33) created more problems than it solved. <b>[40 marks]</b>	16c.
16.9 How far has the impact of the Boom of the 1920s been exaggerated? <b>[40 marks]</b>	16a.
16.10 How far do you agree that in policy areas to deal with the Depression there was more continuity between Hoover and Roosevelt than is often admitted? <b>[40 marks]</b>	16b.

## 17. The Causes of World War II 1918-41

### 17a. International Diplomacy 1919-1930

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that international diplomacy failed to achieve stability in Europe from 1919 to 1930.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian explains the favourable reaction to Locarno.

The Locarno Pact, announced on October 16, included a treaty of mutual guarantee of Germany's western frontiers and the demilitarisation of the Rhineland: Germany, Belgium and France undertook not to make war on each other and undertook to settle disputes by arbitration; and Britain and Italy promised to come to the aid of any party which was the victim of a violation of these promises. Germany's eastern frontiers were not covered by these treaties, but arbitration treaties were concluded between Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and France entered into separate treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Germany was to be welcomed into the League. The Locarno Pact was much more limited than the Geneva Protocol, of which it was an outgrowth. It seemed at the time to guarantee the peace of Europe by an arrangement concerning its most vulnerable area, the Rhineland. French security was bolstered by a treaty with Germany, unilaterally guaranteed by Britain and Italy; and Germany, by joining the League, would be welcomed back into the bosom of the European community. Russia and the security of eastern Europe were left out of the negotiations. None the less, the pact was hailed with enthusiasm in England, and it was generally believed that the 'Locarno Spirit' was bringing in a new era of peace. The spell of the war had at last been exorcised.

From: C. L. Mowat, *Britain between the Wars*, published in 1955.

**Interpretation B:** This historian refers to ongoing plans for peace being discussed before Hitler's rise to power.

In September 1929 Briand, the French foreign minister, issued a dramatic call for European union, urging not only economic association, but also a degree of political and social federation. As the old sanctions were dissolving, Briand attempted to enmesh Germany in a new web of European integration, creating an interdependence which might in time eliminate war as a practical possibility. While German and British press reaction was cool, Stresemann himself was gracious. In what proved to be his last diplomatic appearance, he ruled out the unspoken thought that a European bloc could serve to be an instrument of economic war against America, but gave his blessing to steps to improve economic prosperity in Europe. It was agreed that Briand would draft a proposal, that the twenty-seven members of the League would consider and amend it, and that a revised draft would be further discussed at Geneva in a year's time. Briand's plan was under active consideration in the summer of 1930. In May he had circulated a detailed proposal calling for a federation based on moral union and regional entente reinforced by permanent legislative, executive and secretarial institutions. Briand called for a general European system of arbitration. He briefly urged the creation of a European common market. This proposal, so clearly designed to substitute a new peace structure for the old, was under active debate by the European members of the League gathered at Geneva for its annual meeting when on 14 September 1930 Adolf Hitler's Nazi party achieved significant gains in the German Reichstag elections.

From: Sally Marks, *The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe 1918-33*, published in 1976.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers the limitations of the Locarno Treaties.

Locarno fostered an illusion of detente, an illusion nourished as much by the economic prosperity of the mid-1920s as by the treaty itself. Germany's admission to the League in 1926 encouraged hopes of amity. The conversation between the French and German foreign ministers at Thoiry in September 1926 seemed at the time to contain the seed of great things, but bore no fruit. By the end of the decade the Locarno spirit had evaporated. It had meant different things to different statesmen. For the German foreign minister, Stresemann, it was the first step towards treaty revision; for the French foreign minister, Briand, it was the first step on the road to compliance with the treaties; for the British foreign minister, Austen Chamberlain, it was an assertion of British detachment. By guaranteeing the Franco-German frontier, Britain implicitly repudiated responsibility for any other European frontier. Munich was the logical sequel of the policy. The Weimar Republic, in collusion with the Soviet Union, evaded the disarmament clauses of Versailles. *Reichswehr* leaders advocated a German-Soviet military alliance with the aim of partitioning Poland. The German archives made it clear that Stresemann knew all about the military connection with the Red Army and made no attempt to sever it, in spite of Locarno.

From: Anthony Adamthwaite, *The Making of the Second World War*, published in 1977.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers some effects of diplomatic policies of the 1920s.

By the end of the 1920s Germany was essentially free of the checks imposed on it by the Versailles treaty, was rearming with modern weapons and training officers and men in modern weapons and was already restored to leadership in industrial power. Almost all Germans were still resentful over the territorial settlement, especially in the east, and its legitimacy and permanence had been undermined by the silence of the Locarno agreements. The nations threatened by Germany's return to independence and power could not resist Germany effectively without the threat of a French attack in the west, yet the chances of such an attack were all but eliminated by the evacuation of the Rhineland. In these circumstances it is not certain that a European war could have been averted, even if Hitler had never come to power. A German attack on Poland launched by a conservative nationalist regime would have been less alarming than the one Hitler launched in 1939, but it would have been serious. The situation had been created by a more-or-less conscious policy by Britain and the USA. American support for the Germans in the form of pressure against France and the investment of capital in Germany had put an end to Versailles. British policy had created a major change in the balance of power and an increasingly unstable international situation. Had Britain retained a considerable military establishment; had they made a defensive treaty with France and backed it with concrete military plans; had they undertaken such revisions in the Versailles settlement as seemed appropriate, then such a policy would deserve to be called appeasement from strength. British policy, relying on insubstantial international agreements, was weak and misguided.

From: Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of Wars*, published in 1995.

## 17b. Appeasement

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the British abandoned the policy of appeasement after the German occupation of Prague.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian assesses Chamberlain's response to the events of March 1939.

Following the German destruction of Czechoslovakia, the Prime Minister swung diametrically away from the 'moderates' in the Cabinet and far outstripped the fullest expectations of the 'activists' who had advocated a stern declaration of general policy regarding future aggression. Mr. Chamberlain in his new zeal went much further and offered far more – and, moreover, he carried the French with him. The guarantee which Mr. Chamberlain proclaimed did not merely represent a gesture of support to Poland. It was far more important than that. It was a declaration to the world that Britain, after grave travail, was captain of her soul again and that she stood once more four-square against the tempests of aggression. But it was difficult for Mr. Chamberlain to convince his potential enemies (Germany), his possible ally (Russia), his critical neighbour (America) – or even the Poles themselves – that he had beaten his furred umbrella into a flaming sword, and that he himself had become a mighty warrior before the Lord. Yet Mr. Chamberlain had indeed performed this remarkable transformation. Now fully awakened to the imminence of danger, Britain and France were at this moment working in effective accord and, within a month of the annexation of Albania in April, the shield of the Anglo-French unilateral guarantee had been extended first to Greece and Rumania, then to Denmark, Holland, and Switzerland.

From: J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Munich, Prologue to Tragedy*, published in 1948.

**Interpretation B:** This historian evaluates the British response to the events of March 1939.

The first British reaction to the German occupation of Prague was one of passive acceptance. The Cabinet agreed that there was no possibility of effective opposition, and that the Munich guarantee would not be carried out. Chamberlain observed, accurately if cynically, that the state to which the guarantee had been given no longer existed. Yet another extension of German power was apparently to be accepted with only token protest. But on 30 March Britain offered Poland a guarantee of her independence which was at once accepted. The precise significance of the guarantee has been much debated. It referred to Polish independence, not integrity, and thus left open the possibility of frontier changes; and in consequence it has been regarded as little more than appeasement under another name, with every chance of another Munich. On the other hand, it has been seen as making war virtually inevitable, by throwing down a challenge which Germany was bound to take up. Its real significance lay between these two extremes. The guarantee was designed as a deterrent, and if the deterrent worked, the guarantee would not have to be carried out. The trouble with this concept was that, after a prolonged series of concessions to Germany, the guarantee in itself carried little conviction and was an inadequate deterrent. As it was, the guarantee was enough to bring Britain and France into a war over Poland, but not enough to deter Hitler from launching one. This weakness was demonstrated by the half-hearted way in which the guarantee was followed up. For Britain and France alike the measures taken were not the actions of states preparing urgently for certain war. The British and French both hoped that gestures of deterrence would suffice. They would not.

From: P. M. H. Bell, *The Origins of the Second World War in Europe*, published in 1986.

**Interpretation C:** This historian analyses the response of the Conservative Party to the events of March 1939.

When news reached London that advanced mobile German units had entered Prague, blatantly flouting Munich, it signalled the failure of Chamberlain's appeasement policy. This was certainly the prevalent view amongst members of the Conservative Party: Prague should mean the end of all dealings with Hitler. Although Chamberlain stoutly defended his position to a hostile House of Commons, its reaction meant that a few days later, during a speech to Birmingham Conservatives, he effectively signalled the end of appeasement. The House of Commons debate had revealed the concern amongst Conservative ranks. The government, after consideration, responded further on 31 March by guaranteeing Poland's territorial integrity, as well as that of a number of other European nations. Measures were announced that doubled the size of the Territorial Army, and finally conscription was introduced in April. Conservative Party activists were quick to assure Chamberlain of their support for the new foreign policy emphasis on 'guarantees'. Conservative MPs publicly received the new measures positively. Even Churchill, according to one of Chamberlain's supporters, did not criticise the government, but actually praised it. One MP assured his local association that since Prague, the government had been building up a peace front able to confront Germany and Italy, should they start on any further acts of aggression, with force equal to or superior to their own.

From: N. J. Crowson, *Facing Fascism, The Conservative Party and the European Dictators, 1935-1940*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers British policy after March 1939.

At the end of March 1939 Chamberlain was able to proclaim that Britain had delivered a guarantee of Polish independence. In the wake of this similar guarantees were issued to Greece and Rumania. These were improvised on-the-hoof measures. They implied the kind of open-ended commitment which, hitherto, British governments had been careful to avoid, left the Soviet leaders to draw the unavoidable conclusion that they had been snubbed and, most worryingly to Chamberlain, gave rise to much talk in the German press about a policy of encirclement. Nevertheless, with Halifax persuading the cabinet of the guarantees' necessity, even to the extent of arguing that war with Germany was preferable to dishonour, the Prime Minister was forced to swim with the prevailing tide. This did not mean the leopard had changed its spots. The guarantees, as Chamberlain envisaged them, were non-binding 'interim' devices which, in Poland's case, nipped in the bud any Polish-German *rapprochement*. Moreover, as *The Times* noted, an important distinction was maintained between 'territorial integrity' and 'independence'. That the government had moved so far from the language of negotiation, if only in appearance, was in itself significant. It also marked a difference of outlook between Chamberlain and his Foreign Secretary on paramount international issues.

From: Nick Smart, *The National Government, 1931-40*, published in 1999.

### 17c. Japanese involvement in the war

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Japan was driven into war with the western powers in 1941 by American policies.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian sees America justifiably responding to a naïve and unthinking Japanese aggression.

Nothing could have prevented a Japanese-American war after Japan's takeover of French Indochina in July 1941. And behind this incident lay the shadow of Japanese aggression in China itself. China had become America's Poland. Liberal opinion in the USA had come to regard the embattled land as another outpost of decency and innocence locked in frantic conflict with a predatory aggressor. Japan would not disengage from the China quagmire without the severest loss of face and influence in the Asian world whose destiny Tokyo so ardently wished to shape. Washington felt, rightly or wrongly that spreading Japanese aggression could only be strangled by stopping the flow of essential war materials. An aroused American press and public asserted that to continue supplying such materials to an aggressor power was to abet aggression. Who could or can contest such a point in a world at war? But it is Japanese lack of planning after Pearl Harbour that most strikes the historian's attention as he seeks to resolve the question of whether Japan posed a real threat to the USA in 1941. Tokyo developed no serious plans to meet the menace of a furious, revengeful United States after Pearl Harbour. A government, nation and military were blinded by easy victories over forlorn garrisons in the Pacific. It is difficult to escape the impression that Tokyo hoped the American problem would just go away after Pearl Harbour. There was so much to conquer and consolidate; it was too much to plan seriously for an early American menace.

From: Lisle A. Rose, *The Long Shadow: Reflections on the Second World War Era*, published in 1978.

**Interpretation B:** These historians see US pressure as a significant reason for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941.

The urging of American army and navy leaders to string out negotiations with Japan about the oil embargo until the Philippines could be reinforced went unheeded. An eleventh hour *modus vivendi* proposed a small trickle of oil to Japan and negotiations between China and Tokyo, while maintaining American aid to China; Japan would have to abrogate the Tripartite Pact and accept basic principles of international conduct. Not trusting the Japanese, Hull and Roosevelt decided to shelve the proposal. 'I have washed my hands of it', muttered Hull on 27 November, 'and it is now in the hands of the army and the navy.' The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour cannot be explained simply as an act of irrationality, an impulsive act by an unstable leader. After months of discussion among civilian and military leaders in Japan, a commitment was made at the Imperial Conference in September 1941 to fight the Americans if the life-strangling embargo on strategic materials was not lifted by 15 October. The date was later extended to 25 November and then to 30 November. With 12,000 tons of oil used each day by Japan, moderates and militants alike saw American pressure as provocative. The choices were fighting the United States or pulling out of China, and no Japanese leader counseled the latter. American power and potential were well-known, but as General Tojo put it 'sometimes a man has to jump with his eyes closed from the veranda of Kiyomizu Temple'.

