

- 1 On lines 90 and 91, the article says “The average score for each player works out to be 0.25 points per round”. Derive this figure. [2]

1	

- 2 Line 47 gives the inequality $b > c > d > w$.

Interpret each of the following inequalities in the context of the examples from the 1st World War.

- (i) $b > w$ [1]

- (ii) $c > d$ [1]

2 (i)	
2 (ii)	

- 3 Table 3 illustrates a possible game where you always co-operate. In lines 98 and 99 the article says “Clearly the longer the game goes on the closer your average score approaches -2 points per round and that of your opponent approaches 3.”

How many rounds have you played when your average score is -1.999? [3]

3	

4 A Prisoner's Dilemma game is proposed in which

$$b = 6, c = 1, d = -1 \text{ and } w = -3.$$

Using the information in the article, state whether these values would allow long-term co-operation to evolve. Justify your answer. [2]

4	

5 In a Prisoner's Dilemma game both players keep strictly to a Tit-for-tat strategy. You start with C and your opponent starts with D. The scoring system of $b = 3, c = 1, d = -1$ and $w = -2$ is used.

(i) The table shows the first 8 out of many rounds. Complete the table. [3]

(ii) Find your average score per round in the long run. [2]

5 (i)	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Round</th> <th>You</th> <th>Opponent</th> <th>Your score</th> <th>Opponent's score</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">1</td> <td style="text-align: center;">C</td> <td style="text-align: center;">D</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">2</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">3</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">4</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">5</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">6</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">7</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">8</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">...</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Round	You	Opponent	Your score	Opponent's score	1	C	D			2					3					4					5					6					7					8				
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6 In the article, the scoring system is $b = 3$, $c = 1$, $d = -1$ and $w = -2$.

In Axelrod's experiment, negative numbers were avoided by taking $b = 5$, $c = 3$, $d = 1$ and $w = 0$.

State the effect this change would have on

- (i) the players' scores, [1]
- (ii) who wins. [1]

6 (i)	
6 (ii)	

7 Two companies, X and Y, are the only sellers of ice cream on an island. They both have a market share of about 50%. Although their ice cream is much the same, both companies spend a lot of money on advertising.

- (i) What agreement might the companies reach if they decide to co-operate? [1]
- (ii) What advantage would a company hope to gain by 'defecting' from this agreement? [1]

7 (i)	
7 (ii)	



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