From: Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford and Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Foreign Policy: A History Since 1900*, published in 1983.

**Interpretation C:** These historians point out the importance of Japan's justified concerns about the Soviet Union as being an element in the cause of war in 1941.

On 8 August 1936 there emerged from Tokyo a document entitled 'The Foreign Policy of Imperial Japan'. A new 'positive' foreign policy was revealed which aimed at the progressive development of Manchukuo; independent adjustment of relations with USSR and China and the peaceful advance of Japan to the South. The document stated that 'thwarting the USSR's aggressive intentions, therefore has become the most crucial element in our diplomacy'. There was apprehension in Japanese military circles as to the future intentions of the Soviet army. The Comintern had criticized Japan and Germany's 'ambitions of world division'. There was a mutual assistance pact signed by the Soviets with the Mongolian People's Republic in March 1936. Most significant in Japanese eyes were the military clashes between Red and Imperial forces along the Mongolian-Manchukuo and Soviet-Manchukuo borders. There was the Tauran incident in March 1936; the Kanch'atzu incident June-July 1937, the Amur incident June-July 1937, the Changkufeng incident July-August 1938; and the Nomonham incident May-September 1939. For Japan, wariness of the Soviet Union can be said to have played a crucial part in the growing rapprochement with Germany which led to the German-Japanese Pact, the keystone of the 1937 Anti-Comintern Pact. This antagonized Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States and convinced many nations that Germany, Italy and Japan had united in a single bloc aimed at radical amendment of the International status quo. The signing of the Tripartite Pact, 27 September 1940 was to lead to the onset of global warfare.

From: R. H. Haigh and D. S. Morris, *Japan, Italy and the Anti-Comintern Pact* (in *Rethinking Japan*, ed. A. Boscaro and others), published in 1990.

**Interpretation D:** This historian sees Japan believing that there was no realistic alternative but to launch the southward expansion that began war in 1941.

The collision was not inevitable. There had been no invisible hand of destiny guiding Japan on the course to war against the might of the United States. That disastrous course was the consequence of the fateful choices made by Japan's leaders in the summer and autumn of 1940. These choices were, however, in good measure shaped by mentalities forged over the previous twenty years or so, and by the way that those mentalities interpreted economic realities. The leading political philosophies of the time, as Japan was modernizing and beginning to flex her muscles, assumed that acquiring an empire provided the basis of prosperity and future national security. America, most of all, stood in the way of this through their control of resources in South East Asia. By the time the war in China began in 1937 politicians favouring expansionism were in high offices of state. By now politics were in any case being ever more determined by the demands of the army. By the time the fateful decision for the southern advance was taken in July 1940, it was impossible to put forward a convincing alternative strategy. Better relations with the United States meant effectively to capitulate over China. In the eyes of Japan's leaders that would have entailed a colossal loss of prestige with incalculable internal consequences. It would have left Japan, her international strength undermined, even more dependent on America for the long-term future than she had been before embarking on the war in China.

From: Ian Kershaw, *Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World, 1940-1941*, published in 2007

### The Causes of World War II 1918-41 Investigation Titles

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.
17.1 Assess the view that the Peace Treaties of 1919-20, which dealt with the former Austria-Hungary, were misguided. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	17a.
17.2 Assess the view that the main fault of the Treaty of Versailles was leniency rather than severity. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	17a.
17.3 Assess the view that appeasement was the only realistic option for British policy towards Germany between 1936 and 1938. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	17b.
17.4 Assess the view that the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939 marked the end of appeasement. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	17b.
17.5 Assess the view that the outbreak of war in the Pacific in 1941 was more the fault of the USA than Japan. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	17c.
17.6 To what extent did Roosevelt's policies towards Germany make it inevitable that the USA would enter the war in Europe? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	17c.
17.7 To what extent was Hitler pursuing a purely ideological foreign policy between 1935 and 1939? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	17b.
17.8 How far can Hitler be blamed for the outbreak of war in 1939? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	17b.
17.9 Assess the view that the League of Nations was doomed to fail. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	
17.10 Assess the view that the Locarno Agreements of 1925 did more harm than good to the hopes of lasting international peace. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	17a.

## 18. The Cold War 1941-56

### 18a. The emergence of Russian control in Eastern Europe after 1945

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Stalin's policy in Eastern Europe was motivated more by spreading Communist ideology than by extending Russian power.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian sees Russian leaders eager to control the societies of Eastern Europe by promoting ideas of progress.

Bribery, intimidation and terror alone were not sufficient to dominate society in Eastern Europe. Only if a solid layer of the population identified themselves with Communist leaders would their rule have a secure base. What was required was the formation of a new social stratum bound to the policies of the new rulers by common interest and aspirations. The Communist leaders set out to build up mass, bureaucratically organized parties on the lines of the Stalinist party in Russia. The Communist parties grew at a rapid rate, taking in large numbers of people who were bound to them by ties of relative privilege and identified their future with that of the party. The Polish party grew from 30,000 to 300,000 between January and April 1945. The Czechoslovak party grew from 27,000 to 1,569,164. Careerism and opportunism were not the only motives. Clearly some were motivated by idealism or working class solidarity. More significant, however, was the feeling among whole strata of the population that the moderate, stratified, economic and social system for which the Communists were agitating at the time was the only way forward for any sort of national development. People streamed into the Stalinist parties seeing new hope for both personal advancement and for national development. The Russian rulers were looking for local mass support with which to gain total control over social life. To this end the Communist parties were turned into giant machines for promoting social mobility.

From: Chris Harman, *Class Struggles in Eastern Europe 1945-83*, published in 1988.

**Interpretation B:** This historian sees Stalin eager for political dominance in Europe.

Given the evidence of his negotiating positions in the autumn of 1944 and his subsequent policies, too, Stalin seems to have regarded it as both premature and counterproductive for all the Communist parties to adopt a uniformly militant approach even in what would soon be called the "people's democracies" in Eastern and Central Europe. Although his ultimate objective was surely the establishment of the Soviet Union as the predominant European power, Stalin was prepared to pursue that objective gradually. Accordingly, he appears to have envisaged a Europe made up of three political zones or spheres:

1. A non-communist relatively stable zone in Western Europe, one that would also include Greece.
2. A Communist zone under Soviet control in Eastern Europe – along the vital routes to Germany and the Balkans and the eastern part of Germany to the Black Sea states of Romania and Bulgaria.
3. An intermediate zone in East-Central Europe of coalitional political systems under only gradually increasing Communist influence, extending from Yugoslavia in the south through Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to Finland in the north.

Seeking to divert attention from the socialisation of Eastern Europe, Stalin was eager to provide no reason for the United States to remain active in Europe after the war. For this reason he instructed the powerful French and Italian Communist parties to avoid all provocative actions.

From: Charles Gati, *Hegemony and Repression in the Eastern Alliance*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation C:** This historian puts the Soviet control of Eastern Europe into the context of wartime disruption and the growth of local Communism.

There was an emerging view among political leaders in the West that the Soviet Union followed a single blueprint to create a series of client regimes in their sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Now we know more about the degree of complicity of East European Communists. Rather than focusing simply on the actions of the Russians who naturally sought to create friendly and in fact subservient regimes, we can create a broader picture of the early post-war years. In the interwar years Communists had been ruthlessly persecuted in Eastern Europe and had no traditional base. They were aided by the transformations in social and political structures wrought by the war which opened the way to a rapid seizure of power by the Communists. Perhaps the most striking was the effect of population losses. In Poland, for example, six million people were killed. After the war seven million Germans were expelled. They had made up a large part of the urban merchant class and their loss opened up new avenues of social mobility that the Communists could use to promote their supporters. German exploitation of the Eastern European economies had sped up industrialization and enhanced the power and authority of the state to direct the economy. Finally the war helped to break down civil society – the network of community, civic and religious institutions that knit the largely rural communities of Eastern Europe together. In the midst of chaos and confusion the only plausible source of authority was the central state bureaucrat, a fact that the Communists were only too happy to exploit.

From: William I. Hitchcock, *The Struggle for Europe*, published in 2003.

**Interpretation D:** This historian suggests a variety of motives for Stalin's policies in Eastern and Central Europe.

It is not possible to understand the Communist regime in Russia unless we take seriously its ideological claims and ambitions. But there were moments - and the years 1946-7 are one of them - when even if one knew little of Bolshevik doctrine, it would be possible to make reasonably good sense of Soviet policy simply by looking at the policies of the Tsars. It was Peter the Great who introduced the strategy by which Russia would dominate through 'protection' of her neighbours. It was Catherine the Great who drove the Empire forward to the South and South West. And it was Alexander I who established the template for Russian imperial expansion in Europe. On the verge of the First World War, Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, was envisaging the future of Eastern Europe as a cluster of small, vulnerable states, nominally independent but effectively clients of Great Russia. Where Stalin differed from the Tsars was in his insistence on reproducing in the territories under his control forms of government and society identical to the Soviet Union. Defensiveness and a wary suspicion characterised all aspects of Stalin's foreign policy. What Stalin wanted above all in Europe was security. But he was also interested in economic benefits to be had from his victories. In the 1930s Nazi Germany had been the main trading partner of the little states of central Europe. What happened after 1945 was that the Soviet Union took over where the Germans had left off.

From: Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*, published in 2005.

**18b. Wartime disagreements**

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that during the Second World War the relationship between the USSR and the West was characterised more by co-operation than by disagreement.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian assesses the relations between the USSR and the Western allies.

Wartime co-operation between the USSR and her allies was marred by friction. In particular, Stalin in 1942 and 1943 railed against the absence of a Second Front. But Stalin did not see the enormous risks involved in a seaborne invasion and did not understand that the west could not wage war like he did, could not sacrifice masses of men simply to gain quick victories. But the Western Allies failed to understand the underlying causes of Russian resentment. There was an enormous difference between the war being fought in Russia and the war in Western Europe. Whereas the latter was national and political, fought with a certain restraint, the Russo-German war was a quasi-racial war, fought with extreme savagery. The sacrifices of the Soviet Union were enormously and horribly greater than those of her allies. A particularly contentious issue was the fate of Poland. About 15,000 Polish officers and men captured by the Russians had disappeared, and in 1943 German propaganda broadcasts reported the discovery of mass graves of Polish officers at Katyn. It was widely believed that they had been executed by the Russians. However, Soviet relations with her Western Allies improved after 1943. The Comintern was dissolved in 1943, a gesture which the West chose to regard as placatory. More important, foreign communist parties after June 1941 were instructed to back the war effort of the Allies. At Teheran and Yalta, Stalin was able sometimes to play off the Americans against the British. This, plus his frequent intransigence, meant that more concessions were made to the USSR than by the USSR.

From: J. N. Westwood, *Endurance and Endeavour, Russian History 1812-1980*, published in 1981.

**Interpretation B:** This historian evaluates Soviet-American wartime relations.

The co-operation between the USA and the Soviet Union was based on the shared concern to bring about the military defeat of the Axis powers as quickly as possible. Their mutual interest in the material aid of the USA to the Soviet Union aimed, not only to foreshorten the war itself, but also to render the effects of the war – the extensive devastation of the Soviet Union and the crisis of overproduction in the USA – more tolerable for both sides. Similarly, there was a common interest in definitively blocking the path to a renewed expansion of Germany. Even the guaranteeing of regimes in the East European region that were not hostile to the Soviet Union could be regarded as a common interest: Roosevelt at least had become convinced that such a guarantee was a legitimate Soviet security interest, and that for the sake of future peaceful co-operation in the safeguarding of world peace this interest must be taken into account. Lastly, co-operation was based on their mutual interest in avoiding military entanglements in the future. Both sides exerted efforts to bring about this co-operation: Stalin, in spite (or because) of his fear that American capitalism would eventually turn its attention to his own country, by constantly reiterating the theme of US-Anglo-Soviet friendship and by urging common agreements; and Roosevelt, by staking his entire personal prestige on the attempt to remove Stalin's fundamental mistrust.

From: Wilfried Loth, *The Division of the World, 1941-1955*, published in 1988.

**Interpretation C:** This historian analyses US wartime aid to the USSR.

Roosevelt sought to use the instrument of American economic aid to ameliorate US-Soviet differences in the war years and as a means of building on wartime co-operation for a new era of post-war co-operation. Roosevelt's primary goal in extending Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union was to stave off a Soviet collapse in the early war years and thereby to engage German forces on the Eastern front. But Roosevelt also sought to use aid as a means to mollify Stalin until the second front was opened. In the time of critical peril for the Soviet Union in 1942-3, Lend-Lease aid was of insufficient quantity to make a significant impact on the military outcome, but American sacrifices in naval losses suffered in the hazardous delivery of goods to north Russia constituted substantial evidence of American goodwill. By 1944-5, with the opening of new routes in the south through Iran, American aid was delivered in considerable quantity and significantly assisted the Soviet military machine as it drove the Germans back across Europe. Roosevelt hoped that American wartime aid, along with the promise of post-war reconstruction aid, would be a significant sweetener in US-Soviet relations. Yet, while American public opinion and many elements within the Roosevelt administration grew more optimistic with regard to closer US-Soviet relations in the war years, hard-headed diplomats such as George Kennan and Charles Bohlen were much more wary of the prospects of US-Soviet reconciliation continuing into peacetime. Kennan, who became counsellor in the US embassy in 1944, argued that gestures of goodwill were of no value in dealing with the Soviets. Indeed, he warned that they could be counter-productive and be interpreted as signs of weakness to be exploited to Soviet advantage.

From: Peter G. Boyle, *American-Soviet Relations*, published in 1993.

**Interpretation D:** These historians consider allied relations in the final year of the war.

As Soviet and western forces closed in on Germany from 1944, the sense of the USSR more and more closely interacting and co-operating with its allies increased. News of the long-awaited Second Front in June was greeted with delight. The following month, Soviet representatives attended the Bretton Woods conference, at which the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were established. With America proffering a large loan to assist post-war reconstruction, Moscow gave general endorsement to agreements on exchange rates and international trade. In October, Churchill visited Moscow and diplomatic exchanges became fast and frequent. In February 1945 both he and Roosevelt travelled all the way to the Crimea to meet Stalin at Yalta. In April 1945 the Soviet Union, the US and Britain took the leading role at the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco. A tussle over how many seats the USSR should take in the planned General Assembly conveyed to the Soviet public real engagement with the new organization, while the key role of the Security Council, the USSR's permanent membership and veto power within it, prevented the issue souring the atmosphere. Tensions between the Allies seemed altogether secondary alongside the profound satisfaction of Germany's surrender and occupation.

From: Edward Acton and Tom Stableford, *The Soviet Union, a Documentary History, Volume Two*, published in 2007.

**18c. The nuclear arms race**

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that nuclear weapons made peaceful coexistence between the USSR and the USA more, rather than less, likely.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers the reasons for the US attitude to nuclear weapons.

An external enemy who threatened the USA was convenient for American governments which had concluded, correctly, that the USA was now a world power – in fact, the greatest world power by far – and which still saw ‘isolationism’ or a defensive protectionism as its major domestic obstacle. Public hysteria made it easier for presidents to raise the vast sums required for American policy from a citizenry notorious for its disinclination to pay taxes. And anti-communism was genuinely and viscerally popular in a country built on individualism and private enterprise where the nation itself was defined in exclusively ideological terms (‘Americanism’) which could be virtually defined as the polar opposite of communism. (Nor should we forget the votes of immigrants from Sovietised Eastern Europe.) The squalid and irrational frenzy of the anti-Red witch-hunt both facilitated and constrained Washington policy by pushing it to extremes, especially in the years following the victory of the communists in China, for which Moscow was naturally blamed. At the same time the schizoid demand of the vote-sensitive politicians for a policy that should both roll back the tide of ‘communist aggression’, save money and interfere as little as possible with Americans’ comfort, committed Washington, and with it the rest of the alliance, not only to an essentially nuclear strategy of bombs rather than men, but to the ominous strategy of ‘massive retaliation’, announced in 1954. The potential aggressor was to be threatened with nuclear weapons even in the case of a limited conventional attack. In short, the USA found itself committed to an aggressive stance, with minimal tactical flexibility. Both sides thus found themselves committed to an insane arms race to mutual destruction, and to the sort of nuclear generals and nuclear intellectuals whose profession required them not to notice this insanity.

From: Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation B:** This historian suggests that the USA misjudged Soviet strength.

Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower, and their advisers, were especially shrewd in grasping that nuclear weapons were unusable in war as well as in diplomacy. Although the United States foolishly multiplied its arsenal, the strategy of massive retaliation was really designed to deter all conflict. Chairman Nikita Khrushchev, however, took the balance of military power more seriously, became ensnared in the arms race, and sought to enhance the influence, prestige, and power of the Soviet Union by excelling in the military realm. The Americans were duped into thinking that military might really mattered and foolishly exaggerated Soviet strength, thereby prolonging the Cold War far beyond its necessary time. In truth, the bipolar configuration of power was over long before anyone realized it. The Soviets had only military power, and this was of little use in competition with an ideological system and political economy as resilient and appealing as democratic capitalism.

From: Melvyn P. Leffler, *The Cold War: What Do ‘We Now Know’?*, published in 1999.

**Interpretation C:** This historian considers Soviet and Western views of nuclear weapons.

In March 1954, George Malenkov, one of the triumvirate that succeeded Stalin, surprised his own colleagues, as well as western observers of the Soviet Union, by publicly warning that a new world war fought with 'modern weapons' would mean 'the end of world civilisation'. Soviet scientists quickly confirmed, in a top-secret report to the Kremlin leadership, that the detonation of just a hundred hydrogen bombs could 'create on the whole globe conditions impossible for life'. Meanwhile, Winston Churchill, once again British prime minister, told the House of Commons, 'The new terror brings a certain element of equality in annihilation. Strange as it may seem, it is to the universality of potential destruction that I think we may look with hope and even confidence.' The implications of 'equality in annihilation' were clear: because a war fought with nuclear weapons could destroy what it was intended to defend, such a war must never be fought. A common sense of nuclear danger had transcended differences in culture, nationality, ideology and morality. The physical effects of thermonuclear explosions appalled Eisenhower at least as much as they did Malenkov and Churchill. 'Atomic war will destroy civilisation', he insisted. 'There will be millions of people dead. If the Kremlin and Washington ever lock up in a war, the results are too horrible to contemplate.'

From: John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War*, published in 2007.

**Interpretation D:** This historian examines US security anxieties in 1949 and 1950.

The tumultuous years 1949 and 1950 were crucial in the evolution of US Cold War policies in Asia and indeed globally. A series of stunning events sharply escalated Soviet-American tensions, aroused grave fears for US security, and set off nasty internal debates that poisoned the political atmosphere. Truman administration officials globalized the containment policy, assumed manifold commitments in the worldwide struggle against Communism, and through National Security Council document number 68 embarked on full-scale, peacetime rearmament. With Truman's full confidence, Acheson, appointed secretary of state in January 1949, took the lead in implementing these radically new policies. Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb in September 1949 spread dismay and anxiety across the country. Although not unexpected, it came sooner than most Americans had anticipated. It eliminated the US nuclear monopoly, raised fears that Stalin might be emboldened to take greater risks, drastically heightened Americans' sense of their vulnerability, and in time produced a sweeping reassessment of Cold War strategy and the place of nuclear weapons in it. In light of this shock, some Truman advisers, fearing a nuclear arms race, continued to press for international control of atomic energy. Others urged the production of a much more powerful hydrogen bomb to ensure that the United States maintained nuclear supremacy. Truman sided with the latter group, in February 1950 approving production of a superbomb and significantly escalating an arms race that would continue for the next forty years and at times threaten to spiral out of control.

From: George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations since 1776*, published in 2008.

### The Cold War 1941-56 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
18.1 Assess the view that the disagreements about the Second Front were the most significant cause of tension between Russia and the West between 1941 and 1945. <b>[40 marks]</b>	18b.
18.2 Assess the view that Stalin's suspicions of his western allies between 1941 and 1945 were justified. <b>[40 marks]</b>	18b.
18.3 To what extent was Marshall Aid merely a policy of American self-interest? <b>[40 marks]</b>	18b.
18.4 To what extent was Containment a policy based on the desire to defend freedom? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
18.5 To what extent was Stalin responsible for the Korean War? <b>[40 marks]</b>	18c.
18.6 How far was US policy in Asia between September 1945 and 1953 driven by economic considerations? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
18.7 How important was the arms race in the Cold War between 1949 and 1956? <b>[40 marks]</b>	18c.
18.8 Assess the view that the prospects for peaceful coexistence were less likely in 1956 than they had been in 1949. <b>[40 marks]</b>	18c.
18.9 Assess the view that Stalin's policies in Eastern Europe in 1945-7 were brutal and expansionist. <b>[40 marks]</b>	18a.
18.10 How far was Stalin to blame for the Berlin crisis 1948-9? <b>[40 marks]</b>	18a.

## 19. The War in Vietnam, 1955-75

### 19a. President Kennedy and Vietnam

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that concerns about the Cold War led President Kennedy to increase US involvement in Vietnam.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers Kennedy's aims in South-East Asia.

Kennedy's basic objective in Vietnam was essentially the same as in Laos and the rest of Southeast Asia. He sought neither a cold war client state nor a hot war battleground. He did not insist that South Vietnam maintain Western bases or membership in a Western alliance. As in Laos, his desire was to halt a Communist-sponsored guerrilla war and to permit the local population peacefully to choose its own future. We would not stay in Southeast Asia against the wishes of any local government, the president often said. The Kennedy Southeast Asia policy respected the neutrality of all who wished to be neutral. But it also insisted that other nations similarly respect that neutrality, withdraw their troops and abide by negotiated settlements and boundaries, thus leaving each neutral free to choose and fulfil its own future within the framework of its own culture and traditions. To the extent that this required a temporary US military presence, American and Communist objectives conflicted. The cockpit in which that conflict was principally tested was hapless South Vietnam, but neither Kennedy nor the Communists believed that the consequences of success or failure in that country would be confined to Vietnam alone. By early 1961 Vietcong guerrillas were gradually bleeding South Vietnam to death, destroying its will to resist, eroding its faith in the future, and paralyzing its progress through systematic terror against the already limited number of local officials, teachers, health workers, agricultural agents, rural police, priests, village elders and even ordinary villagers who refused to cooperate. Favourite targets for destruction included schools, hospitals, agricultural research stations and malaria control centres.

From: Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy*, published in 1965.

**Interpretation B:** This historian considers Kennedy's response to Diem's campaign against the Buddhists in South Vietnam.

If Kennedy had been looking for a face-saving and domestically defensible way out of Vietnam, Diem and Nhu presented it to him during the summer of 1963 with their attacks on the Buddhists. The American news media gave extensive coverage to the viciousness and stunning political gaucherie that marked this campaign, presenting to the American public a clear-cut issue of heavy religious persecution. Considerable sectors of American opinion were now outraged. Suddenly public criticism of America's Vietnamese ward crystallised, providing Kennedy with an avenue for disengagement that risked considerably less domestic political damage than ever before. But the president ignored the opportunity and chose instead to respond by dramatically escalating American political involvement. This major decision by Kennedy on Vietnam locked the United States even more firmly on its course and willed a deepened involvement to a successor served by the same advisers he had chosen – men unlikely to change that course because, to a considerable degree, their reputations had come to ride on the Vietnam policies they and Kennedy had jointly fashioned.

From: George McT. Kahin, *Intervention, How America Became Involved in Vietnam*, published in 1986.

**Interpretation C:** These historians assess Kennedy's attitude to Vietnam.

The politics of anti-Communism played a large role in shaping Kennedy's decisions. He had survived and prospered in the McCarthyite atmosphere of the fifties, and he feared the loss of swing anti-Communist votes to the Republicans and the Dixiecrats in the increasingly turbulent politics of the sixties. The lesson of the so-called loss of China remained with him, and the Republicans repeatedly peppered him with charges of appeasement on a host of issues. During the 1960 campaign he had promised to turn the tide of the Cold War, and he was preparing to claim considerable progress in 1964. Though some of his defenders have claimed he would have withdrawn the United States from Vietnam after his re-election in 1964, they underestimate the degree to which Kennedy had committed himself and the country to supporting a non-Communist Vietnam. Kennedy would have had to admit the failure of his major counter-insurgency effort, which was designed to discourage national liberation wars everywhere. By late 1963 Kennedy had radically expanded the American commitment to Vietnam. By arguing that Vietnam was a test of American credibility in the Cold War, he raised the costs of withdrawal for his successor. By publicly and privately committing the United States to the survival of an anti-Communist state in South Vietnam, he made it much more difficult to blame the South Vietnamese government for its own failures and to withdraw. And by insisting that military victory was the only acceptable outcome, he ignored the possibility that negotiations might lead to an acceptable process of retreat.

From: Lawrence J. Bassett and Stephen E. Pelz, *The Failed Search for Victory: Vietnam and the Politics of War*, published in 1989.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers Kennedy's options over Vietnam.

Kennedy had every wish to keep Vietnam out of the Soviet-Chinese communist orbit. But he was unwilling to pay any price or bear any burden for the freedom of Saigon from communist control. His scepticism about South Vietnam's commitment to preserving its freedom by rallying the country around popular policies and leaders fuelled his reluctance to involve the United States more deeply in the conflict. His fears of turning the war into a struggle on a scale with the Korean fighting and of getting trapped in a war that demanded ever more US resources became reasons in 1963 for him to plan reductions of US military personnel in South Vietnam. No one can prove, of course, what Kennedy would have done about Vietnam between 1964 and 1968. His actions and statements, however, are suggestive of a carefully managed stand-down from the sort of involvement that occurred under LBJ. With no presidential track record to speak of in foreign affairs during 1964-1965, Johnson had a more difficult time limiting US involvement in a tottering Vietnam than Kennedy would have had. By November 1963, Kennedy had established himself as a strong foreign policy leader. After facing down Khrushchev in the missile crisis and overcoming Soviet and US military and Senate resistance to a test ban treaty, Kennedy had much greater credibility as a defender of the national security than Johnson had. It gave Kennedy more freedom to convince people at home and abroad that staying clear of large-scale military intervention in Vietnam was in the best interests of the United States.

From: Robert Dallek, *John F. Kennedy, An Unfinished Life, 1917-1963*, published in 2003.

### 19b. Why the USA lost the war in Vietnam

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that political factors in the USA best explain the American withdrawal from Vietnam.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian sees the US commitment to total victory as limited.

Why did the United States lose the war? Some post-mortems singled out media criticism of the war and antiwar activism in America as undermining the will of the US government to continue fighting. Others cited the restrictions placed by civilian politicians on the military's operations or, conversely, blamed US military chiefs for not providing civilian leaders with a sound strategy for victory. These so-called win arguments assume that victory was possible, but they overlook the flawed reasons for US involvement in Vietnam. Washington had sought to contain international communism, but this global strategic concern masked the reality that the appeal of the communists in Vietnam derived from local economic, social, and historical conditions. The US response to Vietnamese communism was essentially to apply a military solution to an internal political problem. America's infliction of enormous destruction on Vietnam served only to discredit politically the Vietnamese that the United States sought to assist. Furthermore, US leaders underestimated the tenacity of the enemy. For the Vietnamese communists, the struggle was a total war for their own and their cause's survival. For the United States, it was a limited war. Despite US concern about global credibility, Vietnam was a peripheral theatre of the Cold War. For many Americans, the ultimate issue in Vietnam was not a question of winning or losing. Rather, they came to believe that the rising level of expenditure of lives and dollars was unacceptable in pursuit of a marginal national objective.

From: David L. Sanderson, *The Reader's Companion to American History*, published in 1991.

**Interpretation B:** This historian describes some US military weaknesses.

My Lai sickened the American people. In its wake came a wave of other atrocity reports. Discipline broke down completely. The collapse of military discipline brought into currency a new word – fragging. It meant the murder of an officer with a fragmentation grenade. Another symptom of the collapse of morale was the widespread abuse of drugs. In 1969 and 1970 alone around 16,000 GIs received a dishonourable discharge for possession. Despite continuing troop withdrawals US casualties continued to rise, topping 40,000 by the end of 1969. The morale of the US troops was at breaking point. At the beginning of the war they had faced a guerrilla army who hit then ran away; and they had longed for a conventional battle where they could use their superior firepower. But when they did meet the enemy in set-piece battles, they found that the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) could suffer enormous casualties without breaking. The Communists mounted a new offensive in January 1970 attacking over a hundred bases. Nixon responded by pounding the Ho Chi Minh trail with B62 bombers. The NVA began a major offensive in Laos. In 1971 there was a major incursion into Laos ostensibly by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). However the South Vietnamese forces were dangerously under strength and inexperienced troops were met by a full-scale counter attack by hardened North Vietnamese forces. The North Vietnamese used Laos as a springboard for their Easter Offensive in South Vietnam the following year.

From: Nigel Cawthorne, *Vietnam: A War Lost and Won*, published in 2003.

**Interpretation C:** This historian stresses non-military factors in explaining US defeat.

As the political divisions within Vietnam became more complicated, so did the conflict. The Western forces deemed themselves to be in the midst of a technologically-driven war and conducted themselves accordingly, when in reality they were caught up in a war among peoples. Once the French had been defeated, the US became embroiled on the cold war basis. Throughout all the military activity, however, the ideological and political confrontation with the people of Vietnam persisted – both with the South who simply sought freedom from occupation and with the communist regime in the north – and it was on this count that the US was defeated: they never offered the people any alternative. On almost every occasion they achieved the density of force to win a local trial of strength, drawing on their technological advantage to do so – but in so doing they lost the clash of wills. The North Vietnamese, though the weaker side, so as to win the clash of wills, used force to achieve their strategic goal of uniting their nation. Their force had the greater utility; they understood how to use it both in the context of their political goals, and at lower levels, to enable the politicization of the people in support of their struggle for liberation. Both the French and the US forces were considered superior to any fielded by North Vietnam. But both ended up defeated.

From: Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, published in 2003.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that internal concerns were important in bringing about US failure in Vietnam.

After the Tet offensive, there was a period when the war seemed to be going the Americans' way, and a British expert Robert Thompson gave sage advice: the war would have to be 'nativised' in the sense that the South Vietnamese should take over as far as possible. Whether this worked is still debated: there is evidence for and against, but the Northern Communists were certainly not popular in the South. There was also an American programme of counter-insurgency. There was a careful targeting of North Vietnamese cadres. In 1970-71 10,444 of these were killed. By spring 1970 there was a regular war, not a guerrilla one. The North Vietnamese were able to keep troops in great force in Cambodia. Nixon decided to strike there, together with the South Vietnamese army which, Thompson said, were now capable of action. There was much military justification for this. The Americans' attack did not go badly – but there was an explosion of rage inside the USA. The war had now, in a sense, to be won at home. American opinion was in places violently, hysterically hostile. The opposition to the Vietnam War does not now look very impressive. After they had won in 1975, the Communists massacred a quarter of the population of Cambodia. Nixon's response, however, was to withdraw American troops. In the first two weeks of March 1972 there was a South Vietnamese collapse and only vast US bombing stabilised the front. Maybe South Vietnam could have been saved, but by 1971 the chief foundation of American hegemony was collapsing; in mid-August 1971 Nixon refused to honour the gold bills of the dollar. This opened the way to a general crisis of the West, and in that context, Vietnam hardly counted, except for a symbol.

From: Norman Stone, *The Atlantic and Its Enemies*, published in 2010.

### 19c. The significance of the USA's defeat in South Vietnam

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the war in Vietnam had a more lasting impact on the USA than on the people of South-East Asia.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that defeat in Vietnam had profound consequences for the USA.

The Vietnam War taught Americans a few lessons, chief among them the dangers of large-scale military intervention in strategically marginal areas of the world. In future years American politicians and military leaders were more likely to set limits before sliding into quagmires like the one that had swallowed so much humanity in Southeast Asia. "No more Vietnams," they warned. Given the grand expectations that Americans had had until then about their ability to shape the world, this was a shift of historic importance. This useful lesson, however, was learned only after extraordinary costs that Nixon's policies helped to escalate. After 1969 the war further savaged and badly destabilised Vietnam and Cambodia. It diverted the attention of American foreign policy-makers from serious problems elsewhere, especially in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. Continuing fixation on Vietnam also left the United States relatively weaker vis-à-vis the Soviets, whose arsenal of missiles and delivery capability reached parity with that of the United States by the 1970s. At home, the war provoked serious economic difficulties, especially inflation, by 1973. It accelerated the rise of an imperial presidency and contributed powerfully – thanks to Nixon's quest for control – to the constitutional crisis of Watergate. More generally the war undercut the standing of political elites. Popular doubt and cynicism about "the system" and the Washington Establishment lingered long after the men came home. The war, above all, left an abiding sourness in the United States. Veterans, dumped into civilian life after surviving the terrors of the bush, experienced staggering problems including unemployment, guilt, depression, rage and a sense of rejection. Hundreds of thousands suffered from "post-traumatic neurosis", flashbacks, and nightmares. Suicide rates among the veterans were much higher than in the population at large. But some Americans, including political leaders like Ronald Reagan, never stopped insisting that the war need not have been lost. They regarded anti-war activists and draft avoiders with a fury and contempt that did not abate with time. Other people, including many who had once supported the war, raged at the military and political leaders who had dragged the country into the conflict. America's longest war inflicted wounds that time was very slow to heal.

From: James T. Patterson, *Grand Expectations: The United States 1945-74*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the American defeat in Vietnam had significant effects for South-East Asia.

On April 21 1975, the South Vietnamese government abdicated. It was indeed the most shameful defeat in the whole of American history. The democratic world looked on in dismay at this abrupt collapse of American power, which had looked so formidable only two years before. But it was the helpless people of the region who had to pay the real price. Nine days after the last US helicopter clattered out to sea, Communist tanks entered the city of Saigon, and the secret trial and shootings of America's abandoned allies began almost immediately. All over Indochina, the Communist elites which had seized power by force began their programs of 'social engineering.' The best-documented is the 'ruralization' conducted by the Communist Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Members of Congress were made well aware of what they were permitting to happen. But they averted their gaze. Between April 1975 and the beginning of 1977, the Marxist-Leninist ideologues ruling Cambodia ended the lives of 1,200,000 people, a fifth of the population. Comparable atrocities took place in Laos, and during Communist efforts to unify Vietnam by force, between 1975 and 1977. Following this, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and occupied Phnom Penh on January 7, 1979. Laos was likewise occupied by Vietnamese troops.

From: P. Johnson, *A History of the American People*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that the outcome of the Vietnam War was mixed and varied.

So, was the war in Vietnam worth it – for the Americans or the Vietnamese? The immediate response is: of course not. Vietnam was unified; the nationalists/revolutionaries won. But the cost included three million dead, as many as fifteen million made refugees at different times throughout the war, horrible physical devastation, over one million people, including some of the most industrious and educated, forced to flee, and the creation of one of the world's poorest economies. Despite the fears expressed by American officials, Vietnam did not endure a bloodbath after the communist triumph, but the victors did impose an authoritarian, repressive regime. Much of the death and damage was the responsibility of the United States. The victorious revolutionaries bore responsibility for the forced departure of the refugees, the terrible economic mismanagement, and the political repression of postwar Vietnam. Was the war worth it for the United States? Again, of course, the predominant answer is no. There were 58,000 dead and far more severely wounded than in earlier wars (primarily because of the improvements in medical evacuation). The US economy suffered years of inflation because of government policies pursued during the Vietnam years. In the aftermath of the Cold War, it is also hard to see that the investment in Vietnam had anything much to do with the demise of the Soviet Union. The most enduring legacy of all, perhaps, was a persistent distrust of public institutions and the officials who ran them. But the United States emerged stronger than many people expected from the crucible of Vietnam.

From: R. Schulzinger, *A Time for War*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that the Vietnam War had a limited impact on the USA.

Reminders of a war that Americans wished to forget, most veterans were ignored when they returned home. Beyond media attention to the psychological difficulties that they faced in re-adjusting to civilian life (which principally fostered an image of veterans as disturbed and dangerous) the nation paid little heed to those who had served and sacrificed. Most Americans wanted “to put Vietnam behind us” and just forget. The bitterness of many veterans, as of embattled hawks and doves, moderated with time. Few Americans gave much thought to the two million casualties and the devastation in Vietnam, or to the suffering in Laos, or the price paid by Cambodia. “We’ve adjusted too well,” complained Tim O’Brien, a veteran and novelist of the war, in 1980. “Too many of us have lost touch with the horror of war. It would seem that the memories of soldiers should serve, at least in a modest way, as a restraint on national bellicosity. But time and distance erode memory. We adjust, we lose the intensity. I fear that we are back where we started. I wish we were more troubled.”

From: Paul S. Boyer, *The Enduring Vision*, published in 2000.

### The War in Vietnam 1955-75 Investigation Titles

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.
19.1 Assess the view that the main reason the US became increasingly involved in Vietnam between 1955 and 1965 was the fear of successive presidents that they would be labelled as weak by their domestic opponents. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	19a.
19.2 Assess the view that Kennedy lacked a clear policy about US involvement in Vietnam. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	19a.
19.3 Assess the view that Lyndon Johnson had no choice but to send US troops to Vietnam in 1965. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	19a.
19.4 To what extent has the importance of the Tet Offensive of 1968 been over-rated? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	19b.
19.5 Assess the view that the Vietnam War was a pointless, costly failure. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	19c.
19.6 Assess the view that the American 'hearts and minds' strategy in South Vietnam never had any chance of success. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	19b.
19.7 To what extent can the programme of Vietnamisation be defended? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	19b.
19.8 To what extent was the Vietnam War lost because of the hostility of much of the American media? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	19b.
19.9 Assess the view that American military commanders, rather than American politicians, lost the war in Vietnam. <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	19b.
19.10 How far can it be argued that Nixon's peace negotiations sacrificed the chance of victory in South Vietnam? <p style="text-align: right;"><b>[40 marks]</b></p>	19b.

## 20. The Development of Rights for Women in Great Britain 1867-1918

### 20a. Educational, Social and Political Change in the later nineteenth century

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that there was little significant change in the political and social status of women in the later nineteenth century.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** These historians emphasize the difficulties in the path of educational reformers.

Throughout the nineteenth century, middle and upper class women were, in Ray Strachey's phrase 'shut up tight within the conventions which forbade independent action to a woman'. Any innovation in behaviour was likely to cause unfavourable comment. Girls were known to be unhealthy, but when schools introduced games, they aroused controversy. In 1881 the Edgbaston Girls' High School staged a cricket match and it was criticised in the local paper. Emily Davis stopped the students of Girton College, Cambridge playing soccer on the lawn 'because it would shock the world'. Painting outdoors was suspect because it meant wearing heavy shoes. Schools had also to be careful. In 1911 an annual gym display at a girls' school in Tunbridge Wells was restricted to mothers only and fathers who were doctors. The staff and students of educational establishments had to behave properly and be vigilant about leisure activities. Bicycles, acting and cricket were damaging for a lady's reputation, but far worse was association with other feminist campaigns. The educational pioneers were not all feminists but others supposed them to be. Josephine Butler's campaign about venereal disease and prostitution had to be separated from educational battles. The preservation of ladylike standards would have been simpler if the pioneers had not had another aim which ran counter to it – that of giving girls and women a worthwhile academic education. The pioneers of education who held out for equal standards were correct to do so. They recognized a truth that separate never means equal.

From: Sara Delamont and Lorna Duffin, *Nineteenth Century Woman: Her Cultural and Physical World*, published in 1978.

**Interpretation B:** This historian discusses some changes in the status of women in the late nineteenth century.

From the 1860s more direct pressure in the form of the women's movement had been gathering strength. A series of campaigns to extend women's rights and opportunities, led by a notable group of middle-class feminists, produced debates and legislation on prostitution and venereal disease, women's education, divorce, property rights, and the suffrage. For the women affected by them they were momentous. Participation in local government and higher education were important as assertions of women's rights. They provided opportunity to develop interests outside the home and the family and challenged the rigid doctrine of separate spheres. Economic, social and legal changes brought a measure of emancipation for middle-class women, but the degree of emancipation was fairly modest. The appearance of the New Woman in the later nineteenth century was disturbing to men because she upset deeply-held assumptions and threatened the conventional bases of society.

From: J. F. C. Harrison, *Late Victorian Britain, 1875-1901*, published in 1990.

**Interpretation C:** This historian questions the effectiveness of changes in the law concerning married women and property in the 1880s.

The vision of a transformation of the marriage relationship from one of 'tyrant and victim' to one where husband and wife could walk 'hand in hand, eye to eye, heart and heart' underlay the Victorian feminists' repeated campaigns to rid British common law of injustices. Even though they made brilliant and radical use of the liberal principle of equality to challenge inequitable marriage laws, their emphasis on equal rights kept them from seeing other prerequisites for the realization of justice in the family. They paid a lot of attention to married women's lack of economic and contractual rights, but devoted less time to analysing those disabilities which stemmed from the economic dependency of most wives on their husbands. Feminists hoped that their efforts for a married Women's Property Law would keep women from entering marriages out of economic necessity and enable them to support themselves so that they could leave bad marriages. But these changes by themselves could not substantially affect the cultural balance of economic power between husbands and wives. The number of women with substantial pre-marital property was small, and even feminists did not envisage middle class wives going out to work. The awareness that she might work and keep her earnings did not liberate a married woman from the subordinate role within marriage that stems from economic inequality. The economic consequences of leaving husbands were for most women bad enough to deter all but the most desperate from walking away from a marriage. The early feminists, too, paid little attention to the absence of men from the private world of domestic life. Effective equality between husband and wife depends on sharing responsibility for domestic and child-rearing chores.

From: Mary Lyndon Stanley, *Feminism, Marriage and the Law in Victorian England, 1850-1895*, published in 1993.

**Interpretation D:** This historian suggests there was progress in attitudes to women in higher education.

In addition to the clergy, some of the loudest voices arguing against women's higher education were those of the medical profession making a case from science for its detrimental effects on the 'less robust' sex. Particular concern was caused by the medical theory of 'menstrual disability', a belief that spawned a condition coined 'anorexia scolastica' which was believed to be a debilitating thinness and weakness resulting from too much mental stimulus. In response to these anxieties, women's colleges carried out joint research on the health, marriage and childbirth patterns of former students. Their findings contradicted medical opinion in concluding that college-educated women were healthier and less likely to have childless marriages than their less-educated sisters and cousins. Another way in which educational pioneers sought to counter health fears, and to reassure female students and their families, was to include medical facilities within women's colleges, as was done as part of Girton College, Cambridge's expansion in 1876. Equivalent facilities were not considered essential at men's colleges. A particular problem was anticipated when women attempted hard men's subjects, particularly mathematics. Even Sara Burstall (who was an early student of mathematics at Girton and who became Headmistress of Manchester High School for Girls) could at times be ambivalent to mathematics' place within female programmes of study. Echoing Herbert Spencer's principle of the 'conservation of energy', she argued in 1912 that teaching girls mathematics required too much teaching for too little return, consequently 'We ought to recognise that the average girl has a natural disability for Mathematics. One cause may be that she has less vital energy to spare ...' Any question mark over women's ability to do mathematics appeared to have been squashed when, in 1890, Philippa Fawcett of Newnham College, Cambridge beat the top male student in the University mathematics examinations.

From: Claire Jones, *Women's Access to Higher Education*, published in 2010.

## 20b. Suffragettes and the Campaign for the Vote

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the leadership of the WSPU was the main reason for the failure of women to gain the right to vote in parliamentary elections in the period 1906-1914.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers the effects of divisions within the suffragette movement.

In 1912 a difference of opinion arose among the suffrage supporters. Mrs Pankhurst was determined that the fight should be intensified along the lines already laid down by previous suffragette activity. Christabel was of the same opinion; to weaken now, they felt, would be to undo all they had gained. Mr and Mrs Pethick Lawrence, however, disagreed with this view. They did not give their reasons, but a statement issued to the press made it clear that Mr and Mrs Pethick Lawrence had separated from the Pankhursts and retained the paper *Votes for Women*. This split marked the end of prudence and the plunge into greater extravagances of militancy. Mrs Pankhurst intoxicated her followers with passionate words. Large sums of money poured into the WSPU: rich women gave hundreds of pounds. In sober fact, however, the militant movement was now at the end of its importance. The militants did not know it, living in an artificial world of their own importance where excitement always ran high. The press and the public had become tired of news of 'outrages' and they attracted relatively little attention. What people wanted to know was how the matter actually stood, what the government would do, and what the real prospects were; and the question of methods which had once been so interesting, faded into insignificance. However, the Liberal Party, exasperated by the militant campaigns, was obstinately blind to the feelings of the country. The only chance of progress appeared to be in a change of government.

Ray Strachey, *The Cause, a History of the Women's Movement in Great Britain*, published in 1928.

**Interpretation B:** This historian examines the opposition to Suffragette tactics.

The Pankhurst plan had the simplicity of genius. All depended on one single assumption that whatever happened, the Government would never dare to allow any suffragette to die on its hands in jail. They had calculated on being able to command a kind of passive heroism particularly feminine. But the authorities were not yet disposed to be checkmated by hunger strikes. Food would be administered to them through a tube. It was part of the Pankhurst plan that there should be no alternative for the government short of surrender. For surrender the ministers were not prepared. Apart from the fact that to yield would have meant splitting the party, the humiliation of being publicly henpecked into submission would have been too intolerable, and the Pankhursts were not the women to refrain from rubbing it in. And Mr Asquith was not only opposed to their claims, but combined a native obstinacy with all a lawyer's skill in the avoidance of being cornered. The politicians, like Pharaoh, hardened their hearts with each successive plague of protests. A Conciliation Bill passed its second reading in 1910 but the indomitable Asquith took care that it should not get the necessary facilities for passing into law. In 1911 another Parliament gave a second reading to the same Bill with the same result. A Reform Bill had been promised on the basis of an extended male franchise, with the proviso that a free vote might be taken on the question of its extension to women. But when in 1913, the amendment came to be moved, the Speaker ruled it out of order. Thus the Suffragettes found themselves, in spite of all their efforts, completely baffled and baffled by the same maddening parliamentary devices that had held up their cause for so many years.

Esmé Wingfield-Stratford, *The Victorian Aftermath 1901-1914*, published in 1933.

**Interpretation C:** This historian offers an explanation of male fears about female suffrage.

Most deeply felt of all, perhaps, was the fear of government by women. To some extent this seems to have been a fear of the irrationality and emotionality of women. However, the women voter aroused specific fears, most frequently from the alliance between temperance and feminism. There was opposition from the brewing industry and it is perhaps not without significance that Churchill, while a cadet at Sandhurst in the 1890s had been involved in tearing down screens put up to protect the public from prostitutes in the Empire Theatre, Leicester Square. These screens had been part of a social purity campaign launched by Mrs Chant, a member of the London County Council and an active purity campaigner. The virulent purity campaign launched by the Pankhursts with the slogan; 'votes for women, purity for men' did nothing to counteract this impression. Moreover by this time the militant movement, now largely in the hands of Christabel Pankhurst, had become violently anti-male, rejecting men even as political allies. Pethick Lawrence, writing in 1943, believed that fear of women's impossibly strict standards of morality was the principal cause of opposition to women's suffrage. Ironically, the suffrage cause also suffered from accusations of immorality on the grounds that some of its supporters were advocating motherhood outside marriage. There were advocates of a freer morality among the feminists. There is no doubt that women's suffrage was feared both because it could impose too great a morality on society and because it could herald the break-down of the sanctity of the home.

Olive Banks, *Faces of Feminism*, published in 1981.

**Interpretation D:** This historian writes about the influence of the Press.

The press often reported militancy in ways which were condemnatory rather than complimentary or neutral. Once the militant campaign escalated, the response to the suffragettes was even more hostile, with the press describing the suffragettes as mad, bad and dangerous to know. *The Times* in particular was most unsympathetic. In 1912 it viewed the suffragettes as 'regrettable by-products of our civilization, out with their hammers and their bags full of stones because of dreary, empty lives and high-strung, over-excitables natures'. Letters to *The Times* also suggest deep antagonism towards women's suffrage, especially when comparisons were drawn between suffragette militancy and 'the explosive fury of epileptics'. In a similar fashion, the *London Standard* condemned militancy as an act of deranged lunatics. Both the *Daily Mirror* and the *Illustrated London News* carried full pages of photographs of suffragettes being assaulted. By the outbreak of war in 1914 the suffragette movement had reached an impasse. Although there were considerable numbers of men across the class, political and religious spectrum who supported women's suffrage, there were considerable numbers who opposed it.

Paula Bartley, *Votes for Women, 1860-1928*, published in 1998.

### 20c. World War I and Women

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that women's war service was the main reason they were given the vote in 1918.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian believes that the War did not make much difference in attitudes to women's right to vote.

There is little evidence that war service caused a change in attitudes towards women's political rights. Opponents of the female franchise, like Asquith, appear to have been ready to concede defeat in 1914, but war had delayed progress. The 1916 Speaker's Conference on electoral issues, unanimous on most recommendations including one for proportional representation, only voted by a narrow majority for a limited female suffrage. The restriction on women's voting rights contrasted with attitudes to male members of the forces. The withholding of the vote from members of the auxiliary services under the age of thirty suggests little alteration in the treatment of women as second class citizens. War had provided the opportunity for such change as had occurred, but it was not the cause of it. Political representation remained largely a male prerogative. These attitudes were backed by a barrage of propaganda on the joys of motherhood and domesticity in 1918 and women tended to be used as a reserve of labour in low-paid jobs.

From: Rex Pope, *War and Society in Britain, 1899-1948*, published in 1991.

**Interpretation B:** This historian suggests that the War did lead to improvements for women.

It has been argued that the Act of February 1918 was a muted victory, and less than women would have got, had there been no war. But it seems to me that the United Suffragists got it right. As early as 26 November 1915 the front page of their paper, *Votes for Women*, carried a cartoon headed: 'Votes for Heroines as well as Heroes'. They saw the Act as a mighty victory which would lead quickly and inevitably towards complete women's suffrage; indeed they brought publication of *Votes for Women* to an end. It is perfectly true that a broad, liberal-democratic movement starting in the late nineteenth century, and supported by men as well as women, had come near to achieving votes for women before 1914. Yet the political advance of women was still blocked by two great forces of prejudice: the vigorous hostility of a majority of men, particularly powerful ones, and the often fearful reluctance and opposition of many women. The war experience brought a new confidence to women, dissipated apathy and silenced the female anti-suffragists. Asquith was only the most prominent of the converts among men. No doubt the actual swing among Members of the House of Commons was not enormous; but as politicians, whatever their private convictions, most came to feel that it was no longer politically wise to make strong statements against women's suffrage. No doubt many agreed with a member of the Conservative Party Central Office that; 'the granting of a vote to wives of the duly qualified male electors would as a rule increase the majority of the opinion of the male voters'. The replacement of militant Suffragette activity by frantic patriotic endeavour played its part as well.

From: Arthur Marwick, *A History of the Modern British Isles, 1914-1990*, published in 1991.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that the 1918 Act was passed because it had Conservative support.

Many of the Conservative MPs who voted for the 1918 Representation of the People Act were anti-suffragists who changed sides rather than opinion. Some shared the view that reform was inevitable and that conceding a limited measure of reform now would postpone more radical change for 20 or 30 years. Others refrained from voting against the bill because they feared retribution by female voters if the measure passed. Also, by the time the vote was taken, MPs had become aware that Conservative opinion in the constituencies favoured reform. The overwhelming vote for women's suffrage also reflected the fact that it was an extremely conservative measure. Despite wartime publicity about the nation's gratitude to female munition workers, the 1918 legislation left most of them disenfranchised because they were under 30. Women over 30 were believed to be less likely to support radical or feminist reforms than those who were younger. Also, women who had reached the age of 30 were more likely to be married and to be mothers, factors which were expected to make them less susceptible to radical movements. Finally, the educated women, who had been an important source of support for the suffrage movement often remained voteless. Because they typically rented furnished lodgings or lived with their parents, they did not qualify as local government electors and thus did not gain the parliamentary franchise. Many female teachers found themselves excluded for that reason.

From: Harold Smith, *The British Women's Suffrage Campaign, 1866-1928*, published in 1998.

**Interpretation D:** This historian considers that changing opinion among men was the reason for women to get the vote.

The intellectual case for enfranchising women had long been won. The war simply created circumstances in which Votes for Women could be granted with minimum political disturbance, since the existence of the National Government meant that the suffrage issue was no longer intertwined with party rivalries. Asquith, along with many former 'antis', including many Conservatives, was looking for an escape from the impossible position into which he had boxed himself in the pre-war years, and this the argument about women's service conveniently furnished. In any case, male MPs could gracefully concede the vote to women in 1917 without fear of being reproached for giving way to violence and agitation; for although some members of the NUWSS had cautiously started to revive their campaigns in 1917, they did not make many ripples, and neither government nor Parliament felt itself under serious external pressure. Raising the age-bar for women, in any case helped remove male fears by ensuring that men would not be 'swamped' by the new female voters, who comprised only 39.6 of the electorate in 1918. Mrs Fawcett weakly accepted this restriction, saying she did not wish to 'risk their prospects for partial success by standing out for more'. The fact that women gained the vote as a gift from men, rather than forcing it from recalcitrant opponents by their own heroic endeavours, had a dampening effect on the feminist cause for a generation. True, the 1918 Act went beyond the demands of the pre-war suffrage societies by allowing women to sit in the Commons. But in the event few tried to do so – only seventeen in the 1918 election. Even fewer were successful. Countess Markievicz of Sinn Fein, who refused to take her seat, was the only victor in 1918.

From: G. R. Searle, *A New England? Peace and War 1886-1918*, published in 2004.

**The Development of Rights for Women in Great Britain 1867-1918 Investigation Titles**

Investigation Titles	Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.
20.1 Assess the view that working opportunities and conditions for the working-class woman changed little before 1900. <b>[40 marks]</b>	20a.
20.2 Assess the view that the methods of Emmeline and Christabel Pankhurst were responsible for the delay in women obtaining the vote. <b>[40 marks]</b>	20b.
20.3 Assess the view that Asquith was the main barrier to the granting of the female franchise before 1914. <b>[40 marks]</b>	20b.
20.4 How valid is the view that the hard work of women during World War I was the reason for them achieving the vote in 1918? <b>[40 marks]</b>	20c.
20.5 How far were women able to influence the political process up to 1906? <b>[40 marks]</b>	20a.
20.6 How significant was the work of Millicent Fawcett in advancing the rights of women? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
20.7 Assess the significance of any female educational reformer in the period 1867–1902. <b>[40 marks]</b>	20a.
20.8 Assess the view that the argument over female suffrage was won by 1914 but the war held up its implementation. <b>[40 marks]</b>	20c, 20b.
20.9 Has the impact of World War I on women’s employment been exaggerated? <b>[40 marks]</b>	20c.
20.10 How far was education for women before 1900 aimed at improving their domestic accomplishments? <b>[40 marks]</b>	20a.

**21. Nazi Germany 1933-45****21a. The maintenance of power by the Nazis 1933-1945**

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the most important element in maintaining Hitler's regime in power between 1933 and 1945 was the consent of the German people.

**[40 marks]**

**Interpretation A:** This historian suggests that the Germans supported Hitler because of a mixture of tradition, a divided opposition, propaganda and repression.

Freedom of individual speech and action, of the press, of publication of books, disappeared as Germany under her new Nazi masters drew away from western development. It is not easy to explain why the German people not merely suffered but supported this regime, giving it vote after vote of overwhelming confidence. They were the most literate people in Europe, producing and reading more books than any other nation. But reading, as Francis Bacon long ago pointed out, produced a fool rather than a wise man. And some writers in the nineteenth century had remarked on the contrast between German boldness in philosophical speculation and their meekness before authority. The long tradition of obedience to authority and the retarded development of political and civil freedom undoubtedly played their part. So too did the divided state of the political parties under the Weimar Republic, not least that of organized labour, in which the Communists deluded themselves that the Nazi triumph was only a brief prelude to the proletarian revolution, whose advent it would hasten. The effects of the First World War in destroying the old leadership, leaving a vacuum of power which the democratic leaders were not ready to fill, likewise contributed. While neither workers nor the middle class entirely succumbed to the allurements of Nazi propaganda, the power available and ruthlessly employed by the new regime effectively disposed of opposition.

From: Ralph Flenly, *Modern German History*, published in 1953.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that economic conditions and force were important in explaining how Hitler maintained power.

Certainly no one even moderately familiar with totalitarian methods and practices will be tempted to consider the 100 per cent plebiscites in favour of Hitler as genuine expressions of support. Yet there can be no doubt about the widespread effectiveness of that diabolical mixture of terror and propaganda which was characteristic of the National Socialist regime. And it was not only fear of the overt and concealed weapons of the regime, of the rubber truncheon or the block supervisor which provoked a rush to join the Party or its affiliated organizations. To a great degree it was the necessity of economic existence which since the inflation had been reduced to bare subsistence. And reinforcing these motives there was undeniably an emotional urge, played on in masterly fashion by the instruments of propaganda, a sham-idealistic attraction which cast a spell, particularly on young people. The fact that Hitler's admirers abroad who sought peace at any price contributed considerably to the victory of a well-calculated mass psychology in no way alters the significance of this propaganda success. All the same, the men of the German opposition were entitled to look at this support for Hitler from outside as a stab in the back. Can Hitler be blamed on constitutional weakness in the German character or a kind of special problem in national development which prevented the growth of democratic support in Germany, the result of disastrous tendencies in German history? It is easy to pass judgements never having undergone experiences comparable to the Germans in 1933. Hundreds of thousands submitted because they were defenceless and without legal remedy. They faced brute force, whether this was confined to threats or took the form of actual maltreatment and torture. Bearing in mind the threat of the rubber truncheon, one looks sceptically at explanations of weaknesses supposed to be typically German.

From: Hans Rothfels, *The German Opposition to Hitler*, published in 1961.

**Interpretation C:** This historian summarizes the view that the propaganda of the Hitler Myth was a vital element in sustaining support for the regime.

Frustration and disappointment with life in National Socialist Germany led ordinary Germans to grumble and complain, but seldom to engage in behaviour that can be appropriately termed 'resistance'. The most important mechanism of social integration which held people together and kept their belief in the state was Hitler's charismatic leadership. The 'Hitler Myth' secured the loyalty of millions of even those who opposed the Nazi movement itself. Millions of ordinary Germans believed that the Fuhrer would certainly right all the wrongs in Nazi Germany, especially those done by his lieutenants, the so-called 'little Führers', if only these abuses could be brought to Hitler's personal attention. Hitler's successes convinced ordinary Germans (at least until the defeat at Stalingrad in 1943) that the Fuhrer was a brilliant, indeed infallible leader who was leading Germany to world power. The 'Hitler Myth' was not just a cunning triumph of Goebbels' propaganda machine; mass belief in the charismatic leader was the inevitable result of the disappointments of daily life in the Third Reich. In the 'Hitler Myth' ordinary Germans found compensation for the tensions, anxieties and frustrations of everyday life under National Socialism. By the time Allied bombing raids and German defeats in Russia in the war had begun to deflate this myth, Hitler was already a prisoner of his own propaganda image.

From: David Crew, *Nazism and German Society 1933-1945*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation D:** This historian, in a study of the Gestapo in the German town of Krefeld, suggests that terror was of limited significance in maintaining Nazi support.

Once the threat from the political left had been eliminated (from the mid 1930s) the Nazi terror began to concentrate on silencing potential sources of opposition in religious circles and on removing from society what the regime deemed social outsiders, such as homosexuals, career criminals and the physically and mentally disabled. During the war the terror reached its most drastic phase. Although many German citizens belonged to one or more of the targeted groups, most Germans suffered not at all from the terror. There was no need to target them because most Germans remained loyal to the Nazi leadership and supported it voluntarily from the beginning to the end, to various degrees. Some Germans voluntarily spied on and denounced their neighbours, but the overwhelming majority of German citizens did not. It remains true, however, that the German civilian population played a large part in its own control and its collusion and accommodation with the Nazi regime made the Nazi crimes against humanity possible.

From: Eric Johnson, *The Nazi Terror*, published in 1999.

## 21b. Women and the Volksgemeinschaft

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the Nazi regime was largely successful in its policies towards women before 1939.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** These historians consider Nazi policy towards women in the economy.

Widespread male unemployment, including many heads of households, appeared to offer powerful justification in terms of public conceptions of social justice for the idea that women in paid employment should, where possible, return home and be replaced by men. The level of women's employment did, in fact remain low. This was the result not so much of Nazi policies as of the fact that the initial phase of economic recovery was largely restricted to the production goods sector of the economy, whereas women were predominantly employed in the consumer goods sector. By 1936-7, however, a labour shortage began to develop, and it became clear that women provided the main untapped source of labour. In this situation, the regime was obliged to do an about turn: having previously discouraged women from going to work, it now had to encourage them to do so. From now onwards, its anti-feminist propaganda and the requirements of the labour market worked at cross-purposes. The regime's attempts to encourage women to take up employment had only a very limited success. In July 1939 the proportion of women working was below that of the late 1920s. Disincentives for women were: poor prospects, low wages and poor working conditions. Middle-class women were particularly likely to opt out of work when married.

J. Noakes and G. Pridham, *Nazism 1919–1945 Vol 2*, published in 1984.

**Interpretation B:** This historian considers the commitment of women to the Nazi regime.

Looking back at Nazi Germany, it seems that decency vanished, but when we listen to feminine voices of the period, we realize instead that it was cordoned off. Loyal Nazis fashioned an image for themselves, a fake domestic realm where they felt virtuous. Nazi women facilitated that mirage by doing what women have done in other societies – they made the world a more pleasant place in which to live for the members of their community. And they simultaneously made life unbearable and later impossible for the 'racially unworthy' citizens. As fanatical Nazis or lukewarm 'tag-alongs', they resolutely turned their heads away from assaults on socialists, Jews, religious dissenters, the handicapped, and 'degenerates'. They gazed instead at their own cradles, children and 'Aryan' families. Mothers and wives directed by Gertrud Scholtz-Klink made a vital contribution to Nazi power by preserving the illusion of love in an environment of hatred, just as men sustained the image of order in the utter disarray of conflicting bureaucratic and military priorities and commands. Over time, Nazi women destroyed ethical vision, debased humane traditions and rendered decent people helpless.

Claudia Koonz, *Mothers in the Fatherland*, published in 1987.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that the Nazi state made women both victims and collaborators.

Ordinary men and women became combinations of both victims and perpetrators. Their complicity in the regime consisted of passivity and tolerance in the face of the actions of the Nazi state. Women have often been portrayed as the victims of National Socialism. The Nazi system oppressed women and reduced them to mere objects. There were undeniably victims, above all Jewish women, and gypsy women, women of the resistance. There were victims of structural discrimination in politics, society and the economy, forced out of offices and professions. Many young women had to work in low-paid agricultural work and as housemaids. The list of discriminatory measures could be enlarged considerably and the term 'victim' is quite appropriate. However, there could be no completely innocent private sphere. The Nazi State which many women tolerated was a barbaric system made possible by the passive acquiescence of the overwhelming majority of the German people. The combined existence of a seemingly intact private sphere made it easier for the Nazi system to wield power. Women in the Third Reich were given their own public sphere, though with limited influence. Here a relatively autonomous field of activity within the general framework of National Socialist values and aims became possible for women, even if they were under the leadership of men at the very top. Eleven million of the thirty-five million women in Germany in 1936 were members of the *NS-Frauenschaft*. These women, especially those who were leaders, accepted the role allotted to them by the Nazi system. Many were more or less positively inclined to National Socialism.

Adelheim von Saldern, *Victims or Perpetrators*, published in 1994.

**Interpretation D:** This historian reflects on the nature and effectiveness of Nazi policies towards women and motherhood.

The decision to sterilize a person was taken by the new Hereditary Health Courts. Hearings were extremely brief. If Appeals were overruled, the operation had to take place within a fortnight, with the use of force if necessary. Some five thousand people died through surgical complications; the majority of them women because of the more complicated nature of the surgery. Instances of gross medical negligence were simply covered up. Apart from those who committed suicide in the wake of the operation, many of those sterilised suffered enduring traumatisations, and do so today, whenever they are reminded of the fact that they have no children or grandchildren. The Nazis' coldly instrumental view of women as bearers of the racially fit was enveloped in kitsch and sentiment. For a few days each year, the nation was transformed into the greeting card section of Woolworths. One objective of the mother cult was to boost the sagging birthrate. To which ends the Nazis introduced loans for newly-married 'Aryan' couples which were reduced with births of children. Single people and childless couples received enhanced tax bills to subsidise child allowances and one-off payments for other people's children. Although there was an appreciable short-lived increase in the birth of third or fourth children, the lack of a commensurate public housing policy did little to arrest the drift towards modest nuclear families, with SS members especially distinguished by their failure to go forth and multiply. Everything about the Nazis' manipulation of motherhood was false. In 1938 the Nazis instituted Mothers' Crosses for women 'rich in children'. Women who received these crosses could derive comfort from the claim that their bodies were the medium for the transmission of Nordic blood even as they were being demeaned to the level of cows.

Michael Burleigh, *The Third Reich, A New History*, published in 2000.

### 21c. Hitler and the Holocaust

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the Holocaust was mainly the result of a long-term plan by Hitler to eliminate the Jews.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian links the final decision to annihilate Jews to the circumstance brought about by war.

If the language of the rabid anti-Semites was to be taken literally, then by 1939 the Jews had good reason to fear for their property, or their citizens' rights but also for their lives. This is not to imply that the inventors of the Final Solution had a clear idea before 1939 of how to solve the 'Jewish Question'. The only organization to take a systematic approach was the SS and it came up with an emigration programme. A revised version of the programme re-emerged in 1940/1 in the shape of a plan to ship all Jews to Madagascar for resettlement. Heydrich called this idea the 'territorial final solution'. However, the outbreak of war and its subsequent escalation into total war seriously weakened the Jews' chances of survival. The military victories in the east and west suddenly added several millions of Jews to the number who had been unable to leave the Reich before September 1939. Any 'resettlement' plans had now become a major logistical and bureaucratic operation, the size of which helped to tip the scales in favour of physical annihilation. However, before this possibility could seriously be contemplated, there were also the psychological barriers to be removed. Resettlement plans were still being discussed as late as the spring of 1941.

From: V. R. Berghahn, *Modern Germany*, published in 1982.

**Interpretation B:** This historian sees Nazi treatment of Jews as part of a widespread belief about alien groups within the community.

Unlike traditional anti-Semitism of a religious or nationalist kind, the anti-Semitism of the NSDAP was directed against an abstract object – 'the Jew' an artificial racialist construct. The all-embracing image entailed an all-embracing 'final solution'. In fact the mythical target of 'the Jew' served to conceal that a racialist interpretation of the world bore little relation to reality. The ostracism and annihilation of the Jews stood at the head of a long list of measures for racial purification. Destructive measures had to be taken against other 'community aliens'. (These included gypsies, homosexuals, the work-shy and the physically and mentally handicapped). The formulators of National Socialist racial policy quite explicitly wanted to prevent the reproduction of families which they labeled 'alien' or 'asocial'. In this they were going back to the imperial period when there was concern that middle class German families were reproducing at a lesser rate than families from lower social groups. Even non-fascist theorists argued in favour of a population policy to encourage 'better' genetic stock. By 1945 a total of between 200,000 and 350,000 had been sterilized. We understate the racialism of the Third Reich if we limit our attention to the pornographic smears of *Der Stürmer*, the grotesque cranial measurements performed by the anthropologist and the sadism of the concentration camps. Surely more dangerous was the ostensibly mild racialism which moved to advocating the eradication of those of 'inferior value'.

From: Detlev Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany*, published in 1982.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that it was the long-term plan of Hitler, with the support of his party and people, to eliminate the Jews.

Although Hitler and the Nazis' eliminationist desire was, even before their accession to power, clear and constant, the evolution of their immediate intentions and actual policies towards the Jews was not linear and unambiguous. This is not surprising. A regime had come to power determined to undertake a task – the elimination of the Jews from all spheres of social life in Germany and also their capacity to harm Germany. That was enormously complex and difficult and it was without precedent in modern times. It was a task, no less, that had to be carried out under a variety of constraints and at the same time as other competing goals. To expect any regime to have pursued the goal of eliminating Jewry from Germany, from Europe, from the world, without any twists and turns of policy, without any tactical compromises, without deferring long-term goals in favour of short-term goals is to have unrealistic expectations of the nature of government. The anti-Jewish policy was indeed characterized by seeming inconsistencies and by conflicts between different elements of the Nazi regime. This has led to the view that the evolution of Nazi policy was incoherent, that no-one was in control, that the decision to annihilate the Jews had little to do with the long term intentions of the Nazi leadership or Hitler and was not organic to the Nazi world view. These views are erroneous. Nazi policy towards the Jews was eminently coherent and goal directed. The genocide was not the outgrowth of Hitler's moods, nor of local initiatives by men on the spot, nor of the impersonal hand of structural obstacle, but of Hitler's long held ideal to eliminate all Jewish power, an ideal broadly shared in Germany.

From: Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation D:** This historian stresses Hitler's role in the Holocaust.

Hitler had not been involved in the Wannsee conference. Probably he knew it was taking place; but even this is not certain. There was no need for his involvement. He had signaled yet again in unmistakable terms in December 1941 what the fate of the Jews should be now that Germany was embroiled in another world war. By then, local and regional killing initiatives had already developed their own momentum. Heydrich was more than happy to use Hitler's blanket authorization of deportations to the east now to expand the killing operations into an overall programme of Europe-wide genocide. On 30 January 1942, the ninth anniversary of the seizure of power Hitler addressed a packed meeting in Berlin at the Sportpalast. As he had been doing privately over the past weeks, he invoked once again his 'prophecy' of 30 January 1939. As always, he wrongly dated it to the outbreak of war with Poland on 1 September. He said that he had already stated on 1 September 1939 in the German Reichstag that this war would not come to an end as the Jews imagined with the extermination of the European-Aryan peoples, but with the annihilation of the Jews. For the first time the old Jewish law would be applied; an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. The hour would come when the most evil world-enemy of all time would have played out its role. The message was not lost on its audience. The SD reported that his words had been taken to mean that the Führer's battle with the Jews would now be followed through to the end with merciless consistency and that very soon the Jews would disappear from European soil.

From: Ian Kershaw, *Hitler*, published in 2000.

### Nazi Germany 1933-45 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
21.1 To what extent did Hitler rely on coercion in maintaining power in Germany after 1933? <b>[40 marks]</b>	21a.
21.2 Assess the view that the role of propaganda in maintaining the Nazi regime in power after 1933 has been exaggerated. <b>[40 marks]</b>	21a.
21.3 How successfully did Nazi policies succeed in winning the support of the industrial workers? <b>[40 marks]</b>	21a.
21.4 Assess the view that divided aims were the main reason why internal opposition to the Nazi regime was ineffective. <b>[40 marks]</b>	21a.
21.5 To what extent was Hitler 'a weak dictator'? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
21.6 Assess the view that the Holocaust was the result of a predetermined plan by the Nazi regime. <b>[40 marks]</b>	21c.
21.7 Assess the view that the German people were active and enthusiastic supporters of the Holocaust. <b>[40 marks]</b>	21c.
21.8 To what extent did women's status improve in Nazi Germany? <b>[40 marks]</b>	21b.
21.9 How effectively did Nazi policies towards young people achieve their goals? <b>[40 marks]</b>	
21.10 To what extent did the Nazis succeed in reducing class barriers in Germany? <b>[40 marks]</b>	

**22. Britain under Margaret Thatcher, 1979-90****22a. Thatcher and Thatcherism**

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that the policies carried out by Thatcher's governments owed more to pragmatism than ideology.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian considers the nature of Thatcher's achievements in her first two terms.

She was more a politician than an ideologue. Power was her game. She was fascinated by it in others (Reagan and Gorbachev), she accumulated it for herself, and determinedly denied it to her enemies (the unions, left-wing councils and the rest). But the scale of the resources required to regenerate the cities, reform the secondary school system and restore civilisation to the housing estates was at huge variance with the canons of her housekeeping finance. That is why it was an article of Thatcherite faith that 'money wasn't the answer'. The problem was political, cultural, anything but financial. One Nation she believed, she *had* to believe, could be built on sound money. Mrs Thatcher excited expectations of a certain kind. She taught more people to want to own their homes, to want to own a stake in things, to want a better chance for their children. To demean these as 'materialist', or even 'selfish', is to fail to understand the equality and freedom which material prosperity confers. But even with that important proviso 'Thatcherism' was about something more than material advancement. She, more powerfully than anyone else, articulated the moral doubts and yearnings of her age. For what people wanted, surely, was an end to decline, release from the corrosive sense of failure, a government which governed, and a country to begin to be proud of once again.

From: Peter Jenkins, *Mrs Thatcher's Revolution*, published in 1989.

**Interpretation B:** This historian assesses Thatcher's achievements.

Thatcher was a populist who never contrived to be popular. She was a supposed Conservative who despised the British Establishment. She believed in Victorian values, yet maintained an awesome welfare state and barely sought to shackle the 'permissive society'. Abortion was not banned or divorce made harder. Her 'Section 28' law preventing local councils from publicizing homosexual support was the nearest she came to legislating on sex. She claimed to be anti-planning, yet she demanded manpower targets in higher education and retained detailed town and country planning controls. She believed in free markets, yet controlled interest rates and joined the European Monetary System. An admirer of personal and community self-help, she persistently eroded local democracy. In day-to-day policy the author of Thatcherism found herself constantly restraining her more Thatcherite ministers. However, the past was central to her political education; she learned the lesson that Britain's ills would not be cured by further manipulating the post-war consensus. There was no question that 1979 was a revolutionary moment. It was the start of a new British settlement. In the early 1980s Britain was truly the 'sick man of Europe' but by the 1990s Britain's economic image, if not yet its performance, had been transformed. Of the 22 countries in the OECD, Britain's ranking for 'economic freedom' and 'entrepreneurial welcome' rose from 15th in 1980 to top in 1999. This was an extraordinary turnaround in economic confidence and received wide publicity abroad. The Reagan government in America drew inspiration from the bond between Thatcher and Reagan and from the apparent success Thatcher had in standing up to the trade unions after 1985.

From: Simon Jenkins, *Thatcher and Sons*, published in 2006.

**Interpretation C:** This historian evaluates some aspects of Thatcherism.

The central paradox of Thatcherism is that Mrs Thatcher presided over and celebrated a culture of rampant materialism fundamentally at odds with her own values which were essentially conservative, old-fashioned and puritanical. She believed in thrift, yet encouraged record indebtedness. She lauded the family as the essential basis of a stable society, yet created a cut-throat economy and a climate of social fragmentation, which tended to break up families, and tax and benefit provisions which positively discriminated against marriage. She disapproved of sexual licence and the public display of offensive material, yet promoted untrammelled commercialism which unleashed a tide of pornography, both in print and on film, unimaginable a few years earlier. Above all, she believed passionately in the uniqueness of Britain among the nations. Yet market forces respect no boundaries. While beating the drum for Britain, Mrs Thatcher presided over an unprecedented extension of internationalism – not only in the European Community, where she did try, in her last three years, to slow the momentum towards further integration, but rather in the explosion of American-led global capitalism, eliminating economic sovereignty and homogenising local identities, in Britain as across the world.

From: John Campbell, *The Iron Lady*, published in 2008.

**Interpretation D:** This historian analyses the changes in Thatcherism.

There were really several different Thatcherite projects and they overlapped only to a limited extent. Before the 1979 election, Thatcherism meant, in large measure, certain attitudes to crime, race and disorder. It was known that powerful Conservatives were monetarists, but it was not clear how far the party leader had embraced this doctrine or how far it would be applied in government. After the 1979 election, the focus on a particular kind of economic policy became so intense that many commentators talked as though monetarism was a synonym for Thatcherism. After the 1983 election, monetarism was discussed less. Privatization played an increasing role in the government's image, as did the booming stock market. After 1988, and even more after 1990, Thatcherism was increasingly interpreted as meaning opposition to Britain's further integration into Europe. Underneath the tactical adjustments it is possible to discern certain general themes in the Thatcher government. It sought to promote the free market, to reduce public spending (or at least to reduce its rate of increase) and to place the control of inflation above that of unemployment. Economics was at the core of Thatcherism but it would be wrong to assume that Thatcherism was just about economics or that economics could be entirely separated from other elements of the project. A concern for 'order' or 'discipline' was discernible in almost everything the Thatcher governments did and to some extent this concern transcended the division between economic and non-economic policies. Dealing with strikes and trade unions, to take an obvious example, can be seen as both an attempt to re-establish order (something that should be placed alongside Thatcherite concern with crime), and as an attempt to make the economy more productive.

From: Richard Vinen, *Thatcher's Britain*, published in 2009.

## 22b. Thatcher's Electoral victories

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Thatcher's electoral success was a result of the weakness of the Labour party.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian argues that divisions within the Labour movement were crucial in explaining Conservative electoral dominance.

The schism on the Left gave the Conservatives their parliamentary victory in 1983. It can be argued that with more than three million unemployed Labour should have won, but it lost because of its defence policy and its spectacular disunity. Alternatively, it can be said that the continuance of the social and political trends which had contributed to Labour's loss in 1979 virtually doomed it to lose again in 1983. That is not to suggest that Labour's defeat was inevitable, although there is no doubt that most of the changes taking place in society were making it more difficult for it to win. Between 1979 and 1983 the working class, which had diminished in size, swung 3% to the Conservatives - in spite of 'Thatcherism', unemployment, the welfare spending cuts and the union laws - or, perhaps, not in spite of, but because of some of these things. Only 38% of manual workers and 39% of trade unionists voted Labour while 32% of trade unionists voted Conservative. The Tories led Labour by 12% among the skilled working class. In 1983 Labour became not 'the party of the working class' but rather the party of the underclass. In part this was due to continuing demographic change. However, there were new or special factors at work. In 1983 it did a good deal worse than socio-economic or demographic changes can explain. In 1983 Labour presented an unelectable face to the electorate, in terms of its leaders, many of its policies and in its general demeanour as a party aspiring to government, and this must explain a good deal of its unnaturally poor showing. Labour and the electorate made a poor 'fit'. Labour had moved Left and the electorate to the Right; or rather the Labour party's concerns and the electorate's had grown increasingly apart.

From: Peter Jenkins, *Mrs Thatcher's Revolution*, published in 1989.

**Interpretation B:** This historian argues that the Conservatives gained from the economic successes of the period.

Two factors made progress towards a third term irresistible. One was the state of the economy, particularly as felt and perceived by Conservative voters. Slow but steady growth had been registered each year since 1981. In the four years after the 1983 election average weekly earnings rose by 14% in real terms. No government had ever been defeated after presiding over real increases in personal disposable income for two years before an election, and this one had done so for longer. One promise the Government delivered as its highest priority was the steady cutting of personal taxation; by 1987 it was three-quarters of the way towards its stated target of a 25% standard rate. All employed people, therefore, felt better off. To this beneficence were added other material successes. The second Thatcher term coincided with a stock-market boom of unprecedented length. If successful politics consists of furthering the interests of your own supporters, the privatisation programme was another consummate exercise in vote-winning. There have been few more obviously potent seductions in the annals of electoral politics. The material advance of the individual, in fact, had begun to supplant the more traditional factors in determining the political verdict. One of the successes of the Thatcherite enterprise consisted in re-educating the electorate not seriously to care about unemployment. Slowly, and not incorrectly, burgeoning economic success became the headline story. By the time of the election, optimism had replaced pessimism in sample surveys of popular opinion.

From: Hugo Young, *One of Us*, published in 1993.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that there were a number of factors that contributed to the Conservatives' electoral success.

Why were the Tories so successful? The so-called 'Falklands factor' played a huge part in the government's recovery of popularity in 1982-3. Many voters supported the Conservatives in 1983 because they saw in Thatcher a powerful leader who had stood up for Britain against a foreign power. The Conservatives had no compunction about unfurling the patriotic flag. It is worth remembering, however, that the tide of popular opinion was beginning to turn with the economic recovery under way at the beginning of 1982, before the war began. In 1987, the economy - enthusiastically stoked by Nigel Lawson - was roaring away, living standards were increasing rapidly and the great Stock Exchange crash of October was still four months off. The electorate voted for the promise of continued prosperity. Other factors also played a part. The election was fought on redrawn boundaries, which gave a small, but not insignificant, advantage to the Tories. As commentators have also pointed out, the Conservatives had the enormous fortune to be faced by a divided opposition. Labour's appalling disarray in 1980-1 led to both splits and deep unpopularity. The Alliance had enough popular support to come a good second in well over 100 constituencies, but in a first past the post system this is of no value. The Tory share of the popular vote under Thatcher never exceeded 43%. Yet this produced two landslides, largely because the anti-Tory vote was so evenly split. There is no doubt that the quirks of the British electoral system favoured the Tories and it is no surprise that Thatcher should be so vehement in her defence of its simple virtue of providing secure majority governments.

From: Eric Evans, *Thatcher and Thatcherism*, published in 1997.

**Interpretation D:** This historian argues that Thatcher's electoral victories were achieved because of Conservative strength in the south and east of England.

The victory for the Thatcherite ethic in 1983 seemed overwhelming. The evidence is less convincing. In 1983 the Conservative party won 42.9% of the popular vote, less than they had achieved in any election between 1945 and 1979. It won because of its residual strength in southern and eastern England, and also greater London, where most of the constituencies were located. Thatcherism triumphed because of its political and social roots. It had coincided with rising prosperity in the expanding towns of southern England and East Anglia. High-tech industries, based on computer software and the like, had meant near-boom conditions for places such as Cambridge, Basingstoke, Winchester and especially Swindon, the outstanding growth town of the decade. Along the so-called M4 corridor, as far west as Newport in Gwent, new technically sophisticated smaller industries were mushrooming. The legacy of four years of Thatcherism, therefore, was an intensification of social division and varied economic expectations in different parts of Britain. It went further than the much-discussed 'north-south divide'. Prosperity, too, had been the product of small enterprises and a lengthy consumer boom financed by credit. The decline in Britain's manufacturing base was indisputable. For the clients of the Thatcher order in the south and east of the nation it was more than enough. The dispiriting memories of the seventies were fading. Mass unemployment had lost its old political potency. It was the suburban conquerors of southern Britain, not the decaying and dispirited north and west, who would pay the piper and call the tune.

From: Kenneth Morgan, *Britain since 1945*, published in 2001.

## 22c. Thatcher's Fall from Power in 1990

Using these four passages and your own knowledge, assess the view that Thatcher's fall had more to do with her style of government than real disagreements about policy.

[40 marks]

**Interpretation A:** This historian stresses the importance of divisions within the Thatcher government over European policy.

On 21 September 1988, Thatcher made a speech at Bruges in Belgium in which she came out clearly against political and economic union within the EC. This pleased the 'Eurosceptics' in the Conservative party but informed opinion was increasingly worried that Britain would be isolated in Europe. This was undoubtedly a factor in Labour's victory in the elections to the European Parliament on 15 June 1989. At the Madrid EC summit on 27 June, Thatcher was forced to admit that one day the UK would join the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Sir Geoffrey Howe, Foreign Secretary, and Nigel Lawson, Chancellor, had threatened to resign if she did not make this statement of intent. Howe paid for his insistence by being moved from the Foreign Office to Leadership of the Commons. Nigel Lawson resigned over the ERM in October 1989. By March 1990, another Thatcher nightmare was rapidly becoming reality – German reunification. Thatcher and others in her circle dreaded the prospect. Senior ministers pressed Thatcher to say 'Yes' to the ERM and Britain finally joined on 4 October 1990. This was the day after German unity was restored. On 28 October Thatcher was again isolated as the EC summit in Rome set a 1994 deadline for the second stage of European Monetary Union. Thatcher denounced this in the Commons as 'the back door to a federal Europe', which she opposed. She appeared to be undermining her own Chancellor who was trying to work out an acceptable alternative to a common currency. Thatcher's manoeuvre was the last straw for Howe, who resigned on 1 November 1990. The forceful attack by Howe on Thatcher in his resignation speech set in motion the leadership contest in the Conservative Party.

From: David Childs, *Britain since 1939: Progress and Decline*, published in 1995.

**Interpretation B:** This historian regards Thatcher's fall as the result of growing dissatisfaction among Conservative MPs with a number of her policies.

In the autumn of 1989 Mrs Thatcher faced the first formal challenge to her leadership. It came from a backbencher of almost startling obscurity, Sir Anthony Meyer, who appeared as a sort of water-logged survival from the era of the 'wets'. As predicted, Mrs Thatcher won by a massive margin, but it rather looked as though there was a sizeable minority who did not mind signalling their disaffection. In the circumstances, this was a worrying development. With the electorate disgruntled by the recession and the 'poll tax', and with the party itself split over attitudes to the forthcoming European summit at Maastricht, the nerve of Conservative MPs, never naturally robust, began to give way. Back in 1981, Mrs Thatcher and her band of zealots, fired with the conviction that they were on the right road, had ridden out the storm, but this time she was more isolated by her record and her longevity as Prime Minister. Rumours grew that there would be another challenge to her, and this time from someone rather more serious than Meyer – Michael Heseltine. A challenge from that quarter would come only after another year of damaging speculation, as a General Election approached and the unpopularity of the 'poll-tax' kept the party's opinion poll ratings low.

From: John Charmley, *A History of Conservative Politics, 1900-1996*, published in 1996.

**Interpretation C:** This historian argues that Thatcher's style of leadership rather than her policies undermined her support within the Conservative Party.

The trial of strength in the winter of 1985-6 between Thatcher and Michael Heseltine involved no great principle but escalated out of control into a battle of wills. Heseltine was a dangerous man to antagonize, for his Conference oratory had made him over the previous decade a darling of the party faithful, and he now devoted himself to touring constituency events and cultivating backbenchers in an undeclared campaign to become Thatcher's successor. Equally damaging, the fact that Heseltine himself attributed his resignation to her dictatorial methods provided the first line in a story that would get steadily longer. The unnecessary departure of Nigel Lawson as Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1989 was symptomatic of pure hubris on her part. There were certainly policy disagreements over European issues and over the details of financial policy, though these were hardly of deeper significance than those that Chancellors and Prime Ministers had surmounted in the past, and the issue once again developed from policy content to one of conflicting wills. The final departure was the least necessary of all. Geoffrey Howe had patiently endured for years her dismissive treatment of him personally, both in conversation and in covert briefings of the press. This he had loyally endured, until an off-the-cuff remark by Thatcher herself in November 1990 went back on a policy towards Europe hammered out with great difficulty in Cabinet, and he immediately resigned in protest. His resignation speech in the Commons in the following week recapitulated the essence of what first Heseltine and then Lawson had already said in similar circumstances about Thatcher's style of government, but went further than they had done by implying that the party should now change its Leader.

From: John Ramsden, *An Appetite for Power: A History of the Conservative Party since 1830*, published in 1998.

**Interpretation D:** This historian attributes Thatcher's fall to intrigue at Westminster.

Mrs Thatcher's downfall was a drama which unfolded with shocking suddenness. For political journalists those three weeks in November 1990 were a once-in-a-lifetime story of rumour and intrigue, calculation and backstabbing, all conducted in the bars and tearooms, clubs and private houses of the Westminster village. Though all the elements of a climactic bust-up had been coming together over a long period, with persistent talk of another leadership challenge, speculation about Michael Heseltine's intentions and questions about how long she could go on, few at Westminster or in the media really believed that she could be toppled as swiftly or abruptly as she was. The conventional wisdom of political scientists held that a Prime Minister in good health and in possession of a secure majority was invulnerable between elections. She might be given a warning shot but she could not be defeated. When suddenly she was gone, Tory MPs were amazed at what they had done; to some it was a ruthless act of political ingratitude. Others spoke of treachery, betrayal, or assassination.

From: John Campbell, *Margaret Thatcher, Volume Two: The Iron Lady*, published in 2003.

## Britain under Margaret Thatcher 1979-90 Investigation Titles

<b>Investigation Titles</b>	<b>Cannot be answered in combination with the following Interpretation questions.</b>
22.1 How far did Thatcher reduce the power of the Trade Unions? [40 marks]	
22.2 Assess the view that Thatcher achieved a 'social revolution'. [40 marks]	22a.
22.3 Assess the view that the Thatcher government deliberately provoked the Miners' Strike. [40 marks]	22a.
22.4 Assess the view that Thatcher's electoral success in the period from 1979 to 1989 was the result of Labour weakness, rather than Conservative strengths. [40 marks]	22b.
22.5 How successful was Thatcher's handling of the Falklands crisis? [40 marks]	
22.6 To what extent was Thatcher's policy towards the USSR militaristic and hostile? [40 marks]	
22.7 Assess the view that Thatcher's policy towards Europe did more to damage than improve Britain's interests. [40 marks]	
22.8 Assess the view that Thatcher reformulated Conservative ideology. [40 marks]	22a.
22.9 Assess the view that the events of 1990 were the main reason for the fall of Thatcher. [40 marks]	22c.
22.10 How far was New Labour influenced by Thatcher? [40 marks]	



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